Commit Graph

9559 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Kees Cook
b907693883 x86/vmlinux: Actually use _etext for the end of the text segment
Various calculations are using the end of the exception table (which
does not need to be executable) as the end of the text segment. Instead,
in preparation for moving the exception table into RO_DATA, move _etext
after the exception table and update the calculations.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-c6x-dev@linux-c6x.org
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <zwisler@chromium.org>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029211351.13243-16-keescook@chromium.org
2019-11-04 17:54:16 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini
b8e8c8303f kvm: mmu: ITLB_MULTIHIT mitigation
With some Intel processors, putting the same virtual address in the TLB
as both a 4 KiB and 2 MiB page can confuse the instruction fetch unit
and cause the processor to issue a machine check resulting in a CPU lockup.

Unfortunately when EPT page tables use huge pages, it is possible for a
malicious guest to cause this situation.

Add a knob to mark huge pages as non-executable. When the nx_huge_pages
parameter is enabled (and we are using EPT), all huge pages are marked as
NX. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.

This is not an issue for shadow paging (except nested EPT), because then
the host is in control of TLB flushes and the problematic situation cannot
happen.  With nested EPT, again the nested guest can cause problems shadow
and direct EPT is treated in the same way.

[ tglx: Fixup default to auto and massage wording a bit ]

Originally-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-04 12:22:02 +01:00
Vineela Tummalapalli
db4d30fbb7 x86/bugs: Add ITLB_MULTIHIT bug infrastructure
Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:

   https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195

There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.

This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.

It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.

Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.

Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli <vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-04 12:22:01 +01:00
Pawan Gupta
1b42f01741 x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort
TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel vulnerability to the internal
buffers in some Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data
Sampling (MDS). In this case, certain loads may speculatively pass
invalid data to dependent operations when an asynchronous abort
condition is pending in a TSX transaction.

This includes loads with no fault or assist condition. Such loads may
speculatively expose stale data from the uarch data structures as in
MDS. Scope of exposure is within the same-thread and cross-thread. This
issue affects all current processors that support TSX, but do not have
ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (bit 8) set in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.

On CPUs which have their IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0,
CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1 and the MDS mitigation is clearing the CPU buffers
using VERW or L1D_FLUSH, there is no additional mitigation needed for
TAA. On affected CPUs with MDS_NO=1 this issue can be mitigated by
disabling the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature.

A new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL in future and current processors after a
microcode update can be used to control the TSX feature. There are two
bits in that MSR:

* TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE disables the TSX sub-feature Restricted
Transactional Memory (RTM).

* TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR clears the RTM enumeration in CPUID. The other
TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally
disabled with updated microcode but still enumerated as present by
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}.

The second mitigation approach is similar to MDS which is clearing the
affected CPU buffers on return to user space and when entering a guest.
Relevant microcode update is required for the mitigation to work.  More
details on this approach can be found here:

  https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html

The TSX feature can be controlled by the "tsx" command line parameter.
If it is force-enabled then "Clear CPU buffers" (MDS mitigation) is
deployed. The effective mitigation state can be read from sysfs.

 [ bp:
   - massage + comments cleanup
   - s/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED/g - Josh.
   - remove partial TAA mitigation in update_mds_branch_idle() - Josh.
   - s/tsx_async_abort_cmdline/tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline/g
 ]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2019-10-28 08:36:58 +01:00
Pawan Gupta
c2955f270a x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR
Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain
processors as part of a speculative side channel attack.  A microcode
update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will
add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the
option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations.

The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones
which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those
CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all
CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well.

  [ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also
    support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ]

Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits.

TSX has two sub-features:

1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature
   where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions.
2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of
   "old" style locks are used by software.

Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the
IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR.

There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:

  Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
         sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
	 XBEGIN instruction).

  Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
         (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
	  CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).

The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is
unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated
as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by
IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2019-10-28 08:36:58 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
153a971ff5 Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Two fixes for the VMWare guest support:

   - Unbreak VMWare platform detection which got wreckaged by converting
     an integer constant to a string constant.

