Errors from the server need to be decoded. A bunch of code was imported from
the server to do this but much of it is convoluted and not even needed. The
result is better but still as convoluted as required by the protocol.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Previously the code silently failed to update the disk. Now it will not
allow writable and shared mmaps.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Al Viro glanced at readdir and surmised that getdents
would misbehave the way it was written... and sure enough.
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
replace opencoded pvfs_bufmap_copy_to_kernel_iovec,
pvfs_bufmap_copy_to_user_iovec, pvfs_bufmap_copy_iovec_from_kernel,
and pvfs_bufmap_copy_iovec_from_user with pvfs_bufmap_copy_to_iovec
and pvfs_bufmap_copy_from_iovec, which both use the iov_iter
interface.
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
spinlock_types.h requires types from linux/types.h.
Including spinlock_types.h first may result in the following build errors,
as seen with arm:allmodconfig.
arch/arm/include/asm/spinlock_types.h:12:3: error: unknown type name 'u32'
arch/arm/include/asm/spinlock_types.h:16:4: error: unknown type name 'u16'
Fixes: deb4fb58ff73 ("Orangefs: kernel client part 2")
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
make.cross ARCH=tile doesn't like "inode->i_bytes = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;",
so cast PAGE_CACHE_SIZE to unsigned short.
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Don't check for negative rc from boolean.
Don't pointlessly initialize variables, it short-circuits
gcc's uninitialized variable warnings. And max_new_nr_segs
can never be zero, so don't check for it.
Preserve original kstrdup pointer for freeing later.
Don't check for negative value in unsigned variable.
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
OrangeFS (formerly PVFS) is an lgpl licensed userspace networked parallel
file system. OrangeFS can be accessed through included system utilities,
user integration libraries, MPI-IO and can be used by the Hadoop
ecosystem as an alternative to the HDFS filesystem. OrangeFS is used
widely for parallel science, data analytics and engineering applications.
While applications often don't require Orangefs to be mounted into
the VFS, users do like to be able to access their files in the normal way.
The Orangefs kernel client allows Orangefs filesystems to be mounted as
a VFS. The kernel client communicates with a userspace daemon which in
turn communicates with the Orangefs server daemons that implement the
filesystem. The server daemons (there's almost always more than one)
need not be running on the same host as the kernel client.
Orangefs filesystems can also be mounted with FUSE, and we
ship code and instructions to facilitate that, but most of our users
report preferring to use our kernel module instead. Further, as an example
of a problem we can't solve with fuse, we have in the works a
not-yet-ready-for-prime-time version of a file_operations lock function
that accounts for the server daemons being distributed across more
than one running kernel.
Many people and organizations, including Clemson University,
Argonne National Laboratories and Acxiom Corporation have
helped to create what has become Orangefs over more than twenty
years. Some of the more recent contributors to the kernel client
include:
Mike Marshall
Christoph Hellwig
Randy Martin
Becky Ligon
Walt Ligon
Michael Moore
Rob Ross
Phil Carnes
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Fix multiple bugs in ext4_encrypted_zeroout(), including one that
could cause us to write an encrypted zero page to the wrong location
on disk, potentially causing data and file system corruption.
Fortunately, this tends to only show up in stress tests, but even with
these fixes, we are seeing some test failures with generic/127 --- but
these are now caused by data failures instead of metadata corruption.
Since ext4_encrypted_zeroout() is only used for some optimizations to
keep the extent tree from being too fragmented, and
ext4_encrypted_zeroout() itself isn't all that optimized from a time
or IOPS perspective, disable the extent tree optimization for
encrypted inodes for now. This prevents the data corruption issues
reported by generic/127 until we can figure out what's going wrong.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Since ext4_page_crypto() doesn't need an encryption context (at least
not any more), this allows us to simplify a number function signature
and also allows us to avoid needing to allocate a context in
ext4_block_write_begin(). It also means we no longer need a separate
ext4_decrypt_one() function.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
In cases where the file system block size is the same as the page
size, and ext4_writepage() is asked to write out a page which is
either has the unwritten bit set in the extent tree, or which does not
yet have a block assigned due to delayed allocation, we can bail out
early and, unlocking the page earlier and avoiding a round trip
through ext4_bio_write_page() with the attendant calls to
set_page_writeback() and redirty_page_for_writeback().
