4dc0484e90a3cde1cb1514f1db1de3145d99cb18
9617 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Josef Bacik
|
76211f1dd9 |
btrfs: don't arbitrarily slow down delalloc if we're committing
commit 11aeb97b45ad2e0040cbb2a589bc403152526345 upstream. We have a random schedule_timeout() if the current transaction is committing, which seems to be a holdover from the original delalloc reservation code. Remove this, we have the proper flushing stuff, we shouldn't be hoping for random timing things to make everything work. This just induces latency for no reason. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
4be0407ffc |
btrfs: use u64 for buffer sizes in the tree search ioctls
[ Upstream commit dec96fc2dcb59723e041416b8dc53e011b4bfc2e ]
In the tree search v2 ioctl we use the type size_t, which is an unsigned
long, to track the buffer size in the local variable 'buf_size'. An
unsigned long is 32 bits wide on a 32 bits architecture. The buffer size
defined in struct btrfs_ioctl_search_args_v2 is a u64, so when we later
try to copy the local variable 'buf_size' to the argument struct, when
the search returns -EOVERFLOW, we copy only 32 bits which will be a
problem on big endian systems.
Fix this by using a u64 type for the buffer sizes, not only at
btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2(), but also everywhere down the call chain
so that we can use the u64 at btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2().
Fixes:
|
||
|
Josef Bacik
|
4e71ae53f1 |
btrfs: fix some -Wmaybe-uninitialized warnings in ioctl.c
[ Upstream commit 9147b9ded499d9853bdf0e9804b7eaa99c4429ed ]
Jens reported the following warnings from -Wmaybe-uninitialized recent
Linus' branch.
In file included from ./include/asm-generic/rwonce.h:26,
from ./arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h:71,
from ./include/linux/compiler.h:246,
from ./include/linux/export.h:5,
from ./include/linux/linkage.h:7,
from ./include/linux/kernel.h:17,
from fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:6:
In function ‘instrument_copy_from_user_before’,
inlined from ‘_copy_from_user’ at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:148:3,
inlined from ‘copy_from_user’ at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:183:7,
inlined from ‘btrfs_ioctl_space_info’ at fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2999:6,
inlined from ‘btrfs_ioctl’ at fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4616:10:
./include/linux/kasan-checks.h:38:27: warning: ‘space_args’ may be used
uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
38 | #define kasan_check_write __kasan_check_write
./include/linux/instrumented.h:129:9: note: in expansion of macro
‘kasan_check_write’
129 | kasan_check_write(to, n);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/kasan-checks.h: In function ‘btrfs_ioctl’:
./include/linux/kasan-checks.h:20:6: note: by argument 1 of type ‘const
volatile void *’ to ‘__kasan_check_write’ declared here
20 | bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int
size);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2981:39: note: ‘space_args’ declared here
2981 | struct btrfs_ioctl_space_args space_args;
| ^~~~~~~~~~
In function ‘instrument_copy_from_user_before’,
inlined from ‘_copy_from_user’ at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:148:3,
inlined from ‘copy_from_user’ at ./include/linux/uaccess.h:183:7,
inlined from ‘_btrfs_ioctl_send’ at fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4343:9,
inlined from ‘btrfs_ioctl’ at fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4658:10:
./include/linux/kasan-checks.h:38:27: warning: ‘args32’ may be used
uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
38 | #define kasan_check_write __kasan_check_write
./include/linux/instrumented.h:129:9: note: in expansion of macro
‘kasan_check_write’
129 | kasan_check_write(to, n);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./include/linux/kasan-checks.h: In function ‘btrfs_ioctl’:
./include/linux/kasan-checks.h:20:6: note: by argument 1 of type ‘const
volatile void *’ to ‘__kasan_check_write’ declared here
20 | bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int
size);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4341:49: note: ‘args32’ declared here
4341 | struct btrfs_ioctl_send_args_32 args32;
| ^~~~~~
This was due to his config options and having KASAN turned on,
which adds some extra checks around copy_from_user(), which then
triggered the -Wmaybe-uninitialized checker for these cases.
Fix the warnings by initializing the different structs we're copying
into.
Reported-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Josef Bacik
|
840b912df5 |
btrfs: initialize start_slot in btrfs_log_prealloc_extents
[ Upstream commit b4c639f699349880b7918b861e1bd360442ec450 ] Jens reported a compiler warning when using CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE=y that looks like this fs/btrfs/tree-log.c: In function ‘btrfs_log_prealloc_extents’: fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4828:23: warning: ‘start_slot’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] 4828 | ret = copy_items(trans, inode, dst_path, path, | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 4829 | start_slot, ins_nr, 1, 0); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4725:13: note: ‘start_slot’ was declared here 4725 | int start_slot; | ^~~~~~~~~~ The compiler is incorrect, as we only use this code when ins_len > 0, and when ins_len > 0 we have start_slot properly initialized. However we generally find the -Wmaybe-uninitialized warnings valuable, so initialize start_slot to get rid of the warning. Reported-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Tested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
9801e2798b |
btrfs: return -EUCLEAN for delayed tree ref with a ref count not equals to 1
[ Upstream commit 1bf76df3fee56d6637718e267f7c34ed70d0c7dc ] When running a delayed tree reference, if we find a ref count different from 1, we return -EIO. This isn't an IO error, as it indicates either a bug in the delayed refs code or a memory corruption, so change the error code from -EIO to -EUCLEAN. Also tag the branch as 'unlikely' as this is not expected to ever happen, and change the error message to print the tree block's bytenr without the parenthesis (and there was a missing space between the 'block' word and the opening parenthesis), for consistency as that's the style we used everywhere else. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Josef Bacik
|
cbbfdb4bab |
btrfs: properly report 0 avail for very full file systems
commit 58bfe2ccec5f9f137b41dd38f335290dcc13cd5c upstream. A user reported some issues with smaller file systems that get very full. While investigating this issue I noticed that df wasn't showing 100% full, despite having 0 chunk space and having < 1MiB of available metadata space. This turns out to be an overflow issue, we're doing: total_available_metadata_space - SZ_4M < global_block_rsv_size to determine if there's not enough space to make metadata allocations, which overflows if total_available_metadata_space is < 4M. Fix this by checking to see if our available space is greater than the 4M threshold. This makes df properly report 100% usage on the file system. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Qu Wenruo
|
d678c078f3 |
btrfs: reset destination buffer when read_extent_buffer() gets invalid range
[ Upstream commit 74ee79142c0a344d4eae2eb7012ebc4e82254109 ] Commit |
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
7390bb377b |
btrfs: release path before inode lookup during the ino lookup ioctl
commit ee34a82e890a7babb5585daf1a6dd7d4d1cf142a upstream.