   - Fix the clang build of the VMWAre hypercall by explicitely
     specifying the ouput register for INL instead of using the short
     form"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/cpu/vmware: Fix platform detection VMWARE_PORT macro
  x86/cpu/vmware: Use the full form of INL in VMWARE_HYPERCALL, for clang/llvm
2019-10-27 07:14:40 -04:00
Jim Mattson
671ddc700f KVM: nVMX: Don't leak L1 MMIO regions to L2
If the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control is set in the
VMCS, the APIC virtualization hardware is triggered when a page walk
in VMX non-root mode terminates at a PTE wherein the address of the 4k
page frame matches the APIC-access address specified in the VMCS. On
hardware, the APIC-access address may be any valid 4k-aligned physical
address.

KVM's nVMX implementation enforces the additional constraint that the
APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 must be backed by
a "struct page" in L1. If not, L0 will simply clear the "virtualize
APIC accesses" VM-execution control in the vmcs02.

The problem with this approach is that the L1 guest has arranged the
vmcs12 EPT tables--or shadow page tables, if the "enable EPT"
VM-execution control is clear in the vmcs12--so that the L2 guest
physical address(es)--or L2 guest linear address(es)--that reference
the L2 APIC map to the APIC-access address specified in the
vmcs12. Without the "virtualize APIC accesses" VM-execution control in
the vmcs02, the APIC accesses in the L2 guest will directly access the
APIC-access page in L1.

When there is no mapping whatsoever for the APIC-access address in L1,
the L2 VM just loses the intended APIC virtualization. However, when
the APIC-access address is mapped to an MMIO region in L1, the L2
guest gets direct access to the L1 MMIO device. For example, if the
APIC-access address specified in the vmcs12 is 0xfee00000, then L2
gets direct access to L1's APIC.

Since this vmcs12 configuration is something that KVM cannot
faithfully emulate, the appropriate response is to exit to userspace
with KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION.

Fixes: fe3ef05c75 ("KVM: nVMX: Prepare vmcs02 from vmcs01 and vmcs12")
Reported-by: Dan Cross <dcross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-10-22 19:04:40 +02:00
Aaron Lewis
7204160eb7 KVM: x86: Introduce vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled
Cache whether XSAVES is enabled in the guest by adding xsaves_enabled to
vcpu->arch.

Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Change-Id: If4638e0901c28a4494dad2e103e2c075e8ab5d68
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-10-22 15:42:48 +02:00
Lianbo Jiang
e095cb7a0f x86/kdump: Remove the unused crash_copy_backup_region()
The crash_copy_backup_region() function is unused so remove it.

Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jürgen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191017094347.20327-3-lijiang@redhat.com
2019-10-22 13:59:49 +02:00
Like Xu
4be946728f KVM: x86/vPMU: Declare kvm_pmu->reprogram_pmi field using DECLARE_BITMAP
Replace the explicit declaration of "u64 reprogram_pmi" with the generic
macro DECLARE_BITMAP for all possible appropriate number of bits.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-10-22 13:39:32 +02:00
Suthikulpanit, Suravee
2cf9af0b56 kvm: x86: Modify kvm_x86_ops.get_enable_apicv() to use struct kvm parameter
Generally, APICv for all vcpus in the VM are enable/disable in the same
manner. So, get_enable_apicv() should represent APICv status of the VM
instead of each VCPU.

Modify kvm_x86_ops.get_enable_apicv() to take struct kvm as parameter
instead of struct kvm_vcpu.

Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-10-22 13:34:17 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
34059c2570 KVM: x86: Fold decache_cr3() into cache_reg()
Handle caching CR3 (from VMX's VMCS) into struct kvm_vcpu via the common
cache_reg() callback and drop the dedicated decache_cr3().  The name
decache_cr3() is somewhat confusing as the caching behavior of CR3
follows that of GPRs, RFLAGS and PDPTRs, (handled via cache_reg()), and
has nothing in common with the caching behavior of CR0/CR4 (whose
decache_cr{0,4}_guest_bits() likely provided the 'decache' verbiage).