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
There are times when ext4_bio_write_page() is called even though we
don't actually need to do any I/O. This happens when ext4_writepage()
gets called by the jbd2 commit path when an inode needs to force its
pages written out in order to provide data=ordered guarantees --- and
a page is backed by an unwritten (e.g., uninitialized) block on disk,
or if delayed allocation means the page's backing store hasn't been
allocated yet. In that case, we need to skip the call to
ext4_encrypt_page(), since in addition to wasting CPU, it leads to a
bounce page and an ext4 crypto context getting leaked.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
When the client goes to return a delegation, it should always update any
nfs4_state currently set up to use that delegation stateid to instead
use the open stateid. It already does do this in some cases,
particularly in the state recovery code, but not currently when the
delegation is voluntarily returned (e.g. in advance of a RENAME). This
causes the client to try to continue using the delegation stateid after
the DELEGRETURN, e.g. in LAYOUTGET.
Set the nfs4_state back to using the open stateid in
nfs4_open_delegation_recall, just before clearing the
NFS_DELEGATED_STATE bit.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Since commit 5cae02f427 an OPEN_CONFIRM should
have a privileged sequence in the recovery case to allow nograce recovery to
proceed for NFSv4.0.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
We need to warn against broken NFSv4.1 servers that try to hand out
delegations in response to NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_DELEG_CUR_FH.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Currently, we don't test if the state owner is in use before we try to
recover it. The problem is that if the refcount is zero, then the
state owner will be waiting on the lru list for garbage collection.
The expectation in that case is that if you bump the refcount, then
you must also remove the state owner from the lru list. Otherwise
the call to nfs4_put_state_owner will corrupt that list by trying
to add our state owner a second time.
Avoid the whole problem by just skipping state owners that hold no
state.
Reported-by: Andrew W Elble <aweits@rit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
If all other conditions in nfs_can_extend_write() are met, and there
are no locks, then we should be able to assume close-to-open semantics
and the ability to extend our write to cover the whole page.
With this patch, the xfstests generic/074 test completes in 242s instead
of >1400s on my test rig.
Fixes: bd61e0a9c8 ("locks: convert posix locks to file_lock_context")
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Currently, we are crediting all the calls to nfs_writepages_callback()
(i.e. the nfs_writepages() callback) to nfs_writepage(). Aside from
being inconsistent with the behaviour of the equivalent readpage/readpages
accounting, this also means that we cannot distinguish between bulk writes
and single page writebacks (which confuses the 'nfsiostat -p' tool).
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
The error paths in set_file_size for cifs and smb3 are incorrect.
In the unlikely event that a server did not support set file info
of the file size, the code incorrectly falls back to trying SMBWriteX
(note that only the original core SMB Write, used for example by DOS,
can set the file size this way - this actually does not work for the more
recent SMBWriteX). The idea was since the old DOS SMB Write could set
the file size if you write zero bytes at that offset then use that if
server rejects the normal set file info call.
Fortunately the SMBWriteX will never be sent on the wire (except when
file size is zero) since the length and offset fields were reversed
in the two places in this function that call SMBWriteX causing
the fall back path to return an error. It is also important to never call
an SMB request from an SMB2/sMB3 session (which theoretically would
be possible, and can cause a brief session drop, although the client
recovers) so this should be fixed. In practice this path does not happen
with modern servers but the error fall back to SMBWriteX is clearly wrong.
Removing the calls to SMBWriteX in the error paths in cifs_set_file_size
Pointed out by PaX/grsecurity team
Signed-off-by: Steve French <steve.french@primarydata.com>
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
CC: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
CC: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
This patch fixes a timing window that causes a segfault.
The problem is that bd can remain NULL throughout the function
and then reference that NULL pointer if the bh->b_private starts
out NULL, then someone sets it to non-NULL inside the locking.
In that case, bd still needs to be set.
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
To avoid deadlock described in commit 084b6e7c76 ("btrfs: Fix a
lockdep warning when running xfstest."), we should move kobj stuff out
of dev_replace lock range.
"It is because the btrfs_kobj_{add/rm}_device() will call memory
allocation with GFP_KERNEL,
which may flush fs page cache to free space, waiting for it self to do
the commit, causing the deadlock.
To solve the problem, move btrfs_kobj_{add/rm}_device() out of the
dev_replace lock range, also involing split the
btrfs_rm_dev_replace_srcdev() function into remove and free parts.
Now only btrfs_rm_dev_replace_remove_srcdev() is called in dev_replace
lock range, and kobj_{add/rm} and btrfs_rm_dev_replace_free_srcdev() are
called out of the lock range."
Signed-off-by: Liu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
[added lockup description]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Originally the message was not in a helper but ended up there. We should
print error messages from callers instead.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
[reworded subject and changelog]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
By general rule of thumb there shouldn't be any way that user land
could trigger a kernel operation just by sending wrong arguments.
