
Live patching consistency model is of LEAVE_PATCHED_SET and SWITCH_THREAD. This means that all tasks in the system have to be marked one by one as safe to call a new patched function. Safe means when a task is not (sleeping) in a set of patched functions. That is, no patched function is on the task's stack. Another clearly safe place is the boundary between kernel and userspace. The patching waits for all tasks to get outside of the patched set or to cross the boundary. The transition is completed afterwards. The problem is that a task can block the transition for quite a long time, if not forever. It could sleep in a set of patched functions, for example. Luckily we can force the task to leave the set by sending it a fake signal, that is a signal with no data in signal pending structures (no handler, no sign of proper signal delivered). Suspend/freezer use this to freeze the tasks as well. The task gets TIF_SIGPENDING set and is woken up (if it has been sleeping in the kernel before) or kicked by rescheduling IPI (if it was running on other CPU). This causes the task to go to kernel/userspace boundary where the signal would be handled and the task would be marked as safe in terms of live patching. There are tasks which are not affected by this technique though. The fake signal is not sent to kthreads. They should be handled differently. They can be woken up so they leave the patched set and their TIF_PATCH_PENDING can be cleared thanks to stack checking. For the sake of completeness, if the task is in TASK_RUNNING state but not currently running on some CPU it doesn't get the IPI, but it would eventually handle the signal anyway. Second, if the task runs in the kernel (in TASK_RUNNING state) it gets the IPI, but the signal is not handled on return from the interrupt. It would be handled on return to the userspace in the future when the fake signal is sent again. Stack checking deals with these cases in a better way. If the task was sleeping in a syscall it would be woken by our fake signal, it would check if TIF_SIGPENDING is set (by calling signal_pending() predicate) and return ERESTART* or EINTR. Syscalls with ERESTART* return values are restarted in case of the fake signal (see do_signal()). EINTR is propagated back to the userspace program. This could disturb the program, but... * each process dealing with signals should react accordingly to EINTR return values. * syscalls returning EINTR happen to be quite common situation in the system even if no fake signal is sent. * freezer sends the fake signal and does not deal with EINTR anyhow. Thus EINTR values are returned when the system is resumed. The very safe marking is done in architectures' "entry" on syscall and interrupt/exception exit paths, and in a stack checking functions of livepatch. TIF_PATCH_PENDING is cleared and the next recalc_sigpending() drops TIF_SIGPENDING. In connection with this, also call klp_update_patch_state() before do_signal(), so that recalc_sigpending() in dequeue_signal() can clear TIF_PATCH_PENDING immediately and thus prevent a double call of do_signal(). Note that the fake signal is not sent to stopped/traced tasks. Such task prevents the patching to finish till it continues again (is not traced anymore). Last, sending the fake signal is not automatic. It is done only when admin requests it by writing 1 to signal sysfs attribute in livepatch sysfs directory. Signed-off-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
422 lines
11 KiB
C
422 lines
11 KiB
C
/*
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* common.c - C code for kernel entry and exit
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* Copyright (c) 2015 Andrew Lutomirski
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* GPL v2
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*
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* Based on asm and ptrace code by many authors. The code here originated
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* in ptrace.c and signal.c.
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*/
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/smp.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/tracehook.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/seccomp.h>
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
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#include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
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#include <linux/uprobes.h>
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#include <linux/livepatch.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <asm/desc.h>
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#include <asm/traps.h>
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#include <asm/vdso.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
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#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
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#include <trace/events/syscalls.h>
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#ifdef CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING
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/* Called on entry from user mode with IRQs off. */
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__visible inline void enter_from_user_mode(void)
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{
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CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() != CONTEXT_USER);
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user_exit_irqoff();
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}
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#else
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static inline void enter_from_user_mode(void) {}
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#endif
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static void do_audit_syscall_entry(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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if (arch == AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64) {
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audit_syscall_entry(regs->orig_ax, regs->di,
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regs->si, regs->dx, regs->r10);
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} else
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#endif
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{
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audit_syscall_entry(regs->orig_ax, regs->bx,
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regs->cx, regs->dx, regs->si);
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}
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}
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/*
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* Returns the syscall nr to run (which should match regs->orig_ax) or -1
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* to skip the syscall.
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*/
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static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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u32 arch = in_ia32_syscall() ? AUDIT_ARCH_I386 : AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64;
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struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
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unsigned long ret = 0;
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bool emulated = false;
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u32 work;
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY))
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BUG_ON(regs != task_pt_regs(current));
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work = READ_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY;
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if (unlikely(work & _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU))
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emulated = true;
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if ((emulated || (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) &&
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tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
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return -1L;
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if (emulated)
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return -1L;
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
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/*
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* Do seccomp after ptrace, to catch any tracer changes.