This would effectivel adds a BUG() if KVM attempts to cache CR3 on SVM.
Change it to a WARN_ON_ONCE() -- if the cache never requires filling,
the value is already in the right place -- and opportunistically add one
in VMX to provide an equivalent check.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-10-22 13:34:16 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
f8845541e9 KVM: x86: Fold 'enum kvm_ex_reg' definitions into 'enum kvm_reg'
Now that indexing into arch.regs is either protected by WARN_ON_ONCE or
done with hardcoded enums, combine all definitions for registers that
are tracked by regs_avail and regs_dirty into 'enum kvm_reg'.  Having a
single enum type will simplify additional cleanup related to regs_avail
and regs_dirty.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-10-22 13:34:14 +02:00
Thomas Hellstrom
6fee2a0be0 x86/cpu/vmware: Fix platform detection VMWARE_PORT macro
The platform detection VMWARE_PORT macro uses the VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_PORT
definition, but expects it to be an integer. However, when it was moved
to the new vmware.h include file, it was changed to be a string to better
fit into the VMWARE_HYPERCALL set of macros. This obviously breaks the
platform detection VMWARE_PORT functionality.

Change the VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_PORT and VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_PORT_HB
definitions to be integers, and use __stringify() for their stringified
form when needed.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: b4dd4f6e36 ("Add a header file for hypercall definitions")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191021172403.3085-3-thomas_os@shipmail.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-22 00:51:44 +02:00
Thomas Hellstrom
db633a4e0e x86/cpu/vmware: Use the full form of INL in VMWARE_HYPERCALL, for clang/llvm
LLVM's assembler doesn't accept the short form INL instruction:

  inl (%%dx)

but instead insists on the output register to be explicitly specified.

This was previously fixed for the VMWARE_PORT macro. Fix it also for
the VMWARE_HYPERCALL macro.

Suggested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com
Fixes: b4dd4f6e36 ("Add a header file for hypercall definitions")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191021172403.3085-2-thomas_os@shipmail.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-22 00:51:44 +02:00
Jia He
f2c4e5970c x86/mm: implement arch_faults_on_old_pte() stub on x86
arch_faults_on_old_pte is a helper to indicate that it might cause page
fault when accessing old pte. But on x86, there is feature to setting
pte access flag by hardware. Hence implement an overriding stub which
always returns false.

Signed-off-by: Jia He <justin.he@arm.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2019-10-18 11:11:25 +01:00
Jiri Slaby
b4edca1501 x86/asm: Remove the last GLOBAL user and remove the macro
Convert the remaining 32bit users and remove the GLOBAL macro finally.
In particular, this means to use SYM_ENTRY for the singlestepping hack
region.

Exclude the global definition of GLOBAL from x86 too.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011115108.12392-20-jslaby@suse.cz
2019-10-18 11:29:50 +02:00
Jiri Slaby
ffedeeb780 linkage: Introduce new macros for assembler symbols
Introduce new C macros for annotations of functions and data in
assembly. There is a long-standing mess in macros like ENTRY, END,
ENDPROC and similar. They are used in different manners and sometimes
incorrectly.

So introduce macros with clear use to annotate assembly as follows:

a) Support macros for the ones below
   SYM_T_FUNC -- type used by assembler to mark functions
   SYM_T_OBJECT -- type used by assembler to mark data
   SYM_T_NONE -- type used by assembler to mark entries of unknown type

   They are defined as STT_FUNC, STT_OBJECT, and STT_NOTYPE
   respectively. According to the gas manual, this is the most portable
   way. I am not sure about other assemblers, so this can be switched
   back to %function and %object if this turns into a problem.
   Architectures can also override them by something like ", @function"
   if they need.

   SYM_A_ALIGN, SYM_A_NONE -- align the symbol?
   SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_L_WEAK, SYM_L_LOCAL -- linkage of symbols

b) Mostly internal annotations, used by the ones below
   SYM_ENTRY -- use only if you have to (for non-paired symbols)
   SYM_START -- use only if you have to (for paired symbols)
   SYM_END -- use only if you have to (for paired symbols)

c) Annotations for code
   SYM_INNER_LABEL_ALIGN -- only for labels in the middle of code
   SYM_INNER_LABEL -- only for labels in the middle of code

   SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_ALIAS -- use where there are two local names for
	one function
   SYM_FUNC_START_ALIAS -- use where there are two global names for one
	function
   SYM_FUNC_END_ALIAS -- the end of LOCAL_ALIASed or ALIASed function

   SYM_FUNC_START -- use for global functions
   SYM_FUNC_START_NOALIGN -- use for global functions, w/o alignment
   SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL -- use for local functions
   SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN -- use for local functions, w/o
	alignment
   SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK -- use for weak functions
   SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK_NOALIGN -- use for weak functions, w/o alignment
   SYM_FUNC_END -- the end of SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL, SYM_FUNC_START,
	SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK, ...

