Commit Graph

9559 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Paolo Bonzini
46f4f0aabc Merge branch 'kvm-tsx-ctrl' into HEAD
Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
2019-11-21 12:03:40 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini
edef5c36b0 KVM: x86: implement MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL effect on CPUID
Because KVM always emulates CPUID, the CPUID clear bit
(bit 1) of MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL must be emulated "manually"
by the hypervisor when performing said emulation.

Right now neither kvm-intel.ko nor kvm-amd.ko implement
MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL but this will change in the next patch.

Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Tested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-21 09:59:31 +01:00
David S. Miller
ee5a489fd9 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2019-11-20

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.

We've added 81 non-merge commits during the last 17 day(s) which contain
a total of 120 files changed, 4958 insertions(+), 1081 deletions(-).

There are 3 trivial conflicts, resolve it by always taking the chunk from
196e8ca748:

<<<<<<< HEAD
=======
void *bpf_map_area_mmapable_alloc(u64 size, int numa_node);
>>>>>>> 196e8ca748

<<<<<<< HEAD
void *bpf_map_area_alloc(u64 size, int numa_node)
=======
static void *__bpf_map_area_alloc(u64 size, int numa_node, bool mmapable)
>>>>>>> 196e8ca748

<<<<<<< HEAD
        if (size <= (PAGE_SIZE << PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER)) {
=======
        /* kmalloc()'ed memory can't be mmap()'ed */
        if (!mmapable && size <= (PAGE_SIZE << PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER)) {
>>>>>>> 196e8ca748

The main changes are:

1) Addition of BPF trampoline which works as a bridge between kernel functions,
   BPF programs and other BPF programs along with two new use cases: i) fentry/fexit
   BPF programs for tracing with practically zero overhead to call into BPF (as
   opposed to k[ret]probes) and ii) attachment of the former to networking related
   programs to see input/output of networking programs (covering xdpdump use case),
   from Alexei Starovoitov.

2) BPF array map mmap support and use in libbpf for global data maps; also a big
   batch of libbpf improvements, among others, support for reading bitfields in a
   relocatable manner (via libbpf's CO-RE helper API), from Andrii Nakryiko.

3) Extend s390x JIT with usage of relative long jumps and loads in order to lift
   the current 64/512k size limits on JITed BPF programs there, from Ilya Leoshkevich.

4) Add BPF audit support and emit messages upon successful prog load and unload in
   order to have a timeline of events, from Daniel Borkmann and Jiri Olsa.

5) Extension to libbpf and xdpsock sample programs to demo the shared umem mode
   (XDP_SHARED_UMEM) as well as RX-only and TX-only sockets, from Magnus Karlsson.

6) Several follow-up bug fixes for libbpf's auto-pinning code and a new API
   call named bpf_get_link_xdp_info() for retrieving the full set of prog
   IDs attached to XDP, from Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.

7) Add BTF support for array of int, array of struct and multidimensional arrays
   and enable it for skb->cb[] access in kfree_skb test, from Martin KaFai Lau.

8) Fix AF_XDP by using the correct number of channels from ethtool, from Luigi Rizzo.

9) Two fixes for BPF selftest to get rid of a hang in test_tc_tunnel and to avoid
   xdping to be run as standalone, from Jiri Benc.

10) Various BPF selftest fixes when run with latest LLVM trunk, from Yonghong Song.

11) Fix a memory leak in BPF fentry test run data, from Colin Ian King.

12) Various smaller misc cleanups and improvements mostly all over BPF selftests and
    samples, from Daniel T. Lee, Andre Guedes, Anders Roxell, Mao Wenan, Yue Haibing.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-11-20 18:11:23 -08:00
Jan Beulich
81ff2c37f9 x86/stackframe/32: Repair 32-bit Xen PV
Once again RPL checks have been introduced which don't account for a 32-bit
kernel living in ring 1 when running in a PV Xen domain. The case in
FIXUP_FRAME has been preventing boot.

Adjust BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 as well to guard against future uses of the macro
on a code path reachable when running in PV mode under Xen; I have to admit
that I stopped at a certain point trying to figure out whether there are
present ones.