During the ino lookup ioctl we can end up calling btrfs_iget() to get an
inode reference while we are holding on a root's btree. If btrfs_iget()
needs to lookup the inode from the root's btree, because it's not
currently loaded in memory, then it will need to lock another or the
same path in the same root btree. This may result in a deadlock and
trigger the following lockdep splat:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00004-gf7757129e3de #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor277/5012 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88802df41710 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88802df418e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}:
down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645
__btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
btrfs_search_slot+0x13a4/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2302
btrfs_init_root_free_objectid+0x148/0x320 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4955
btrfs_init_fs_root fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1128 [inline]
btrfs_get_root_ref+0x5ae/0xae0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1338
btrfs_get_fs_root fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1390 [inline]
open_ctree+0x29c8/0x3030 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3494
btrfs_fill_super+0x1c7/0x2f0 fs/btrfs/super.c:1154
btrfs_mount_root+0x7e0/0x910 fs/btrfs/super.c:1519
legacy_get_tree+0xef/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:611
vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x270 fs/super.c:1519
fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1112 [inline]
vfs_kern_mount+0xbc/0x150 fs/namespace.c:1142
btrfs_mount+0x39f/0xb50 fs/btrfs/super.c:1579
legacy_get_tree+0xef/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:611
vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x270 fs/super.c:1519
do_new_mount+0x28f/0xae0 fs/namespace.c:3335
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3675 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3884 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x2d9/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3861
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
-> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645
__btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:142 [inline]
btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x292/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:281
btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline]
btrfs_search_slot+0x4ff/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2154
btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:412
btrfs_read_locked_inode fs/btrfs/inode.c:3892 [inline]
btrfs_iget_path+0x2d9/0x1520 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5716
btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1961 [inline]
btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user+0x77a/0xf50 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2105
btrfs_ioctl+0xb0b/0xd40 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4683
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf8/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
rlock(btrfs-tree-00);
lock(btrfs-tree-01);
lock(btrfs-tree-00);
rlock(btrfs-tree-01);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz-executor277/5012:
#0: ffff88802df418e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5012 Comm: syz-executor277 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00004-gf7757129e3de #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
down_read_nested+0x49/0x2f0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1645
__btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x2f/0x220 fs/btrfs/locking.c:136
btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:142 [inline]
btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x292/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:281
btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline]
btrfs_search_slot+0x4ff/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2154
btrfs_lookup_inode+0xdc/0x480 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:412
btrfs_read_locked_inode fs/btrfs/inode.c:3892 [inline]
btrfs_iget_path+0x2d9/0x1520 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5716
btrfs_search_path_in_tree_user fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1961 [inline]
btrfs_ioctl_ino_lookup_user+0x77a/0xf50 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:2105
btrfs_ioctl+0xb0b/0xd40 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4683
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf8/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f0bec94ea39
Fix this simply by releasing the path before calling btrfs_iget() as at
point we don't need the path anymore.
Reported-by: syzbot+bf66ad948981797d2f1d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000045fa140603c4a969@google.com/
Fixes:
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
3d379dd109 |
btrfs: fix lockdep splat and potential deadlock after failure running delayed items
commit e110f8911ddb93e6f55da14ccbbe705397b30d0b upstream. When running delayed items we are holding a delayed node's mutex and then we will attempt to modify a subvolume btree to insert/update/delete the delayed items. However if have an error during the insertions for example, btrfs_insert_delayed_items() may return with a path that has locked extent buffers (a leaf at the very least), and then we attempt to release the delayed node at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(), which requires taking the delayed node's mutex, causing an ABBA type of deadlock. This was reported by syzbot and the lockdep splat is the following: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.2/13257 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88801835c0c0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 but task is already holding lock: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5475 [inline] lock_release+0x36f/0x9d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5781 up_write+0x79/0x580 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625 btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline] btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x179/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:239 search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1986 [inline] btrfs_search_slot+0x2511/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2230 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4376 btrfs_insert_delayed_item fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746 [inline] btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xd24/0x2410 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111 __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x1db/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153 flush_space+0x269/0xe70 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:723 btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x106/0x350 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1078 process_one_work+0x92c/0x12c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2600 worker_thread+0xa63/0x1210 kernel/workqueue.c:2751 kthread+0x2b8/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:145 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276 btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988 vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline] vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline] do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline] __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline] __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline] __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); lock(btrfs-tree-00); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by syz-executor.2/13257: #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: spin_unlock include/linux/spinlock.h:391 [inline] #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xb87/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:287 #1: ffff88802c1ee398 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xbb2/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #2: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 13257 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761 __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256 btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276 btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988 vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline] vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline] do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline] __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline] __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline] __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f3ad047cae9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 (...) RSP: 002b:00007f3ad12510c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3ad059bf80 RCX: 00007f3ad047cae9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f3ad04c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f3ad059bf80 R15: 00007ffe56af92f8 </TASK> ------------[ cut here ]------------ Fix this by releasing the path before releasing the delayed node in the error path at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(). Reported-by: syzbot+a379155f07c134ea9879@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000abba27060403b5bd@google.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Anand Jain
|
df380d6f5c |
btrfs: compare the correct fsid/metadata_uuid in btrfs_validate_super
[ Upstream commit 6bfe3959b0e7a526f5c64747801a8613f002f05a ]
The function btrfs_validate_super() should verify the metadata_uuid in
the provided superblock argument. Because, all its callers expect it to
do that.