   For functions with special (non-C) calling conventions:
   SYM_CODE_START -- use for non-C (special) functions
   SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN -- use for non-C (special) functions, w/o
	alignment
   SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL -- use for local non-C (special) functions
   SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN -- use for local non-C (special)
	functions, w/o alignment
   SYM_CODE_END -- the end of SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL or SYM_CODE_START

d) For data
   SYM_DATA_START -- global data symbol
   SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL -- local data symbol
   SYM_DATA_END -- the end of the SYM_DATA_START symbol
   SYM_DATA_END_LABEL -- the labeled end of SYM_DATA_START symbol
   SYM_DATA -- start+end wrapper around simple global data
   SYM_DATA_LOCAL -- start+end wrapper around simple local data

==========

The macros allow to pair starts and ends of functions and mark functions
correctly in the output ELF objects.

All users of the old macros in x86 are converted to use these in further
patches.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191011115108.12392-2-jslaby@suse.cz
2019-10-18 09:48:11 +02:00
Masami Hiramatsu
4d65adfcd1 x86: xen: insn: Decode Xen and KVM emulate-prefix signature
Decode Xen and KVM's emulate-prefix signature by x86 insn decoder.
It is called "prefix" but actually not x86 instruction prefix, so
this adds insn.emulate_prefix_size field instead of reusing
insn.prefixes.

If x86 decoder finds a special sequence of instructions of
XEN_EMULATE_PREFIX and 'ud2a; .ascii "kvm"', it just counts the
length, set insn.emulate_prefix_size and fold it with the next
instruction. In other words, the signature and the next instruction
is treated as a single instruction.

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/156777564986.25081.4964537658500952557.stgit@devnote2
2019-10-17 21:31:57 +02:00
Masami Hiramatsu
b3dc0695fa x86: xen: kvm: Gather the definition of emulate prefixes
Gather the emulate prefixes, which forcibly make the following
instruction emulated on virtualization, in one place.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/156777563917.25081.7286628561790289995.stgit@devnote2
2019-10-17 21:31:57 +02:00
Masami Hiramatsu
f7919fd943 x86/asm: Allow to pass macros to __ASM_FORM()
Use __stringify() at __ASM_FORM() so that user can pass
code including macros to __ASM_FORM().

Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/156777562873.25081.2288083344657460959.stgit@devnote2
2019-10-17 21:31:57 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
fcb45a2848 Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "A handful of fixes: a kexec linking fix, an AMD MWAITX fix, a vmware
  guest support fix when built under Clang, and new CPU model number
  definitions"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/cpu: Add Comet Lake to the Intel CPU models header
  lib/string: Make memzero_explicit() inline instead of external
  x86/cpu/vmware: Use the full form of INL in VMWARE_PORT
  x86/asm: Fix MWAITX C-state hint value
2019-10-12 14:46:14 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
e9ec3588a9 Merge branch 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 license tag fixlets from Ingo Molnar:
 "Fix a couple of SPDX tags in x86 headers to follow the canonical
  pattern"

* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86: Use the correct SPDX License Identifier in headers
2019-10-12 14:37:55 -07:00
Sami Tolvanen
f53e2cd0b8 x86/mm: Use the correct function type for native_set_fixmap()
We call native_set_fixmap indirectly through the function pointer
struct pv_mmu_ops::set_fixmap, which expects the first parameter to be
'unsigned' instead of 'enum fixed_addresses'. This patch changes the
function type for native_set_fixmap to match the pointer, which fixes
indirect call mismatches with Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) checking.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190913211402.193018-1-samitolvanen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-11 12:52:32 +02:00
Sami Tolvanen
6e4847640c syscalls/x86: Fix function types in COND_SYSCALL
Define a weak function in COND_SYSCALL instead of a weak alias to
sys_ni_syscall(), which has an incompatible type. This fixes indirect
call mismatches with Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) checking.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191008224049.115427-6-samitolvanen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-11 12:49:19 +02:00
Andy Lutomirski
cf3b83e19d syscalls/x86: Wire up COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE0
x86 has special handling for COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx, but there was
no override for COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE0.  Wire it up so that we can
use it for rt_sigreturn.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191008224049.115427-3-samitolvanen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-11 12:49:18 +02:00
Sami Tolvanen
8661d769ab syscalls/x86: Use the correct function type in SYSCALL_DEFINE0
Although a syscall defined using SYSCALL_DEFINE0 doesn't accept
parameters, use the correct function type to avoid type mismatches
with Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) checking.

Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191008224049.115427-2-samitolvanen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-11 12:49:18 +02:00
Ralf Ramsauer
7a56b81c47 x86/jailhouse: Only enable platform UARTs if available
ACPI tables aren't available if Linux runs as guest of the hypervisor
Jailhouse. This makes the 8250 driver probe for all platform UARTs as it
assumes that all UARTs are present in case of !ACPI. Jailhouse will stop
execution of Linux guest due to port access violation.

So far, these access violations were solved by tuning the 8250.nr_uarts
cmdline parameter, but this has limitations: Only consecutive platform
UARTs can be mapped to Linux, and only in the sequence 0x3f8, 0x2f8,
0x3e8, 0x2e8.

Beginning from setup_data version 2, Jailhouse will place information of
available platform UARTs in setup_data. This allows for selective
activation of platform UARTs.

Query setup_data version and only activate available UARTS. This
patch comes with backward compatibility, and will still support older
setup_data versions. In case of older setup_data versions, Linux falls
back to the old behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Ralf Ramsauer <ralf.ramsauer@oth-regensburg.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: jailhouse-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191010102102.421035-3-ralf.ramsauer@oth-regensburg.de
2019-10-10 15:43:59 +02:00
Ralf Ramsauer
0935e5f752 x86/jailhouse: Improve setup data version comparison
Soon, setup_data will contain information on passed-through platform
UARTs. This requires some preparational work for the sanity check of the
header and the check of the version.

Use the following strategy:

  1. Ensure that the header declares at least enough space for the
     version and the compatible_version as it must hold that fields for
     any version. The location and semantics of header+version fields
     will never change.

  2. Copy over data -- as much as as possible. The length is either
     limited by the header length or the length of setup_data.

  3. Things are now in place -- sanity check if the header length
     complies the actual version.

For future versions of the setup_data, only step 3 requires alignment.

Signed-off-by: Ralf Ramsauer <ralf.ramsauer@oth-regensburg.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: jailhouse-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191010102102.421035-2-ralf.ramsauer@oth-regensburg.de
2019-10-10 15:38:30 +02:00
Kan Liang
8d7c6ac3b2 x86/cpu: Add Comet Lake to the Intel CPU models header
Comet Lake is the new 10th Gen Intel processor. Add two new CPU model
numbers to the Intel family list.

The CPU model numbers are not published in the SDM yet but they come
from an authoritative internal source.

 [ bp: Touch up commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1570549810-25049-2-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
2019-10-08 19:01:31 +02:00
Janakarajan Natarajan
454de1e7d9 x86/asm: Fix MWAITX C-state hint value
As per "AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 3: General-Purpose
and System Instructions", MWAITX EAX[7:4]+1 specifies the optional hint
of the optimized C-state. For C0 state, EAX[7:4] should be set to 0xf.

Currently, a value of 0xf is set for EAX[3:0] instead of EAX[7:4]. Fix
this by changing MWAITX_DISABLE_CSTATES from 0xf to 0xf0.

This hasn't had any implications so far because setting reserved bits in
EAX is simply ignored by the CPU.

 [ bp: Fixup comment in delay_mwaitx() and massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191007190011.4859-1-Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-08 13:25:24 +02:00
Babu Moger
9d40b85bb4 x86/cpufeatures: Add feature bit RDPRU on AMD
AMD Zen 2 introduces a new RDPRU instruction which is used to give
access to some processor registers that are typically only accessible
when the privilege level is zero.

ECX is used as the implicit register to specify which register to read.
RDPRU places the specified register’s value into EDX:EAX.

For example, the RDPRU instruction can be used to read MPERF and APERF
at CPL > 0.

Add the feature bit so it is visible in /proc/cpuinfo.

Details are available in the AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual:
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24594.pdf

Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: robert.hu@linux.intel.com
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191007204839.5727.10803.stgit@localhost.localdomain
2019-10-08 09:28:37 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
c512c69187 uaccess: implement a proper unsafe_copy_to_user() and switch filldir over to it
In commit 9f79b78ef7 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which
improves code generation on x86 enormously.