Fixes: 3c88c692c2 ("x86/stackframe/32: Provide consistent pt_regs")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0fad341f-b7f5-f859-d55d-f0084ee7087e@suse.com
2019-11-19 21:58:28 +01:00
Ingo Molnar
9f4813b531 Merge tag 'v5.4-rc8' into WIP.x86/mm, to pick up fixes
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-11-19 09:00:45 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
b41d62201b x86: Remove unused asm/rio.h
The removed calgary IOMMU driver was the only user of this header file.

Reported-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@kudzu.us>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2019-11-18 10:52:11 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
111e7b15cf x86/ioperm: Extend IOPL config to control ioperm() as well
If iopl() is disabled, then providing ioperm() does not make much sense.

Rename the config option and disable/enable both syscalls with it. Guard
the code with #ifdefs where appropriate.

Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16 11:24:06 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
a24ca99768 x86/iopl: Remove legacy IOPL option
The IOPL emulation via the I/O bitmap is sufficient. Remove the legacy
cruft dealing with the (e)flags based IOPL mechanism.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> (Paravirt and Xen parts)
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-11-16 11:24:05 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
c8137ace56 x86/iopl: Restrict iopl() permission scope
The access to the full I/O port range can be also provided by the TSS I/O
bitmap, but that would require to copy 8k of data on scheduling in the
task. As shown with the sched out optimization TSS.io_bitmap_base can be
used to switch the incoming task to a preallocated I/O bitmap which has all
bits zero, i.e. allows access to all I/O ports.

Implementing this allows to provide an iopl() emulation mode which restricts
the IOPL level 3 permissions to I/O port access but removes the STI/CLI
permission which is coming with the hardware IOPL mechansim.

Provide a config option to switch IOPL to emulation mode, make it the
default and while at it also provide an option to disable IOPL completely.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-11-16 11:24:05 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
4804e382c1 x86/ioperm: Share I/O bitmap if identical
The I/O bitmap is duplicated on fork. That's wasting memory and slows down
fork. There is no point to do so. As long as the bitmap is not modified it
can be shared between threads and processes.

Add a refcount and just share it on fork. If a task modifies the bitmap
then it has to do the duplication if and only if it is shared.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-11-16 11:24:04 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
ea5f1cd7ab x86/ioperm: Remove bitmap if all permissions dropped
If ioperm() results in a bitmap with all bits set (no permissions to any
I/O port), then handling that bitmap on context switch and exit to user
mode is pointless. Drop it.

Move the bitmap exit handling to the ioport code and reuse it for both the
thread exit path and dropping it. This allows to reuse this code for the
upcoming iopl() emulation.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-11-16 11:24:03 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
22fe5b0439 x86/ioperm: Move TSS bitmap update to exit to user work
There is no point to update the TSS bitmap for tasks which use I/O bitmaps
on every context switch. It's enough to update it right before exiting to
user space.

That reduces the context switch bitmap handling to invalidating the io
bitmap base offset in the TSS when the outgoing task has TIF_IO_BITMAP
set. The invaldiation is done on purpose when a task with an IO bitmap
switches out to prevent any possible leakage of an activated IO bitmap.

It also removes the requirement to update the tasks bitmap atomically in
ioperm().

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16 11:24:03 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
060aa16fdb x86/ioperm: Add bitmap sequence number
Add a globally unique sequence number which is incremented when ioperm() is
changing the I/O bitmap of a task. Store the new sequence number in the
io_bitmap structure and compare it with the sequence number of the I/O
bitmap which was last loaded on a CPU. Only update the bitmap if the
sequence is different.

That should further reduce the overhead of I/O bitmap scheduling when there
are only a few I/O bitmap users on the system.

The 64bit sequence counter is sufficient. A wraparound of the sequence
counter assuming an ioperm() call every nanosecond would require about 584
years of uptime.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16 11:24:02 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
577d5cd7e5 x86/ioperm: Move iobitmap data into a struct
No point in having all the data in thread_struct, especially as upcoming
changes add more.

Make the bitmap in the new struct accessible as array of longs and as array
of characters via a union, so both the bitmap functions and the update
logic can avoid type casts.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16 11:24:02 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
f5848e5fd2 x86/tss: Move I/O bitmap data into a seperate struct
Move the non hardware portion of I/O bitmap data into a seperate struct for
readability sake.