Such as in the following stacks:
write_all_supers()
sb = fs_info->super_for_commit;
btrfs_validate_write_super(.., sb)
btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)
scrub_one_super()
btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)
And
check_dev_super()
btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)
However, it currently verifies the fs_info::super_copy::metadata_uuid
instead. Fix this using the correct metadata_uuid in the superblock
argument.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Anand Jain
|
ab90a3930d |
btrfs: add a helper to read the superblock metadata_uuid
[ Upstream commit 4844c3664a72d36cc79752cb651c78860b14c240 ] In some cases, we need to read the FSID from the superblock when the metadata_uuid is not set, and otherwise, read the metadata_uuid. So, add a helper. Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Stable-dep-of: 6bfe3959b0e7 ("btrfs: compare the correct fsid/metadata_uuid in btrfs_validate_super") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Josef Bacik
|
cc87d2bb39 |
btrfs: move btrfs_pinned_by_swapfile prototype into volumes.h
[ Upstream commit c2e79e865b87c2920a3cd39de69c35f2bc758a51 ] This is defined in volumes.c, move the prototype into volumes.h. Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Stable-dep-of: 6bfe3959b0e7 ("btrfs: compare the correct fsid/metadata_uuid in btrfs_validate_super") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Qu Wenruo
|
b7c3cf2f6c |
btrfs: output extra debug info if we failed to find an inline backref
[ Upstream commit 7f72f50547b7af4ddf985b07fc56600a4deba281 ] [BUG] Syzbot reported several warning triggered inside lookup_inline_extent_backref(). [CAUSE] As usual, the reproducer doesn't reliably trigger locally here, but at least we know the WARN_ON() is triggered when an inline backref can not be found, and it can only be triggered when @insert is true. (I.e. inserting a new inline backref, which means the backref should already exist) [ENHANCEMENT] After the WARN_ON(), dump all the parameters and the extent tree leaf to help debug. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d6f9ff86c1d804ba2bc6 Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Anand Jain
|
e76cef3dcd |
btrfs: use the correct superblock to compare fsid in btrfs_validate_super
commit d167aa76dc0683828588c25767da07fb549e4f48 upstream.
The function btrfs_validate_super() should verify the fsid in the provided
superblock argument. Because, all its callers expect it to do that.
Such as in the following stack:
write_all_supers()
sb = fs_info->super_for_commit;
btrfs_validate_write_super(.., sb)
btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)
scrub_one_super()
btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)
And
check_dev_super()
btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)
However, it currently verifies the fs_info::super_copy::fsid instead,
which is not correct. Fix this using the correct fsid in the superblock
argument.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
f2873a18c2 |
btrfs: don't start transaction when joining with TRANS_JOIN_NOSTART
commit 4490e803e1fe9fab8db5025e44e23b55df54078b upstream.
When joining a transaction with TRANS_JOIN_NOSTART, if we don't find a
running transaction we end up creating one. This goes against the purpose
of TRANS_JOIN_NOSTART which is to join a running transaction if its state
is at or below the state TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START, otherwise return an
-ENOENT error and don't start a new transaction. So fix this to not create
a new transaction if there's no running transaction at or below that
state.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Fixes:
|
||
|
xiaoshoukui
|
bd7bef82ce |
btrfs: fix BUG_ON condition in btrfs_cancel_balance
commit 29eefa6d0d07e185f7bfe9576f91e6dba98189c2 upstream.
Pausing and canceling balance can race to interrupt balance lead to BUG_ON
panic in btrfs_cancel_balance. The BUG_ON condition in btrfs_cancel_balance
does not take this race scenario into account.
However, the race condition has no other side effects. We can fix that.
Reproducing it with panic trace like this:
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4618!
RIP: 0010:btrfs_cancel_balance+0x5cf/0x6a0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? do_nanosleep+0x60/0x120
? hrtimer_nanosleep+0xb7/0x1a0
? sched_core_clone_cookie+0x70/0x70
btrfs_ioctl_balance_ctl+0x55/0x70
btrfs_ioctl+0xa46/0xd20
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x7d/0xa0
do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Race scenario as follows:
> mutex_unlock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
> --------------------
> .......issue pause and cancel req in another thread
> --------------------
> ret = __btrfs_balance(fs_info);
>
> mutex_lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);
> if (ret == -ECANCELED && atomic_read(&fs_info->balance_pause_req)) {
> btrfs_info(fs_info, "balance: paused");
> btrfs_exclop_balance(fs_info, BTRFS_EXCLOP_BALANCE_PAUSED);
> }
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: xiaoshoukui <xiaoshoukui@ruijie.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Josef Bacik
|
200ae5fa0b |
btrfs: set cache_block_group_error if we find an error
commit 92fb94b69c6accf1e49fff699640fa0ce03dc910 upstream. We set cache_block_group_error if btrfs_cache_block_group() returns an error, this is because we could end up not finding space to allocate and mistakenly return -ENOSPC, and which could then abort the transaction with the incorrect errno, and in the case of ENOSPC result in a WARN_ON() that will trip up tests like generic/475. However there's the case where multiple threads can be racing, one thread gets the proper error, and the other thread doesn't actually call btrfs_cache_block_group(), it instead sees ->cached == BTRFS_CACHE_ERROR. Again the result is the same, we fail to allocate our space and return -ENOSPC. Instead we need to set cache_block_group_error to -EIO in this case to make sure that if we do not make our allocation we get the appropriate error returned back to the caller. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Christoph Hellwig
|
bd3175f9d5 |
btrfs: don't stop integrity writeback too early
commit effa24f689ce0948f68c754991a445a8d697d3a8 upstream.
extent_write_cache_pages stops writing pages as soon as nr_to_write hits
zero. That is the right thing for opportunistic writeback, but incorrect
for data integrity writeback, which needs to ensure that no dirty pages
are left in the range. Thus only stop the writeback for WB_SYNC_NONE
if nr_to_write hits 0.