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*/
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if (work & _TIF_SECCOMP) {
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struct seccomp_data sd;
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sd.arch = arch;
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sd.nr = regs->orig_ax;
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sd.instruction_pointer = regs->ip;
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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if (arch == AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64) {
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sd.args[0] = regs->di;
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sd.args[1] = regs->si;
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sd.args[2] = regs->dx;
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sd.args[3] = regs->r10;
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sd.args[4] = regs->r8;
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sd.args[5] = regs->r9;
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} else
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#endif
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{
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sd.args[0] = regs->bx;
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sd.args[1] = regs->cx;
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sd.args[2] = regs->dx;
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sd.args[3] = regs->si;
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sd.args[4] = regs->di;
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sd.args[5] = regs->bp;
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}
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ret = __secure_computing(&sd);
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if (ret == -1)
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return ret;
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}
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#endif
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if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
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trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->orig_ax);
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do_audit_syscall_entry(regs, arch);
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return ret ?: regs->orig_ax;
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}
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#define EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS \
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(_TIF_SIGPENDING | _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_UPROBE | \
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_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY | _TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
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static void exit_to_usermode_loop(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 cached_flags)
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{
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/*
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* In order to return to user mode, we need to have IRQs off with
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* none of EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS set. Several of these flags
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* can be set at any time on preemptable kernels if we have IRQs on,
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* so we need to loop. Disabling preemption wouldn't help: doing the
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* work to clear some of the flags can sleep.
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*/
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while (true) {
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/* We have work to do. */
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local_irq_enable();
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if (cached_flags & _TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
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schedule();
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if (cached_flags & _TIF_UPROBE)
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uprobe_notify_resume(regs);
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if (cached_flags & _TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
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klp_update_patch_state(current);
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/* deal with pending signal delivery */
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if (cached_flags & _TIF_SIGPENDING)
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do_signal(regs);
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if (cached_flags & _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME) {
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clear_thread_flag(TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
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tracehook_notify_resume(regs);
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}
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if (cached_flags & _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)
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fire_user_return_notifiers();
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/* Disable IRQs and retry */
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local_irq_disable();
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cached_flags = READ_ONCE(current_thread_info()->flags);
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if (!(cached_flags & EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS))
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break;
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}
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}
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/* Called with IRQs disabled. */
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__visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
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u32 cached_flags;
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addr_limit_user_check();
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lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
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lockdep_sys_exit();
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cached_flags = READ_ONCE(ti->flags);
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if (unlikely(cached_flags & EXIT_TO_USERMODE_LOOP_FLAGS))
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exit_to_usermode_loop(regs, cached_flags);
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#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
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/*
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* Compat syscalls set TS_COMPAT. Make sure we clear it before
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* returning to user mode. We need to clear it *after* signal
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* handling, because syscall restart has a fixup for compat
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* syscalls. The fixup is exercised by the ptrace_syscall_32
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* selftest.
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*
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* We also need to clear TS_REGS_POKED_I386: the 32-bit tracer
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* special case only applies after poking regs and before the
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* very next return to user mode.
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*/
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current->thread.status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED);
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#endif
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user_enter_irqoff();
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}
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#define SYSCALL_EXIT_WORK_FLAGS \
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(_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE | _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT | \
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_TIF_SINGLESTEP | _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
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static void syscall_slow_exit_work(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 cached_flags)
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{
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bool step;
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audit_syscall_exit(regs);
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if (cached_flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)
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trace_sys_exit(regs, regs->ax);
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/*
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* If TIF_SYSCALL_EMU is set, we only get here because of
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* TIF_SINGLESTEP (i.e. this is PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP).
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* We already reported this syscall instruction in
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* syscall_trace_enter().
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*/
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step = unlikely(
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(cached_flags & (_TIF_SINGLESTEP | _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU))
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== _TIF_SINGLESTEP);
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if (step || cached_flags & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
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tracehook_report_syscall_exit(regs, step);
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}
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/*
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* Called with IRQs on and fully valid regs. Returns with IRQs off in a
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* state such that we can immediately switch to user mode.
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*/
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__visible inline void syscall_return_slowpath(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
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u32 cached_flags = READ_ONCE(ti->flags);
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CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() != CONTEXT_KERNEL);
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) &&
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WARN(irqs_disabled(), "syscall %ld left IRQs disabled", regs->orig_ax))
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local_irq_enable();
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/*
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* First do one-time work. If these work items are enabled, we
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* want to run them exactly once per syscall exit with IRQs on.
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*/
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if (unlikely(cached_flags & SYSCALL_EXIT_WORK_FLAGS))
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syscall_slow_exit_work(regs, cached_flags);
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local_irq_disable();
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prepare_exit_to_usermode(regs);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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__visible void do_syscall_64(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
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unsigned long nr = regs->orig_ax;
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enter_from_user_mode();
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local_irq_enable();
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if (READ_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY)
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nr = syscall_trace_enter(regs);
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/*
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* NB: Native and x32 syscalls are dispatched from the same
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* table. The only functional difference is the x32 bit in
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* regs->orig_ax, which changes the behavior of some syscalls.