Originally-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16 11:24:01 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
ecc7e37d4d x86/io: Speedup schedule out of I/O bitmap user
There is no requirement to update the TSS I/O bitmap when a thread using it is
scheduled out and the incoming thread does not use it.

For the permission check based on the TSS I/O bitmap the CPU calculates the memory
location of the I/O bitmap by the address of the TSS and the io_bitmap_base member
of the tss_struct. The easiest way to invalidate the I/O bitmap is to switch the
offset to an address outside of the TSS limit.

If an I/O instruction is issued from user space the TSS limit causes #GP to be
raised in the same was as valid I/O bitmap with all bits set to 1 would do.

This removes the extra work when an I/O bitmap using task is scheduled out
and puts the burden on the rare I/O bitmap users when they are scheduled
in.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-16 11:24:01 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
2fff071d28 x86/process: Unify copy_thread_tls()
While looking at the TSS io bitmap it turned out that any change in that
area would require identical changes to copy_thread_tls(). The 32 and 64
bit variants share sufficient code to consolidate them into a common
function to avoid duplication of upcoming modifications.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
2019-11-16 11:23:59 +01:00
Peter Zijlstra
c3d6324f84 x86/alternatives: Teach text_poke_bp() to emulate instructions
In preparation for static_call and variable size jump_label support,
teach text_poke_bp() to emulate instructions, namely:

  JMP32, JMP8, CALL, NOP2, NOP_ATOMIC5, INT3

The current text_poke_bp() takes a @handler argument which is used as
a jump target when the temporary INT3 is hit by a different CPU.

When patching CALL instructions, this doesn't work because we'd miss
the PUSH of the return address. Instead, teach poke_int3_handler() to
emulate an instruction, typically the instruction we're patching in.

This fits almost all text_poke_bp() users, except
arch_unoptimize_kprobe() which restores random text, and for that site
we have to build an explicit emulate instruction.

Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191111132457.529086974@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c7eebc10687af45ac8e40ad1bac0cf7893dba9f)
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2019-11-15 14:07:01 -08:00
Fenghua Yu
db8c33f8b5 x86/cpu: Align the x86_capability array to size of unsigned long
The x86_capability array in cpuinfo_x86 is of type u32 and thus is
naturally aligned to 4 bytes. But, set_bit() and clear_bit() require the
array to be aligned to size of unsigned long (i.e. 8 bytes on 64-bit
systems).

The array pointer is handed into atomic bit operations. If the access is
not aligned to unsigned long then the atomic bit operations can end up
crossing a cache line boundary, which causes the CPU to do a full bus lock
as it can't lock both cache lines at once. The bus lock operation is heavy
weight and can cause severe performance degradation.

The upcoming #AC split lock detection mechanism will issue warnings for
this kind of access.

Force the alignment of the array to unsigned long. This avoids the massive
code changes which would be required when converting the array data type to
unsigned long.

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog so it contains information WHY this is required ]

Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190916223958.27048-4-tony.luck@intel.com
2019-11-15 20:20:33 +01:00
Arnd Bergmann
caf5e32d4e y2038: ipc: remove __kernel_time_t reference from headers
There are two structures based on time_t that conflict between libc and
kernel: timeval and timespec. Both are now renamed to __kernel_old_timeval
and __kernel_old_timespec.

For time_t, the old typedef is still __kernel_time_t. There is nothing
wrong with that name, but it would be nice to not use that going forward
as this type is used almost only in deprecated interfaces because of
the y2038 overflow.

In the IPC headers (msgbuf.h, sembuf.h, shmbuf.h), __kernel_time_t is only
used for the 64-bit variants, which are not deprecated.

Change these to a plain 'long', which is the same type as __kernel_time_t
on all 64-bit architectures anyway, to reduce the number of users of the
old type.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2019-11-15 14:38:28 +01:00
Nitesh Narayan Lal
7ee30bc132 KVM: x86: deliver KVM IOAPIC scan request to target vCPUs
In IOAPIC fixed delivery mode instead of flushing the scan
requests to all vCPUs, we should only send the requests to
vCPUs specified within the destination field.

This patch introduces kvm_get_dest_vcpus_mask() API which
retrieves an array of target vCPUs by using
kvm_apic_map_get_dest_lapic() and then based on the
vcpus_idx, it sets the bit in a bitmap. However, if the above
fails kvm_get_dest_vcpus_mask() finds the target vCPUs by
traversing all available vCPUs. Followed by setting the
bits in the bitmap.