But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name
copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it
turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because
unlike x86, they have various alignment issues.

Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa)
will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally.  Which
makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all.

I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures
that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy
"user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old
__copy_to_user() interface.

So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86
version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures
implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they
do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions).

Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we
still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user().

That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly
because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot
efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because
gcc can't do asm goto with outputs).

It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work
really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones.

Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make
this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version
for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those
names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier.

Fixes: 9f79b78ef7 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-07 12:56:48 -07:00
Mike Travis
4fb7d08707 x86/platform/uv: Account for UV Hubless in is_uvX_hub Ops
The references in the is_uvX_hub() function uses the hub_info pointer
which will be NULL when the system is hubless.  This change avoids
that NULL dereference.  It is also an optimization in performance.

Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <mike.travis@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Dimitri Sivanich <dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hedi Berriche <hedi.berriche@hpe.com>
Cc: Justin Ernst <justin.ernst@hpe.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Russ Anderson <russ.anderson@hpe.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190910145840.294981941@stormcage.eag.rdlabs.hpecorp.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-07 13:42:11 +02:00
Mike Travis
8785968bce x86/platform/uv: Add UV Hubbed/Hubless Proc FS Files
Indicate to UV user utilities that UV hubless support is available on
this system via the existing /proc infterface.  The current interface is
maintained with the addition of new /proc leaves ("hubbed", "hubless",
and "oemid") that contain the specific type of UV arch this one is.

Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <mike.travis@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Dimitri Sivanich <dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hedi Berriche <hedi.berriche@hpe.com>
Cc: Justin Ernst <justin.ernst@hpe.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Russ Anderson <russ.anderson@hpe.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190910145840.055590900@stormcage.eag.rdlabs.hpecorp.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-07 13:42:10 +02:00
Mike Travis
9743cb68f7 x86/platform/uv: Add return code to UV BIOS Init function
Add a return code to the UV BIOS init function that indicates the
successful initialization of the kernel/BIOS callback interface.

Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <mike.travis@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Dimitri Sivanich <dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hedi Berriche <hedi.berriche@hpe.com>
Cc: Justin Ernst <justin.ernst@hpe.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Russ Anderson <russ.anderson@hpe.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190910145839.895739629@stormcage.eag.rdlabs.hpecorp.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-07 13:42:10 +02:00
Mike Travis
0959f8256a x86/platform/uv: Return UV Hubless System Type
Return the type of UV hubless system for UV specific code that depends
on that.  Add a function to convert UV system type to bit pattern needed
for is_uv_hubless().

Signed-off-by: Mike Travis <mike.travis@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Steve Wahl <steve.wahl@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Dimitri Sivanich <dimitri.sivanich@hpe.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hedi Berriche <hedi.berriche@hpe.com>
Cc: Justin Ernst <justin.ernst@hpe.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Russ Anderson <russ.anderson@hpe.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190910145839.814880843@stormcage.eag.rdlabs.hpecorp.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-10-07 13:42:10 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
b145b0eb20 Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM and x86 bugfixes of all kinds.