This is a port of write_cache_pages changes in commit
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
3d10481a90 |
btrfs: check if the transaction was aborted at btrfs_wait_for_commit()
[ Upstream commit bf7ecbe9875061bf3fce1883e3b26b77f847d1e8 ]
At btrfs_wait_for_commit() we wait for a transaction to finish and then
always return 0 (success) without checking if it was aborted, in which
case the transaction didn't happen due to some critical error. Fix this
by checking if the transaction was aborted.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
c5c797ccc3 |
btrfs: check for commit error at btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier()
commit b28ff3a7d7e97456fd86b68d24caa32e1cfa7064 upstream.
btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier() is used to get a handle pointing to the
current running transaction if the transaction has not started its commit
yet (its state is < TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START). If the transaction commit
has started, then we wait for the transaction to commit and finish before
returning - however we completely ignore if the transaction was aborted
due to some error during its commit, we simply return ERR_PT(-ENOENT),
which makes the caller assume everything is fine and no errors happened.
This could make an fsync return success (0) to user space when in fact we
had a transaction abort and the target inode changes were therefore not
persisted.
Fix this by checking for the return value from btrfs_wait_for_commit(),
and if it returned an error, return it back to the caller.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
52df40a5c7 |
btrfs: fix extent buffer leak after tree mod log failure at split_node()
[ Upstream commit ede600e497b1461d06d22a7d17703d9096868bc3 ]
At split_node(), if we fail to log the tree mod log copy operation, we
return without unlocking the split extent buffer we just allocated and
without decrementing the reference we own on it. Fix this by unlocking
it and decrementing the ref count before returning.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
52403c3dad |
btrfs: fix race between quota disable and relocation
[ Upstream commit 8a4a0b2a3eaf75ca8854f856ef29690c12b2f531 ]
If we disable quotas while we have a relocation of a metadata block group
that has extents belonging to the quota root, we can cause the relocation
to fail with -ENOENT. This is because relocation builds backref nodes for
extents of the quota root and later needs to walk the backrefs and access
the quota root - however if in between a task disables quotas, it results
in deleting the quota root from the root tree (with btrfs_del_root(),
called from btrfs_quota_disable().
This can be sporadically triggered by test case btrfs/255 from fstests:
$ ./check btrfs/255
FSTYP -- btrfs
PLATFORM -- Linux/x86_64 debian0 6.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-134+ #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Thu Jun 15 11:59:28 WEST 2023
MKFS_OPTIONS -- /dev/sdc
MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/sdc /home/fdmanana/btrfs-tests/scratch_1
btrfs/255 6s ... _check_dmesg: something found in dmesg (see /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/255.dmesg)
- output mismatch (see /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/255.out.bad)
# --- tests/btrfs/255.out 2023-03-02 21:47:53.876609426 +0000
# +++ /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/255.out.bad 2023-06-16 10:20:39.267563212 +0100
# @@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
# QA output created by 255
# +ERROR: error during balancing '/home/fdmanana/btrfs-tests/scratch_1': No such file or directory
# +There may be more info in syslog - try dmesg | tail
# Silence is golden
# ...
(Run 'diff -u /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/tests/btrfs/255.out /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/255.out.bad' to see the entire diff)
Ran: btrfs/255
Failures: btrfs/255
Failed 1 of 1 tests
To fix this make the quota disable operation take the cleaner mutex, as
relocation of a block group also takes this mutex. This is also what we
do when deleting a subvolume/snapshot, we take the cleaner mutex in the
cleaner kthread (at cleaner_kthread()) and then we call btrfs_del_root()
at btrfs_drop_snapshot() while under the protection of the cleaner mutex.
Fixes:
|
||
|
David Sterba
|
ae51eb90bc |
btrfs: add xxhash to fast checksum implementations
[ Upstream commit efcfcbc6a36195c42d98e0ee697baba36da94dc8 ]
The implementation of XXHASH is now CPU only but still fast enough to be
considered for the synchronous checksumming, like non-generic crc32c.
A userspace benchmark comparing it to various implementations (patched
hash-speedtest from btrfs-progs):
Block size: 4096
Iterations: 1000000
Implementation: builtin
Units: CPU cycles
NULL-NOP: cycles: 73384294, cycles/i 73
NULL-MEMCPY: cycles: 228033868, cycles/i 228, 61664.320 MiB/s
CRC32C-ref: cycles: 24758559416, cycles/i 24758, 567.950 MiB/s
CRC32C-NI: cycles: 1194350470, cycles/i 1194, 11773.433 MiB/s
CRC32C-ADLERSW: cycles: 6150186216, cycles/i 6150, 2286.372 MiB/s
CRC32C-ADLERHW: cycles: 626979180, cycles/i 626, 22427.453 MiB/s
CRC32C-PCL: cycles: 466746732, cycles/i 466, 30126.699 MiB/s
XXHASH: cycles: 860656400, cycles/i 860, 16338.188 MiB/s
Comparing purely software implementation (ref), current outdated
accelerated using crc32q instruction (NI), optimized implementations by
M. Adler (https://stackoverflow.com/questions/17645167/implementing-sse-4-2s-crc32c-in-software/17646775#17646775)
and the best one that was taken from kernel using the PCLMULQDQ
instruction (PCL).
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
d2c667cc18 |
btrfs: fix warning when putting transaction with qgroups enabled after abort
commit aa84ce8a78a1a5c10cdf9c7a5fb0c999fbc2c8d6 upstream.
If we have a transaction abort with qgroups enabled we get a warning
triggered when doing the final put on the transaction, like this:
[552.6789] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[552.6815] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 81745 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:144 btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs]
[552.6817] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor (...)
[552.6819] CPU: 4 PID: 81745 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G W 6.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-134+ #1
[552.6819] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[552.6819] RIP: 0010:btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs]
[552.6821] Code: bd a0 01 00 (...)