If we had different vCPUs in the previous request for the
same redirection table entry then bits corresponding to
these vCPUs are also set. This to done to keep
ioapic_handled_vectors synchronized.

This bitmap is then eventually passed on to
kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask() to generate a masked request
only for the target vCPUs.

This would enable us to reduce the latency overhead on isolated
vCPUs caused by the IPI to process due to KVM_REQ_IOAPIC_SCAN.

Suggested-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nitesh Narayan Lal <nitesh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:22 +01:00
Like Xu
b35e5548b4 KVM: x86/vPMU: Add lazy mechanism to release perf_event per vPMC
Currently, a host perf_event is created for a vPMC functionality emulation.
It’s unpredictable to determine if a disabled perf_event will be reused.
If they are disabled and are not reused for a considerable period of time,
those obsolete perf_events would increase host context switch overhead that
could have been avoided.

If the guest doesn't WRMSR any of the vPMC's MSRs during an entire vcpu
sched time slice, and its independent enable bit of the vPMC isn't set,
we can predict that the guest has finished the use of this vPMC, and then
do request KVM_REQ_PMU in kvm_arch_sched_in and release those perf_events
in the first call of kvm_pmu_handle_event() after the vcpu is scheduled in.

This lazy mechanism delays the event release time to the beginning of the
next scheduled time slice if vPMC's MSRs aren't changed during this time
slice. If guest comes back to use this vPMC in next time slice, a new perf
event would be re-created via perf_event_create_kernel_counter() as usual.

Suggested-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:10 +01:00
Like Xu
a6da0d77e9 KVM: x86/vPMU: Reuse perf_event to avoid unnecessary pmc_reprogram_counter
The perf_event_create_kernel_counter() in the pmc_reprogram_counter() is
a heavyweight and high-frequency operation, especially when host disables
the watchdog (maximum 21000000 ns) which leads to an unacceptable latency
of the guest NMI handler. It limits the use of vPMUs in the guest.

When a vPMC is fully enabled, the legacy reprogram_*_counter() would stop
and release its existing perf_event (if any) every time EVEN in most cases
almost the same requested perf_event will be created and configured again.

For each vPMC, if the reuqested config ('u64 eventsel' for gp and 'u8 ctrl'
for fixed) is the same as its current config AND a new sample period based
on pmc->counter is accepted by host perf interface, the current event could
be reused safely as a new created one does. Otherwise, do release the
undesirable perf_event and reprogram a new one as usual.

It's light-weight to call pmc_pause_counter (disable, read and reset event)
and pmc_resume_counter (recalibrate period and re-enable event) as guest
expects instead of release-and-create again on any condition. Compared to
use the filterable event->attr or hw.config, a new 'u64 current_config'
field is added to save the last original programed config for each vPMC.

Based on this implementation, the number of calls to pmc_reprogram_counter
is reduced by ~82.5% for a gp sampling event and ~99.9% for a fixed event.
In the usage of multiplexing perf sampling mode, the average latency of the
guest NMI handler is reduced from 104923 ns to 48393 ns (~2.16x speed up).
If host disables watchdog, the minimum latecy of guest NMI handler could be
speed up at ~3413x (from 20407603 to 5979 ns) and at ~786x in the average.

Suggested-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-11-15 11:44:09 +01:00
Christoph Hellwig
b52b0c4fc9 x86/pci: Remove #ifdef __KERNEL__ guard from <asm/pci.h>
pci.h is not a UAPI header, so the __KERNEL__ ifdef is rather pointless.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191113071836.21041-4-hch@lst.de
2019-11-15 10:37:14 +01:00
Christoph Hellwig
948fdcf942 x86/pci: Remove pci_64.h
This file only contains external declarations for two non-existing
function pointers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191113071836.21041-3-hch@lst.de
2019-11-15 10:36:59 +01:00
Christoph Hellwig
90dc392fc4 x86: Remove the calgary IOMMU driver
The calgary IOMMU was only used on high-end IBM systems in the early
x86_64 age and has no known users left.  Remove it to avoid having to
touch it for pending changes to the DMA API.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191113071836.21041-2-hch@lst.de
2019-11-15 10:36:59 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
ac94be498f Merge branch 'linus' into x86/hyperv
Pick up upstream fixes to avoid conflicts.
2019-11-15 10:30:50 +01:00
Lianbo Jiang
7c321eb2b8 x86/kdump: Remove the backup region handling
When the crashkernel kernel command line option is specified, the low
1M memory will always be reserved now. Therefore, it's not necessary to
create a backup region anymore and also no need to copy the contents of
the first 640k to it.