  The most visible one is that migrating a nested hypervisor has always
  been busted on Broadwell and newer processors, and that has finally
  been fixed"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (22 commits)
  KVM: x86: omit "impossible" pmu MSRs from MSR list
  KVM: nVMX: Fix consistency check on injected exception error code
  KVM: x86: omit absent pmu MSRs from MSR list
  selftests: kvm: Fix libkvm build error
  kvm: vmx: Limit guest PMCs to those supported on the host
  kvm: x86, powerpc: do not allow clearing largepages debugfs entry
  KVM: selftests: x86: clarify what is reported on KVM_GET_MSRS failure
  KVM: VMX: Set VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED if !X86_BUG_L1TF
  selftests: kvm: add test for dirty logging inside nested guests
  KVM: x86: fix nested guest live migration with PML
  KVM: x86: assign two bits to track SPTE kinds
  KVM: x86: Expose XSAVEERPTR to the guest
  kvm: x86: Enumerate support for CLZERO instruction
  kvm: x86: Use AMD CPUID semantics for AMD vCPUs
  kvm: x86: Improve emulation of CPUID leaves 0BH and 1FH
  KVM: X86: Fix userspace set invalid CR4
  kvm: x86: Fix a spurious -E2BIG in __do_cpuid_func
  KVM: LAPIC: Loosen filter for adaptive tuning of lapic_timer_advance_ns
  KVM: arm/arm64: vgic: Use the appropriate TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH
  arm64: KVM: Kill hyp_alternate_select()
  ...
2019-10-04 11:17:51 -07:00
Arnd Bergmann
87d6021b81 x86/math-emu: Limit MATH_EMULATION to 486SX compatibles
The FPU emulation code is old and fragile in places, try to limit its
use to builds for CPUs that actually use it. As far as I can tell,
this is only true for i486sx compatibles, including the Cyrix 486SLC,
AMD Am486SX and ÉLAN SC410, UMC U5S amd DM&P VortexSX86, all of which
were relatively short-lived and got replaced with i486DX compatible
processors soon after introduction, though some of the embedded versions
remained available much longer.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Bill Metzenthen <billm@melbpc.org.au>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191001142344.1274185-2-arnd@arndb.de
2019-10-03 10:51:17 +02:00
Nishad Kamdar
6184488a19 x86: Use the correct SPDX License Identifier in headers
Correct the SPDX License Identifier format in a couple of headers.

Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Nishad Kamdar <nishadkamdar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/697848ff866ade29e78e872525d7a3067642fd37.1555427420.git.nishadkamdar@gmail.com
2019-10-01 20:31:35 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
aefcf2f4b5 Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
 "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
  Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.

  From the original description:

    This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
    intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
    When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
    Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
    kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
    enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.

    The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
    of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
    doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
    to not requiring external patches.

  There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:

   - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
     covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/

   -  Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
      module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
      rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.

  The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
  policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
  tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
  permitted.

  The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
  policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
  level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:

    lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}

  Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
  that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
  confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
  confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.

  This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
  overriden by kernel configuration.

  New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
  lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
  include/linux/security.h for details.

  The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
  across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
  weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.

  Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf ("bpf: Restrict bpf
  when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
  Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
  this under category (c) of the DCO"

* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
  kexec: Fix file verification on S390
  security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
  lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
  efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
  tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
  debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
  kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
  lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
  bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
  lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
  x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
  lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
  lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
  lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
  acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
  ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
  x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
  x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
  ...
2019-09-28 08:14:15 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
8bbe0dec38 Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull more KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "x86 KVM changes:

   - The usual accuracy improvements for nested virtualization

   - The usual round of code cleanups from Sean

   - Added back optimizations that were prematurely removed in 5.2 (the
     bare minimum needed to fix the regression was in 5.3-rc8, here
     comes the rest)

   - Support for UMWAIT/UMONITOR/TPAUSE

   - Direct L2->L0 TLB flushing when L0 is Hyper-V and L1 is KVM

   - Tell Windows guests if SMT is disabled on the host

   - More accurate detection of vmexit cost

   - Revert a pvqspinlock pessimization"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (56 commits)
  KVM: nVMX: cleanup and fix host 64-bit mode checks
  KVM: vmx: fix build warnings in hv_enable_direct_tlbflush() on i386
  KVM: x86: Don't check kvm_rebooting in __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot()
  KVM: x86: Drop ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot()
  KVM: VMX: Add error handling to VMREAD helper
  KVM: VMX: Optimize VMX instruction error and fault handling
  KVM: x86: Check kvm_rebooting in kvm_spurious_fault()
  KVM: selftests: fix ucall on x86
  Revert "locking/pvqspinlock: Don't wait if vCPU is preempted"
  kvm: nvmx: limit atomic switch MSRs
  kvm: svm: Intercept RDPRU
  kvm: x86: Add "significant index" flag to a few CPUID leaves
  KVM: x86/mmu: Skip invalid pages during zapping iff root_count is zero
  KVM: x86/mmu: Explicitly track only a single invalid mmu generation
  KVM: x86/mmu: Revert "KVM: x86/mmu: Remove is_obsolete() call"
  KVM: x86/mmu: Revert "Revert "KVM: MMU: reclaim the zapped-obsolete page first""
  KVM: x86/mmu: Revert "Revert "KVM: MMU: collapse TLB flushes when zap all pages""
  KVM: x86/mmu: Revert "Revert "KVM: MMU: zap pages in batch""
  KVM: x86/mmu: Revert "Revert "KVM: MMU: add tracepoint for kvm_mmu_invalidate_all_pages""
  KVM: x86/mmu: Revert "Revert "KVM: MMU: show mmu_valid_gen in shadow page related tracepoints""
  ...
2019-09-27 12:44:26 -07:00
Paolo Bonzini
6eeb4ef049 KVM: x86: assign two bits to track SPTE kinds
Currently, we are overloading SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK to mean both
"A/D bits unavailable" and MMIO, where the difference between the
two is determined by mio_mask and mmio_value.