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*/
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if (likely((nr & __SYSCALL_MASK) < NR_syscalls)) {
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regs->ax = sys_call_table[nr & __SYSCALL_MASK](
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regs->di, regs->si, regs->dx,
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regs->r10, regs->r8, regs->r9);
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}
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syscall_return_slowpath(regs);
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}
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#endif
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#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) || defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)
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/*
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* Does a 32-bit syscall. Called with IRQs on in CONTEXT_KERNEL. Does
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* all entry and exit work and returns with IRQs off. This function is
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* extremely hot in workloads that use it, and it's usually called from
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* do_fast_syscall_32, so forcibly inline it to improve performance.
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*/
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static __always_inline void do_syscall_32_irqs_on(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
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unsigned int nr = (unsigned int)regs->orig_ax;
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#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
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current->thread.status |= TS_COMPAT;
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#endif
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if (READ_ONCE(ti->flags) & _TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY) {
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/*
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* Subtlety here: if ptrace pokes something larger than
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* 2^32-1 into orig_ax, this truncates it. This may or
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* may not be necessary, but it matches the old asm
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* behavior.
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*/
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nr = syscall_trace_enter(regs);
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}
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if (likely(nr < IA32_NR_syscalls)) {
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/*
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* It's possible that a 32-bit syscall implementation
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* takes a 64-bit parameter but nonetheless assumes that
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* the high bits are zero. Make sure we zero-extend all
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* of the args.
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*/
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regs->ax = ia32_sys_call_table[nr](
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(unsigned int)regs->bx, (unsigned int)regs->cx,
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(unsigned int)regs->dx, (unsigned int)regs->si,
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(unsigned int)regs->di, (unsigned int)regs->bp);
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}
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syscall_return_slowpath(regs);
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}
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/* Handles int $0x80 */
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__visible void do_int80_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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enter_from_user_mode();
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local_irq_enable();
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do_syscall_32_irqs_on(regs);
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}
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/* Returns 0 to return using IRET or 1 to return using SYSEXIT/SYSRETL. */
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__visible long do_fast_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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/*
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* Called using the internal vDSO SYSENTER/SYSCALL32 calling
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* convention. Adjust regs so it looks like we entered using int80.
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*/
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unsigned long landing_pad = (unsigned long)current->mm->context.vdso +
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vdso_image_32.sym_int80_landing_pad;
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/*
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* SYSENTER loses EIP, and even SYSCALL32 needs us to skip forward
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* so that 'regs->ip -= 2' lands back on an int $0x80 instruction.
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* Fix it up.
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*/
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regs->ip = landing_pad;
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enter_from_user_mode();
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local_irq_enable();
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/* Fetch EBP from where the vDSO stashed it. */
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if (
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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/*
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* Micro-optimization: the pointer we're following is explicitly
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* 32 bits, so it can't be out of range.
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*/
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__get_user(*(u32 *)®s->bp,
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(u32 __user __force *)(unsigned long)(u32)regs->sp)
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#else
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get_user(*(u32 *)®s->bp,
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(u32 __user __force *)(unsigned long)(u32)regs->sp)
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#endif
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) {
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/* User code screwed up. */
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local_irq_disable();
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regs->ax = -EFAULT;
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prepare_exit_to_usermode(regs);
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return 0; /* Keep it simple: use IRET. */
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}
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/* Now this is just like a normal syscall. */
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do_syscall_32_irqs_on(regs);
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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/*
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* Opportunistic SYSRETL: if possible, try to return using SYSRETL.
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* SYSRETL is available on all 64-bit CPUs, so we don't need to
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* bother with SYSEXIT.
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*
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* Unlike 64-bit opportunistic SYSRET, we can't check that CX == IP,
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* because the ECX fixup above will ensure that this is essentially
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* never the case.
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*/
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return regs->cs == __USER32_CS && regs->ss == __USER_DS &&
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regs->ip == landing_pad &&
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(regs->flags & (X86_EFLAGS_RF | X86_EFLAGS_TF)) == 0;
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#else
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/*
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* Opportunistic SYSEXIT: if possible, try to return using SYSEXIT.
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*
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* Unlike 64-bit opportunistic SYSRET, we can't check that CX == IP,
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* because the ECX fixup above will ensure that this is essentially
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* never the case.
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*
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* We don't allow syscalls at all from VM86 mode, but we still
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* need to check VM, because we might be returning from sys_vm86.
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*/
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return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP) &&
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regs->cs == __USER_CS && regs->ss == __USER_DS &&
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regs->ip == landing_pad &&
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(regs->flags & (X86_EFLAGS_RF | X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_VM)) == 0;
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#endif
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}
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#endif
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