[552.6821] RSP: 0018:ffffa168c0527e28 EFLAGS: 00010286
[552.6821] RAX: ffff936042caed00 RBX: ffff93604a3eb448 RCX: 0000000000000000
[552.6821] RDX: ffff93606421b028 RSI: ffffffff92ff0878 RDI: ffff93606421b010
[552.6821] RBP: ffff93606421b000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa168c0d07c20
[552.6821] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff93608dc52950 R12: ffffa168c0527e70
[552.6821] R13: ffff93606421b000 R14: ffff93604a3eb420 R15: ffff93606421b028
[552.6821] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff93675fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[552.6821] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[552.6821] CR2: 0000558ad262b000 CR3: 000000014feda005 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[552.6822] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[552.6822] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[552.6822] Call Trace:
[552.6822] <TASK>
[552.6822] ? __warn+0x80/0x130
[552.6822] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs]
[552.6824] ? report_bug+0x1f4/0x200
[552.6824] ? handle_bug+0x42/0x70
[552.6824] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[552.6824] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[552.6824] ? btrfs_put_transaction+0x123/0x130 [btrfs]
[552.6826] btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0xe7/0x5e0 [btrfs]
[552.6828] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x23/0x40
[552.6828] ? try_to_wake_up+0x94/0x5e0
[552.6828] ? __pfx_process_timeout+0x10/0x10
[552.6828] transaction_kthread+0x103/0x1d0 [btrfs]
[552.6830] ? __pfx_transaction_kthread+0x10/0x10 [btrfs]
[552.6832] kthread+0xee/0x120
[552.6832] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[552.6832] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
[552.6832] </TASK>
[552.6832] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This corresponds to this line of code:
void btrfs_put_transaction(struct btrfs_transaction *transaction)
{
(...)
WARN_ON(!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(
&transaction->delayed_refs.dirty_extent_root));
(...)
}
The warning happens because btrfs_qgroup_destroy_extent_records(), called
in the transaction abort path, we free all entries from the rbtree
"dirty_extent_root" with rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(), but we
don't actually empty the rbtree - it's still pointing to nodes that were
freed.
So set the rbtree's root node to NULL to avoid this warning (assign
RB_ROOT).
Fixes:
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
6819bb0b85 |
btrfs: fix race when deleting quota root from the dirty cow roots list
commit b31cb5a6eb7a48b0a7bfdf06832b1fd5088d8c79 upstream.
When disabling quotas we are deleting the quota root from the list
fs_info->dirty_cowonly_roots without taking the lock that protects it,
which is struct btrfs_fs_info::trans_lock. This unsynchronized list
manipulation may cause chaos if there's another concurrent manipulation
of this list, such as when adding a root to it with
ctree.c:add_root_to_dirty_list().
This can result in all sorts of weird failures caused by a race, such as
the following crash:
[337571.278245] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000108: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[337571.278933] CPU: 1 PID: 115447 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-134+ #1
[337571.279153] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[337571.279572] RIP: 0010:commit_cowonly_roots+0x11f/0x250 [btrfs]
[337571.279928] Code: 85 38 06 00 (...)
[337571.280363] RSP: 0018:ffff9f63446efba0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[337571.280582] RAX: ffff942d98ec2638 RBX: ffff9430b82b4c30 RCX: 0000000449e1c000
[337571.280798] RDX: dead000000000100 RSI: ffff9430021e4900 RDI: 0000000000036070
[337571.281015] RBP: ffff942d98ec2000 R08: ffff942d98ec2000 R09: 000000000000015b
[337571.281254] R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff942fe8fbf600
[337571.281476] R13: ffff942dabe23040 R14: ffff942dabe20800 R15: ffff942d92cf3b48
[337571.281723] FS: 00007f478adb7340(0000) GS:ffff94349fa40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[337571.281950] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[337571.282184] CR2: 00007f478ab9a3d5 CR3: 000000001e02c001 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[337571.282416] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[337571.282647] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[337571.282874] Call Trace:
[337571.283101] <TASK>
[337571.283327] ? __die_body+0x1b/0x60
[337571.283570] ? die_addr+0x39/0x60
[337571.283796] ? exc_general_protection+0x22e/0x430
[337571.284022] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
[337571.284251] ? commit_cowonly_roots+0x11f/0x250 [btrfs]
[337571.284531] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x42e/0xf90 [btrfs]
[337571.284803] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30
[337571.285031] ? release_extent_buffer+0x103/0x130 [btrfs]
[337571.285305] reset_balance_state+0x152/0x1b0 [btrfs]
[337571.285578] btrfs_balance+0xa50/0x11e0 [btrfs]
[337571.285864] ? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x14a/0x410
[337571.286086] btrfs_ioctl+0x249a/0x3320 [btrfs]
[337571.286358] ? mod_objcg_state+0xd2/0x360
[337571.286577] ? refill_obj_stock+0xb0/0x160
[337571.286798] ? seq_release+0x25/0x30
[337571.287016] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x3ba/0x4b0
[337571.287235] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x2e/0xa0
[337571.287455] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[337571.287675] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0
[337571.287901] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[337571.288126] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
[337571.288352] RIP: 0033:0x7f478aaffe9b
So fix this by locking struct btrfs_fs_info::trans_lock before deleting
the quota root from that list.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Matt Corallo
|
a3fbd156bd |
btrfs: add handling for RAID1C23/DUP to btrfs_reduce_alloc_profile