Remove all the code related to handling that backup region.

 [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: d.hatayama@fujitsu.com
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com
Cc: horms@verge.net.au
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jürgen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191108090027.11082-3-lijiang@redhat.com
2019-11-14 18:24:43 +01:00
Lianbo Jiang
6f599d8423 x86/kdump: Always reserve the low 1M when the crashkernel option is specified
On x86, purgatory() copies the first 640K of memory to a backup region
because the kernel needs those first 640K for the real mode trampoline
during boot, among others.

However, when SME is enabled, the kernel cannot properly copy the old
memory to the backup area but reads only its encrypted contents. The
result is that the crash tool gets invalid pointers when parsing vmcore:

  crash> kmem -s|grep -i invalid
  kmem: dma-kmalloc-512: slab:ffffd77680001c00 invalid freepointer:a6086ac099f0c5a4
  kmem: dma-kmalloc-512: slab:ffffd77680001c00 invalid freepointer:a6086ac099f0c5a4
  crash>

So reserve the remaining low 1M memory when the crashkernel option is
specified (after reserving real mode memory) so that allocated memory
does not fall into the low 1M area and thus the copying of the contents
of the first 640k to a backup region in purgatory() can be avoided
altogether.

This way, it does not need to be included in crash dumps or used for
anything except the trampolines that must live in the low 1M.

 [ bp: Heavily rewrite commit message, flip check logic in
   crash_reserve_low_1M().]

Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: d.hatayama@fujitsu.com
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com
Cc: horms@verge.net.au
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jürgen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191108090027.11082-2-lijiang@redhat.com
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=204793
2019-11-14 13:54:33 +01:00
Lianbo Jiang
112eee5d06 x86/crash: Add a forward declaration of struct kimage
Add a forward declaration of struct kimage to the crash.h header because
future changes will invoke a crash-specific function from the realmode
init path and the compiler will complain otherwise like this:

  In file included from arch/x86/realmode/init.c:11:
  ./arch/x86/include/asm/crash.h:5:32: warning: ‘struct kimage’ declared inside\
   parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
      5 | int crash_load_segments(struct kimage *image);
        |                                ^~~~~~
  ./arch/x86/include/asm/crash.h:6:37: warning: ‘struct kimage’ declared inside\
   parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
      6 | int crash_copy_backup_region(struct kimage *image);
        |                                     ^~~~~~
  ./arch/x86/include/asm/crash.h:7:39: warning: ‘struct kimage’ declared inside\
   parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
      7 | int crash_setup_memmap_entries(struct kimage *image,
        |

 [ bp: Rewrite the commit message. ]

Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: d.hatayama@fujitsu.com
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com
Cc: horms@verge.net.au
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jürgen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: vgoyal@redhat.com
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191108090027.11082-4-lijiang@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/201910310233.EJRtTMWP%25lkp@intel.com
2019-11-14 13:46:31 +01:00
Jan Beulich
4e3f77d841 xen/mcelog: add PPIN to record when available
This is to augment commit 3f5a7896a5 ("x86/mce: Include the PPIN in MCE
records when available").

I'm also adding "synd" and "ipid" fields to struct xen_mce, in an
attempt to keep field offsets in sync with struct mce. These two fields
won't get populated for now, though.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2019-11-14 10:01:57 +01:00
Josh Poimboeuf
77ac117b3a ftrace/x86: Tell objtool to ignore nondeterministic ftrace stack layout
Objtool complains about the new ftrace direct trampoline code:

  arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.o: warning: objtool: ftrace_regs_caller()+0x190: stack state mismatch: cfa1=7+16 cfa2=7+24

Typically, code has a deterministic stack layout, such that at a given
instruction address, the stack frame size is always the same.

