
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute 'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides authenticity. This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by EVM, if enabled and configured. Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'. Changelov v4: - changed iint cache flags to hex values Changelog v3: - change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail Changelog v2: - fix audit msg 'res' value - removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values Changelog v1: - removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin) - setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin) - evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr (INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the 'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS). - replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin) - re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin) - include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA - merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin) - removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin) - use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured (moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c) - make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file Changelog: - add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin) - fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin) - cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin) - changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those measured/appraised. - don't try to appraise new/empty files - expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig - IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled - add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub - unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status, not before. (Found by Joe Perches) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
299 lines
7.7 KiB
C
299 lines
7.7 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
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*
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* Authors:
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* Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
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* Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
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* Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
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* Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
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* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
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* License.
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*
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* File: ima_main.c
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* implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
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* and ima_file_check.
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*/
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/binfmts.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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#include <linux/ima.h>
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#include "ima.h"
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int ima_initialized;
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#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
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int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
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#else
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int ima_appraise;
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#endif
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char *ima_hash = "sha1";
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static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
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{
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if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
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ima_hash = "md5";
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return 1;
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}
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__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
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/*
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* ima_rdwr_violation_check
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*
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* Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
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* - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
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* results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
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* - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
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* could result in a file measurement error.
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*
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*/
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static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
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{
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struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
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struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
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fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
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int must_measure;
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bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
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unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
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if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
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return;
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mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* file metadata: permissions, xattr */
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if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
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if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode))
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send_tomtou = true;
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goto out;
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}
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must_measure = ima_must_measure(inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
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if (!must_measure)
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goto out;
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if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0)
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send_writers = true;
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out:
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mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
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if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
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return;
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/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
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pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (pathbuf) {
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pathname = d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
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if (IS_ERR(pathname))
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pathname = NULL;
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else if (strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
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pathname = NULL;
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}
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if (send_tomtou)
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ima_add_violation(inode,
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!pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname,
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"invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
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if (send_writers)
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ima_add_violation(inode,
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!pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname,
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"invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
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kfree(pathbuf);
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}
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static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
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struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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{
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fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
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if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
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return;
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mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
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if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1 &&
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iint->version != inode->i_version) {
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iint->flags &= ~(IMA_COLLECTED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_MEASURED);
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if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
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ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
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}
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mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
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}
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/**
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* ima_file_free - called on __fput()
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* @file: pointer to file structure being freed
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*
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* Flag files that changed, based on i_version
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*/
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void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
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{
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struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
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struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
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if (!iint_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
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return;
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iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
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if (!iint)
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return;
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ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
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}
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static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
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int mask, int function)
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{
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struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
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struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
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unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL;
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int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
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if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
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return 0;
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/* Determine if in appraise/measurement policy,
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* returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE bitmask. */
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action = ima_must_appraise_or_measure(inode, mask, function);
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if (!action)
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return 0;
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retry:
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iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
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if (!iint) {
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rc = integrity_inode_alloc(inode);
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if (!rc || rc == -EEXIST)
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goto retry;
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return rc;
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}
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must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
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mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
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/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
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* (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_APPRAISED) */
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iint->flags |= action;
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action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED)) >> 1);
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/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
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if (!action) {
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if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISED)
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rc = iint->ima_status;
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goto out;
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}
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rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
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if (rc != 0)
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goto out;
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if (function != BPRM_CHECK) {
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/* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
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pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (pathbuf) {
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pathname =
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d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11);
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if (IS_ERR(pathname))
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pathname = NULL;
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}
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}
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if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
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ima_store_measurement(iint, file,
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!pathname ? filename : pathname);
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if (action & IMA_APPRAISE)
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rc = ima_appraise_measurement(iint, file,
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!pathname ? filename : pathname);
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kfree(pathbuf);
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out:
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mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
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return (rc && must_appraise) ? -EACCES : 0;
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}
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/**
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* ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
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* @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
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* @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
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*
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* Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
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* policy decision.
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*
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* Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
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* (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
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*/
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int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
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{
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int rc = 0;
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if (!file)
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return 0;
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if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
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rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
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MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
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return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
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}
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/**
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* ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
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* @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
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*
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* The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
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* from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
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* already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
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* So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
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* what is being executed.
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*
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* Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
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* (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
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*/
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int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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int rc;
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rc = process_measurement(bprm->file,
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(strcmp(bprm->filename, bprm->interp) == 0) ?
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bprm->filename : bprm->interp,
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MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
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return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
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}
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/**
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* ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
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* @file: pointer to the file to be measured
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* @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
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*
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* Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
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*
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* Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
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* (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
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*/
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int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
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{
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int rc;
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ima_rdwr_violation_check(file);
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rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
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mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
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FILE_CHECK);
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return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? rc : 0;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
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static int __init init_ima(void)
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{
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int error;
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error = ima_init();
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if (!error)
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ima_initialized = 1;
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return error;
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}
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late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
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MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
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MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
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