commit 160fe8f6fdb13da6111677be6263e5d65e875987 upstream. Callers of `btrfs_reduce_alloc_profile` expect it to return exactly one allocation profile flag, and failing to do so may ultimately result in a WARN_ON and remount-ro when allocating new blocks, like the below transaction abort on 6.1. `btrfs_reduce_alloc_profile` has two ways of determining the profile, first it checks if a conversion balance is currently running and uses the profile we're converting to. If no balance is currently running, it returns the max-redundancy profile which at least one block in the selected block group has. This works by simply checking each known allocation profile bit in redundancy order. However, `btrfs_reduce_alloc_profile` has not been updated as new flags have been added - first with the `DUP` profile and later with the RAID1C34 profiles. Because of the way it checks, if we have blocks with different profiles and at least one is known, that profile will be selected. However, if none are known we may return a flag set with multiple allocation profiles set. This is currently only possible when a balance from one of the three unhandled profiles to another of the unhandled profiles is canceled after allocating at least one block using the new profile. In that case, a transaction abort like the below will occur and the filesystem will need to be mounted with -o skip_balance to get it mounted rw again (but the balance cannot be resumed without a similar abort). [770.648] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [770.648] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -22) [770.648] WARNING: CPU: 43 PID: 1159593 at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4122 find_free_extent+0x1d94/0x1e00 [btrfs] [770.648] CPU: 43 PID: 1159593 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.1.0-0.deb11.7-powerpc64le #1 Debian 6.1.20-2~bpo11+1a~test [770.648] Hardware name: T2P9D01 REV 1.00 POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-bc106a0 PowerNV [770.648] NIP: c00800000f6784fc LR: c00800000f6784f8 CTR: c000000000d746c0 [770.648] REGS: c000200089afe9a0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (6.1.0-0.deb11.7-powerpc64le Debian 6.1.20-2~bpo11+1a~test) [770.648] MSR: 9000000002029033 <SF,HV,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28848282 XER: 20040000 [770.648] CFAR: c000000000135110 IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: c00800000f6784f8 c000200089afec40 c00800000f7ea800 0000000000000026 GPR04: 00000001004820c2 c000200089afea00 c000200089afe9f8 0000000000000027 GPR08: c000200ffbfe7f98 c000000002127f90 ffffffffffffffd8 0000000026d6a6e8 GPR12: 0000000028848282 c000200fff7f3800 5deadbeef0000122 c00000002269d000 GPR16: c0002008c7797c40 c000200089afef17 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 c000200008bc5a98 0000000000000001 GPR24: 0000000000000000 c0000003c73088d0 c000200089afef17 c000000016d3a800 GPR28: c0000003c7308800 c00000002269d000 ffffffffffffffea 0000000000000001 [770.648] NIP [c00800000f6784fc] find_free_extent+0x1d94/0x1e00 [btrfs] [770.648] LR [c00800000f6784f8] find_free_extent+0x1d90/0x1e00 [btrfs] [770.648] Call Trace: [770.648] [c000200089afec40] [c00800000f6784f8] find_free_extent+0x1d90/0x1e00 [btrfs] (unreliable) [770.648] [c000200089afed30] [c00800000f681398] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x1a0/0x2f0 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089afeea0] [c00800000f681bf0] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x108/0x670 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089afeff0] [c00800000f66bd68] __btrfs_cow_block+0x170/0x850 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff100] [c00800000f66c58c] btrfs_cow_block+0x144/0x288 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff1b0] [c00800000f67113c] btrfs_search_slot+0x6b4/0xcb0 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff2a0] [c00800000f679f60] lookup_inline_extent_backref+0x128/0x7c0 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff3b0] [c00800000f67b338] lookup_extent_backref+0x70/0x190 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff470] [c00800000f67b54c] __btrfs_free_extent+0xf4/0x1490 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff5a0] [c00800000f67d770] __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x328/0x1530 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff740] [c00800000f67ea2c] btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xb4/0x3e0 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff800] [c00800000f699aa4] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x8c/0x12b0 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff8f0] [c00800000f6dc628] reset_balance_state+0x1c0/0x290 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089aff9a0] [c00800000f6e2f7c] btrfs_balance+0x1164/0x1500 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089affb40] [c00800000f6f8e4c] btrfs_ioctl+0x2b54/0x3100 [btrfs] [770.648] [c000200089affc80] [c00000000053be14] sys_ioctl+0x794/0x1310 [770.648] [c000200089affd70] [c00000000002af98] system_call_exception+0x138/0x250 [770.648] [c000200089affe10] [c00000000000c654] system_call_common+0xf4/0x258 [770.648] --- interrupt: c00 at 0x7fff94126800 [770.648] NIP: 00007fff94126800 LR: 0000000107e0b594 CTR: 0000000000000000 [770.648] REGS: c000200089affe80 TRAP: 0c00 Tainted: G W (6.1.0-0.deb11.7-powerpc64le Debian 6.1.20-2~bpo11+1a~test) [770.648] MSR: 900000000000d033 <SF,HV,EE,PR,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002848 XER: 00000000 [770.648] IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: 0000000000000036 00007fffc9439da0 00007fff94217100 0000000000000003 GPR04: 00000000c4009420 00007fffc9439ee8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR08: 00000000803c7416 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000000000000 00007fff9467d120 0000000107e64c9c 0000000107e64d0a GPR16: 0000000107e64d06 0000000107e64cf1 0000000107e64cc4 0000000107e64c73 GPR20: 0000000107e64c31 0000000107e64bf1 0000000107e64be7 0000000000000000 GPR24: 0000000000000000 00007fffc9439ee0 0000000000000003 0000000000000001 GPR28: 00007fffc943f713 0000000000000000 00007fffc9439ee8 0000000000000000 [770.648] NIP [00007fff94126800] 0x7fff94126800 [770.648] LR [0000000107e0b594] 0x107e0b594 [770.648] --- interrupt: c00 [770.648] Instruction dump: [770.648] 3b00ffe4 e8898828 481175f5 60000000 4bfff4fc 3be00000 4bfff570 3d220000 [770.648] 7fc4f378 e8698830 4811cd95 e8410018 <0fe00000> f9c10060 f9e10068 fa010070 [770.648] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [770.648] BTRFS: error (device dm-2: state A) in find_free_extent_update_loop:4122: errno=-22 unknown [770.648] BTRFS info (device dm-2: state EA): forced readonly [770.648] BTRFS: error (device dm-2: state EA) in __btrfs_free_extent:3070: errno=-22 unknown [770.648] BTRFS error (device dm-2: state EA): failed to run delayed ref for logical 17838685708288 num_bytes 24576 type 184 action 2 ref_mod 1: -22 [770.648] BTRFS: error (device dm-2: state EA) in btrfs_run_delayed_refs:2144: errno=-22 unknown [770.648] BTRFS: error (device dm-2: state EA) in reset_balance_state:3599: errno=-22 unknown Fixes: |
||
|
Johannes Thumshirn
|
3bc883132d |
btrfs: handle memory allocation failure in btrfs_csum_one_bio
[ Upstream commit 806570c0bb7b4847828c22c4934fcf2dc8fc572f ]
Since f8a53bb58ec7 ("btrfs: handle checksum generation in the storage
layer") the failures of btrfs_csum_one_bio() are handled via
bio_end_io().