That's not the case for the new ftrace_regs_caller() code after it
adjusts the stack for the direct case.  Just plead ignorance and assume
it's always the non-direct path.  Note this creates a tiny window for
ORC to get confused.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191108225100.ea3bhsbdf6oerj6g@treble

Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2019-11-13 09:36:50 -05:00
Steven Rostedt (VMware)
562955fe6a ftrace/x86: Add register_ftrace_direct() for custom trampolines
Enable x86 to allow for register_ftrace_direct(), where a custom trampoline
may be called directly from an ftrace mcount/fentry location.

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2019-11-13 09:36:49 -05:00
Joerg Roedel
9b3a713fee Merge branches 'iommu/fixes', 'arm/qcom', 'arm/renesas', 'arm/rockchip', 'arm/mediatek', 'arm/tegra', 'arm/smmu', 'x86/amd', 'x86/vt-d', 'virtio' and 'core' into next 2019-11-12 17:11:25 +01:00
Daniel Kiper
b3c72fc9a7 x86/boot: Introduce setup_indirect
The setup_data is a bit awkward to use for extremely large data objects,
both because the setup_data header has to be adjacent to the data object
and because it has a 32-bit length field. However, it is important that
intermediate stages of the boot process have a way to identify which
chunks of memory are occupied by kernel data. Thus introduce an uniform
way to specify such indirect data as setup_indirect struct and
SETUP_INDIRECT type.

And finally bump setup_header version in arch/x86/boot/header.S.

Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: rdunlap@infradead.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112134640.16035-4-daniel.kiper@oracle.com
2019-11-12 16:21:15 +01:00
Daniel Kiper
00cd1c154d x86/boot: Introduce kernel_info.setup_type_max
This field contains maximal allowed type for setup_data.

Do not bump setup_header version in arch/x86/boot/header.S because it
will be followed by additional changes coming into the Linux/x86 boot
protocol.

Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: rdunlap@infradead.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112134640.16035-3-daniel.kiper@oracle.com
2019-11-12 16:16:54 +01:00
Daniel Kiper
2c33c27fd6 x86/boot: Introduce kernel_info
The relationships between the headers are analogous to the various data
sections:

  setup_header = .data
  boot_params/setup_data = .bss

What is missing from the above list? That's right:

  kernel_info = .rodata

We have been (ab)using .data for things that could go into .rodata or .bss for
a long time, for lack of alternatives and -- especially early on -- inertia.
Also, the BIOS stub is responsible for creating boot_params, so it isn't
available to a BIOS-based loader (setup_data is, though).

setup_header is permanently limited to 144 bytes due to the reach of the
2-byte jump field, which doubles as a length field for the structure, combined
with the size of the "hole" in struct boot_params that a protected-mode loader
or the BIOS stub has to copy it into. It is currently 119 bytes long, which
leaves us with 25 very precious bytes. This isn't something that can be fixed
without revising the boot protocol entirely, breaking backwards compatibility.

boot_params proper is limited to 4096 bytes, but can be arbitrarily extended
by adding setup_data entries. It cannot be used to communicate properties of
the kernel image, because it is .bss and has no image-provided content.

kernel_info solves this by providing an extensible place for information about
the kernel image. It is readonly, because the kernel cannot rely on a
bootloader copying its contents anywhere, but that is OK; if it becomes
necessary it can still contain data items that an enabled bootloader would be
expected to copy into a setup_data chunk.

Do not bump setup_header version in arch/x86/boot/header.S because it
will be followed by additional changes coming into the Linux/x86 boot
protocol.

Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: rdunlap@infradead.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112134640.16035-2-daniel.kiper@oracle.com
2019-11-12 16:10:34 +01:00
Andrea Parri
dce7cd6275 x86/hyperv: Allow guests to enable InvariantTSC
If the hardware supports TSC scaling, Hyper-V will set bit 15 of the
HV_PARTITION_PRIVILEGE_MASK in guest VMs with a compatible Hyper-V
configuration version.  Bit 15 corresponds to the
AccessTscInvariantControls privilege.  If this privilege bit is set,
guests can access the HvSyntheticInvariantTscControl MSR: guests can
set bit 0 of this synthetic MSR to enable the InvariantTSC feature.
After setting the synthetic MSR, CPUID will enumerate support for
InvariantTSC.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191003155200.22022-1-parri.andrea@gmail.com
2019-11-12 11:44:21 +01:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
b264f57fde x86/hyperv: Micro-optimize send_ipi_one()
When sending an IPI to a single CPU there is no need to deal with cpumasks.