However, the next patch will need two bits to distinguish
availability of A/D bits from write protection.  So, while at
it give MMIO its own bit pattern, and move the two bits from
bit 62 to bits 52..53 since Intel is allocating EPT page table
bits from the top.

Reviewed-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-09-27 13:13:24 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
f209a26dd5 KVM: x86: Don't check kvm_rebooting in __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot()
Remove the kvm_rebooting check from VMX/SVM instruction exception fixup
now that kvm_spurious_fault() conditions its BUG() on !kvm_rebooting.
Because the 'cleanup_insn' functionally is also gone, deferring to
kvm_spurious_fault() means __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() can eliminate
its .fixup code entirely and have its exception table entry branch
directly to the call to kvm_spurious_fault().

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-09-25 15:30:19 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
98cd382d50 KVM: x86: Drop ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot()
Remove the variation of __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() that accepts a
post-fault cleanup instruction now that its sole user (VMREAD) uses
a different method for handling faults.

Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-09-25 15:30:14 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
4b526de50e KVM: x86: Check kvm_rebooting in kvm_spurious_fault()
Explicitly check kvm_rebooting in kvm_spurious_fault() prior to invoking
BUG(), as opposed to assuming the caller has already done so.  Letting
kvm_spurious_fault() be called "directly" will allow VMX to better
optimize its low level assembly flows.

As a happy side effect, kvm_spurious_fault() no longer needs to be
marked as a dead end since it doesn't unconditionally BUG().

Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-09-25 15:23:33 +02:00
Ingo Molnar
44e09568cf x86/mm: Clean up the pmd_read_atomic() comments
Fix spelling, consistent parenthesis and grammar - and also clarify
the language where needed.

Reviewed-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-09-25 10:13:27 +02:00
Wei Yang
a2f7a0bfca x86/mm: Fix function name typo in pmd_read_atomic() comment
The function involved should be pte_offset_map_lock() and we never have
function pmd_offset_map_lock defined.

Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190925014453.20236-1-richardw.yang@linux.intel.com
[ Minor edits. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-09-25 08:40:19 +02:00
Mike Rapoport
782de70c42 mm: consolidate pgtable_cache_init() and pgd_cache_init()
Both pgtable_cache_init() and pgd_cache_init() are used to initialize kmem
cache for page table allocations on several architectures that do not use
PAGE_SIZE tables for one or more levels of the page table hierarchy.

Most architectures do not implement these functions and use __weak default
NOP implementation of pgd_cache_init().  Since there is no such default
for pgtable_cache_init(), its empty stub is duplicated among most
architectures.

Rename the definitions of pgd_cache_init() to pgtable_cache_init() and
drop empty stubs of pgtable_cache_init().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1566457046-22637-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>		[arm64]
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>	[x86]
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-24 15:54:09 -07:00
Nicholas Piggin
13224794cb mm: remove quicklist page table caches
Patch series "mm: remove quicklist page table caches".

A while ago Nicholas proposed to remove quicklist page table caches [1].

I've rebased his patch on the curren upstream and switched ia64 and sh to
use generic versions of PTE allocation.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190711030339.20892-1-npiggin@gmail.com

This patch (of 3):

Remove page table allocator "quicklists".  These have been around for a
long time, but have not got much traction in the last decade and are only
used on ia64 and sh architectures.

The numbers in the initial commit look interesting but probably don't
apply anymore.  If anybody wants to resurrect this it's in the git
history, but it's unhelpful to have this code and divergent allocator
behaviour for minor archs.

Also it might be better to instead make more general improvements to page
allocator if this is still so slow.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1565250728-21721-2-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-24 15:54:09 -07:00