This means, we can return BLK_STS_RESOURCE from btrfs_csum_one_bio() in
case the allocation of the ordered sums fails.
This also fixes a syzkaller report, where injecting a failure into the
kvzalloc() call results in a BUG_ON().
Reported-by: syzbot+d8941552e21eac774778@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Qu Wenruo
|
142fbad314 |
btrfs: scrub: try harder to mark RAID56 block groups read-only
[ Upstream commit 7561551e7ba870b9659083b95feb520fb2dacce3 ] Currently we allow a block group not to be marked read-only for scrub. But for RAID56 block groups if we require the block group to be read-only, then we're allowed to use cached content from scrub stripe to reduce unnecessary RAID56 reads. So this patch would: - Make btrfs_inc_block_group_ro() try harder During my tests, for cases like btrfs/061 and btrfs/064, we can hit ENOSPC from btrfs_inc_block_group_ro() calls during scrub. The reason is if we only have one single data chunk, and trying to scrub it, we won't have any space left for any newer data writes. But this check should be done by the caller, especially for scrub cases we only temporarily mark the chunk read-only. And newer data writes would always try to allocate a new data chunk when needed. - Return error for scrub if we failed to mark a RAID56 chunk read-only Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Zixuan Fu
|
b60e862e13 |
btrfs: unset reloc control if transaction commit fails in prepare_to_relocate()
commit 85f02d6c856b9f3a0acf5219de6e32f58b9778eb upstream.
In btrfs_relocate_block_group(), the rc is allocated. Then
btrfs_relocate_block_group() calls
relocate_block_group()
prepare_to_relocate()
set_reloc_control()
that assigns rc to the variable fs_info->reloc_ctl. When
prepare_to_relocate() returns, it calls
btrfs_commit_transaction()
btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups()
btrfs_alloc_path()
kmem_cache_zalloc()
which may fail for example (or other errors could happen). When the
failure occurs, btrfs_relocate_block_group() detects the error and frees
rc and doesn't set fs_info->reloc_ctl to NULL. After that, in
btrfs_init_reloc_root(), rc is retrieved from fs_info->reloc_ctl and
then used, which may cause a use-after-free bug.
This possible bug can be triggered by calling btrfs_ioctl_balance()
before calling btrfs_ioctl_defrag().
To fix this possible bug, in prepare_to_relocate(), check if
btrfs_commit_transaction() fails. If the failure occurs,
unset_reloc_control() is called to set fs_info->reloc_ctl to NULL.
The error log in our fault-injection testing is shown as follows:
[ 58.751070] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x7ca/0x920 [btrfs]
...
[ 58.753577] Call Trace:
...
[ 58.755800] kasan_report+0x45/0x60
[ 58.756066] btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x7ca/0x920 [btrfs]
[ 58.757304] record_root_in_trans+0x792/0xa10 [btrfs]
[ 58.757748] btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x463/0x4f0 [btrfs]
[ 58.758231] start_transaction+0x896/0x2950 [btrfs]
[ 58.758661] btrfs_defrag_root+0x250/0xc00 [btrfs]
[ 58.759083] btrfs_ioctl_defrag+0x467/0xa00 [btrfs]
[ 58.759513] btrfs_ioctl+0x3c95/0x114e0 [btrfs]
...
[ 58.768510] Allocated by task 23683:
[ 58.768777] ____kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xf0
[ 58.769069] __kmalloc+0x227/0x3d0
[ 58.769325] alloc_reloc_control+0x10a/0x3d0 [btrfs]
[ 58.769755] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x7aa/0x1e20 [btrfs]
[ 58.770228] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0xf1/0x760 [btrfs]
[ 58.770655] __btrfs_balance+0x1326/0x1f10 [btrfs]
[ 58.771071] btrfs_balance+0x3150/0x3d30 [btrfs]
[ 58.771472] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0xd84/0x1410 [btrfs]
[ 58.771902] btrfs_ioctl+0x4caa/0x114e0 [btrfs]
...
[ 58.773337] Freed by task 23683:
...
[ 58.774815] kfree+0xda/0x2b0
[ 58.775038] free_reloc_control+0x1d6/0x220 [btrfs]
[ 58.775465] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x115c/0x1e20 [btrfs]
[ 58.775944] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0xf1/0x760 [btrfs]
[ 58.776369] __btrfs_balance+0x1326/0x1f10 [btrfs]
[ 58.776784] btrfs_balance+0x3150/0x3d30 [btrfs]
[ 58.777185] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0xd84/0x1410 [btrfs]
[ 58.777621] btrfs_ioctl+0x4caa/0x114e0 [btrfs]
...
Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab@tsinghua.edu.cn>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
Reviewed-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Ghinea <stefan.ghinea@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Josef Bacik
|
6f371623f3 |
btrfs: check return value of btrfs_commit_transaction in relocation
commit fb686c6824dd6294ca772b92424b8fba666e7d00 upstream. There are a few places where we don't check the return value of btrfs_commit_transaction in relocation.c. Thankfully all these places have straightforward error handling, so simply change all of the sites at once. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Ghinea <stefan.ghinea@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
pengfuyuan
|
e0b8664c2f |
btrfs: fix csum_tree_block page iteration to avoid tripping on -Werror=array-bounds
commit 5ad9b4719fc9bc4715c7e19875a962095b0577e7 upstream.