With 2 CPU guest on WS2019 a minor (like 3%, 8043 -> 7761 CPU cycles)
improvement with smp_call_function_single() loop benchmark can be seeb. The
optimization, however, is tiny and straitforward. Also, send_ipi_one() is
important for PV spinlock kick.

Switching to the regular APIC IPI send for CPU > 64 case does not make
sense as it is twice as expesive (12650 CPU cycles for __send_ipi_mask_ex()
call, 26000 for orig_apic.send_IPI(cpu, vector)).

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191027151938.7296-1-vkuznets@redhat.com
2019-11-12 11:44:20 +01:00
Christoph Hellwig
d092a87073 arch: rely on asm-generic/io.h for default ioremap_* definitions
Various architectures that use asm-generic/io.h still defined their
own default versions of ioremap_nocache, ioremap_wt and ioremap_wc
that point back to plain ioremap directly or indirectly.  Remove these
definitions and rely on asm-generic/io.h instead.  For this to work
the backup ioremap_* defintions needs to be changed to purely cpp
macros instea of inlines to cover for architectures like openrisc
that only define ioremap after including <asm-generic/io.h>.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
2019-11-11 21:18:19 +01:00
Christoph Hellwig
c0d94aa54b x86: Clean up ioremap()
Use ioremap() as the main implemented function, and defines
ioremap_nocache() as a deprecated alias of ioremap() in
preparation of removing ioremap_nocache() entirely.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-11 17:19:49 +01:00
Yian Chen
f036c7fa0a iommu/vt-d: Check VT-d RMRR region in BIOS is reported as reserved
VT-d RMRR (Reserved Memory Region Reporting) regions are reserved
for device use only and should not be part of allocable memory pool of OS.

BIOS e820_table reports complete memory map to OS, including OS usable
memory ranges and BIOS reserved memory ranges etc.

x86 BIOS may not be trusted to include RMRR regions as reserved type
of memory in its e820 memory map, hence validate every RMRR entry
with the e820 memory map to make sure the RMRR regions will not be
used by OS for any other purposes.

ia64 EFI is working fine so implement RMRR validation as a dummy function

Reviewed-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yian Chen <yian.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
2019-11-11 16:06:07 +01:00
Nicolas Saenz Julienne
e380a0394c x86/PCI: sta2x11: use default DMA address translation
The devices found behind this PCIe chip have unusual DMA mapping
constraints as there is an AMBA interconnect placed in between them and
the different PCI endpoints. The offset between physical memory
addresses and AMBA's view is provided by reading a PCI config register,
which is saved and used whenever DMA mapping is needed.

It turns out that this DMA setup can be represented by properly setting
'dma_pfn_offset', 'dma_bus_mask' and 'dma_mask' during the PCI device
enable fixup. And ultimately allows us to get rid of this device's
custom DMA functions.

Aside from the code deletion and DMA setup, sta2x11_pdev_to_mapping() is
moved to avoid warnings whenever CONFIG_PM is not enabled.

Signed-off-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzjulienne@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2019-11-11 10:52:19 +01:00
Dan Williams
199c847176 x86/efi: Add efi_fake_mem support for EFI_MEMORY_SP
Given that EFI_MEMORY_SP is platform BIOS policy decision for marking
memory ranges as "reserved for a specific purpose" there will inevitably
be scenarios where the BIOS omits the attribute in situations where it
is desired. Unlike other attributes if the OS wants to reserve this
memory from the kernel the reservation needs to happen early in init. So
early, in fact, that it needs to happen before e820__memblock_setup()
which is a pre-requisite for efi_fake_memmap() that wants to allocate
memory for the updated table.

Introduce an x86 specific efi_fake_memmap_early() that can search for
attempts to set EFI_MEMORY_SP via efi_fake_mem and update the e820 table
accordingly.

The KASLR code that scans the command line looking for user-directed
memory reservations also needs to be updated to consider
"efi_fake_mem=nn@ss:0x40000" requests.

Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-11-07 15:44:23 +01:00
Dan Williams
262b45ae3a x86/efi: EFI soft reservation to E820 enumeration
UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the
interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific
purpose".

The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is
reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for
any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback.  Later, through udev
scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can
be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique
node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in
the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the
reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be
disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with
efi=nosoftreserve.