Here do commit cleanups after user input has been verified.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
This patch updates and renames btrfs_scratch_superblocks, (which is used
by the replace device thread), with those fixes from the scratch
superblock code section of btrfs_rm_device(). The fixes are:
Scratch all copies of superblock
Notify kobject that superblock has been changed
Update time on the device
So that btrfs_rm_device() can use the function
btrfs_scratch_superblocks() instead of its own scratch code. And further
replace deivce code which similarly releases device back to the system,
will have the fixes from the btrfs device delete.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
[renamed to btrfs_scratch_superblock]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
This uses a chunk of code from btrfs_read_dev_super() and creates
a function called btrfs_read_dev_one_super() so that next patch
can use it for scratch superblock.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
[renamed bufhead to bh]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Use btrfs specific error code BTRFS_ERROR_DEV_MISSING_NOT_FOUND instead
of -ENOENT. Next this removes the logging when user specifies "missing"
and we don't find it in the kernel device list. Logging are for system
events not for user input errors.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Pull UBI/UBIFS fixes from Richard Weinberger:
"This contains three bug fixes for both UBI and UBIFS"
* tag 'upstream-4.3-rc4' of git://git.infradead.org/linux-ubifs:
UBI: return ENOSPC if no enough space available
UBI: Validate data_size
UBIFS: Kill unneeded locking in ubifs_init_security
So the /proc/PID/stat 'wchan' field (the 30th field, which contains
the absolute kernel address of the kernel function a task is blocked in)
leaks absolute kernel addresses to unprivileged user-space:
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', wchan);
The absolute address might also leak via /proc/PID/wchan as well, if
KALLSYMS is turned off or if the symbol lookup fails for some reason:
static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
unsigned long wchan;
char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];
wchan = get_wchan(task);
if (lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname) < 0) {
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
return 0;
seq_printf(m, "%lu", wchan);
} else {
seq_printf(m, "%s", symname);
}
return 0;
}
This isn't ideal, because for example it trivially leaks the KASLR offset
to any local attacker:
fomalhaut:~> printf "%016lx\n" $(cat /proc/$$/stat | cut -d' ' -f35)
ffffffff8123b380
Most real-life uses of wchan are symbolic:
ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm
and procps uses /proc/PID/wchan, not the absolute address in /proc/PID/stat:
triton:~/tip> strace -f ps -eo pid:10,tid:10,wchan:30,comm 2>&1 | grep wchan | tail -1
open("/proc/30833/wchan", O_RDONLY) = 6
There's one compatibility quirk here: procps relies on whether the
absolute value is non-zero - and we can provide that functionality
by outputing "0" or "1" depending on whether the task is blocked
(whether there's a wchan address).
These days there appears to be very little legitimate reason
user-space would be interested in the absolute address. The
absolute address is mostly historic: from the days when we
didn't have kallsyms and user-space procps had to do the
decoding itself via the System.map.
So this patch sets all numeric output to "0" or "1" and keeps only
symbolic output, in /proc/PID/wchan.
( The absolute sleep address can generally still be profiled via
perf, by tasks with sufficient privileges. )
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150930135917.GA3285@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
btrfs_error() and btrfs_std_error() does the same thing
and calls _btrfs_std_error(), so consolidate them together.
And the main motivation is that btrfs_error() is closely
named with btrfs_err(), one handles error action the other
is to log the error, so don't closely name them.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
error handling logic behaves differently with or without
CONFIG_PRINTK defined, since there are two copies of the same
function which a bit of different logic
One, when CONFIG_PRINTK is defined, code is
__btrfs_std_error(..)
{
::
save_error_info(fs_info);
if (sb->s_flags & MS_BORN)
btrfs_handle_error(fs_info);
}
and two when CONFIG_PRINTK is not defined, the code is
__btrfs_std_error(..)
{
::
if (sb->s_flags & MS_BORN) {
save_error_info(fs_info);
btrfs_handle_error(fs_info);
}
}
I doubt if this was intentional ? and appear to have caused since
we maintain two copies of the same function and they got diverged
with commits.
Now to decide which logic is correct reviewed changes as below,
533574c6bc
Commit added two copies of this function
cf79ffb5b7
Commit made change to only one copy of the function and to the
copy when CONFIG_PRINTK is defined.
To fix this, instead of maintaining two copies of same function
approach, maintain single function, and just put the extra
portion of the code under CONFIG_PRINTK define.
This patch just does that. And keeps code of with CONFIG_PRINTK
defined.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
This will return EIO when __bread() fails to read SB,
instead of EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