This patch introduces 2 new concepts at once given the entanglement
between early boot enumeration relative to memory that can optionally be
reserved from the kernel page allocator by default. The new concepts
are:

- E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED: Upon detecting the EFI_MEMORY_SP
  attribute on EFI_CONVENTIONAL memory, update the E820 map with this
  new type. Only perform this classification if the
  CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=y policy is enabled, otherwise treat it as
  typical ram.

- IORES_DESC_SOFT_RESERVED: Add a new I/O resource descriptor for
  a device driver to search iomem resources for application specific
  memory. Teach the iomem code to identify such ranges as "Soft Reserved".

Note that the comment for do_add_efi_memmap() needed refreshing since it
seemed to imply that the efi map might overflow the e820 table, but that
is not an issue as of commit 7b6e4ba3cb "x86/boot/e820: Clean up the
E820_X_MAX definition" that removed the 128 entry limit for
e820__range_add().

A follow-on change integrates parsing of the ACPI HMAT to identify the
node and sub-range boundaries of EFI_MEMORY_SP designated memory. For
now, just identify and reserve memory of this type.

Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-11-07 15:44:14 +01:00
Dan Williams
6950e31b35 x86/efi: Push EFI_MEMMAP check into leaf routines
In preparation for adding another EFI_MEMMAP dependent call that needs
to occur before e820__memblock_setup() fixup the existing efi calls to
check for EFI_MEMMAP internally. This ends up being cleaner than the
alternative of checking EFI_MEMMAP multiple times in setup_arch().

Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-11-07 15:44:04 +01:00
Babu Moger
b971880fe7 x86/Kconfig: Rename UMIP config parameter
AMD 2nd generation EPYC processors support the UMIP (User-Mode
Instruction Prevention) feature. So, rename X86_INTEL_UMIP to
generic X86_UMIP and modify the text to cover both Intel and AMD.

 [ bp: take of the disabled-features.h copy in tools/ too. ]

Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/157298912544.17462.2018334793891409521.stgit@naples-babu.amd.com
2019-11-07 11:07:29 +01:00
Daniel Axtens
81d2c6f819 kasan: support instrumented bitops combined with generic bitops
Currently bitops-instrumented.h assumes that the architecture provides
atomic, non-atomic and locking bitops (e.g. both set_bit and __set_bit).
This is true on x86 and s390, but is not always true: there is a
generic bitops/non-atomic.h header that provides generic non-atomic
operations, and also a generic bitops/lock.h for locking operations.

powerpc uses the generic non-atomic version, so it does not have it's
own e.g. __set_bit that could be renamed arch___set_bit.

Split up bitops-instrumented.h to mirror the atomic/non-atomic/lock
split. This allows arches to only include the headers where they
have arch-specific versions to rename. Update x86 and s390.

(The generic operations are automatically instrumented because they're
written in C, not asm.)

Suggested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190820024941.12640-1-dja@axtens.net
2019-11-07 13:15:39 +11:00
Junaid Shahid
1aa9b9572b kvm: x86: mmu: Recovery of shattered NX large pages
The page table pages corresponding to broken down large pages are zapped in
FIFO order, so that the large page can potentially be recovered, if it is
not longer being used for execution.  This removes the performance penalty
for walking deeper EPT page tables.

By default, one large page will last about one hour once the guest
reaches a steady state.

Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid <junaids@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2019-11-04 20:26:00 +01:00
Kees Cook
5494c3a6a0 x86/mm: Report which part of kernel image is freed
The memory freeing report wasn't very useful for figuring out which
parts of the kernel image were being freed. Add the details for clearer
reporting in dmesg.

Before:

  Freeing unused kernel image memory: 1348K
  Write protecting the kernel read-only data: 20480k
  Freeing unused kernel image memory: 2040K
  Freeing unused kernel image memory: 172K

After:

  Freeing unused kernel image (initmem) memory: 1348K
  Write protecting the kernel read-only data: 20480k
  Freeing unused kernel image (text/rodata gap) memory: 2040K
  Freeing unused kernel image (rodata/data gap) memory: 172K

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-c6x-dev@linux-c6x.org
Cc: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191029211351.13243-28-keescook@chromium.org
2019-11-04 18:50:33 +01:00