When compiling on a MIPS 64-bit machine we get these warnings:
In file included from ./arch/mips/include/asm/cacheflush.h:13,
from ./include/linux/cacheflush.h:5,
from ./include/linux/highmem.h:8,
from ./include/linux/bvec.h:10,
from ./include/linux/blk_types.h:10,
from ./include/linux/blkdev.h:9,
from fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:7:
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c: In function ‘csum_tree_block’:
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c💯34: error: array subscript 1 is above array bounds of ‘struct page *[1]’ [-Werror=array-bounds]
100 | kaddr = page_address(buf->pages[i]);
| ~~~~~~~~~~^~~
./include/linux/mm.h:2135:48: note: in definition of macro ‘page_address’
2135 | #define page_address(page) lowmem_page_address(page)
| ^~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
We can check if i overflows to solve the problem. However, this doesn't make
much sense, since i == 1 and num_pages == 1 doesn't execute the body of the loop.
In addition, i < num_pages can also ensure that buf->pages[i] will not cross
the boundary. Unfortunately, this doesn't help with the problem observed here:
gcc still complains.
To fix this add a compile-time condition for the extent buffer page
array size limit, which would eventually lead to eliminating the whole
for loop.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Signed-off-by: pengfuyuan <pengfuyuan@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
a3393eb6fb |
btrfs: abort transaction when sibling keys check fails for leaves
[ Upstream commit 9ae5afd02a03d4e22a17a9609b19400b77c36273 ] If the sibling keys check fails before we move keys from one sibling leaf to another, we are not aborting the transaction - we leave that to some higher level caller of btrfs_search_slot() (or anything else that uses it to insert items into a b+tree). This means that the transaction abort will provide a stack trace that omits the b+tree modification call chain. So change this to immediately abort the transaction and therefore get a more useful stack trace that shows us the call chain in the bt+tree modification code. It's also important to immediately abort the transaction just in case some higher level caller is not doing it, as this indicates a very serious corruption and we should stop the possibility of doing further damage. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Josef Bacik
|
139f84c80d |
btrfs: use nofs when cleaning up aborted transactions
commit 597441b3436a43011f31ce71dc0a6c0bf5ce958a upstream. Our CI system caught a lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.3.0-rc7+ #1167 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/46 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8c6543abd650 (sb_internal#2){++++}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x120 but task is already holding lock: ffffffffabe61b40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x4aa/0x7a0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0xa5/0xe0 kmem_cache_alloc+0x31/0x2c0 alloc_extent_state+0x1d/0xd0 __clear_extent_bit+0x2e0/0x4f0 try_release_extent_mapping+0x216/0x280 btrfs_release_folio+0x2e/0x90 invalidate_inode_pages2_range+0x397/0x470 btrfs_cleanup_dirty_bgs+0x9e/0x210 btrfs_cleanup_one_transaction+0x22/0x760 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x3b7/0x13a0 create_subvol+0x59b/0x970 btrfs_mksubvol+0x435/0x4f0 __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x11e/0x1b0 btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0xbf/0x140 btrfs_ioctl+0xa45/0x28f0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc -> #0 (sb_internal#2){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1435/0x21a0 lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2b0 start_transaction+0x401/0x730 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x120 btrfs_evict_inode+0x292/0x3d0 evict+0xcc/0x1d0 inode_lru_isolate+0x14d/0x1e0 __list_lru_walk_one+0xbe/0x1c0 list_lru_walk_one+0x58/0x80 prune_icache_sb+0x39/0x60 super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1f0 do_shrink_slab+0x163/0x340 shrink_slab+0x1d3/0x290 shrink_node+0x300/0x720 balance_pgdat+0x35c/0x7a0 kswapd+0x205/0x410 kthread+0xf0/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal#2); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/46: #0: ffffffffabe61b40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x4aa/0x7a0 #1: ffffffffabe50270 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: shrink_slab+0x113/0x290 #2: ffff8c6543abd0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#44){++++}-{3:3}, at: super_cache_scan+0x38/0x1f0 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 46 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7+ #1167 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x90 check_noncircular+0xd6/0x100 ? save_trace+0x3f/0x310 ? add_lock_to_list+0x97/0x120 __lock_acquire+0x1435/0x21a0 lock_acquire+0xc2/0x2b0 ? btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x120 start_transaction+0x401/0x730 ? btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x120 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x5f/0x120 btrfs_evict_inode+0x292/0x3d0 ? lock_release+0x134/0x270 ? __pfx_wake_bit_function+0x10/0x10 evict+0xcc/0x1d0 inode_lru_isolate+0x14d/0x1e0 __list_lru_walk_one+0xbe/0x1c0 ? __pfx_inode_lru_isolate+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_inode_lru_isolate+0x10/0x10 list_lru_walk_one+0x58/0x80 prune_icache_sb+0x39/0x60 super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1f0 do_shrink_slab+0x163/0x340 shrink_slab+0x1d3/0x290 shrink_node+0x300/0x720 balance_pgdat+0x35c/0x7a0 kswapd+0x205/0x410 ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_kswapd+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xf0/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50 </TASK> This happens because when we abort the transaction in the transaction commit path we call invalidate_inode_pages2_range on our block group cache inodes (if we have space cache v1) and any delalloc inodes we may have. The plain invalidate_inode_pages2_range() call passes through GFP_KERNEL, which makes sense in most cases, but not here. Wrap these two invalidate callees with memalloc_nofs_save/memalloc_nofs_restore to make sure we don't end up with the fs reclaim dependency under the transaction dependency. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
84fdaaf0d7 |
btrfs: fix space cache inconsistency after error loading it from disk
[ Upstream commit 0004ff15ea26015a0a3a6182dca3b9d1df32e2b7 ]
When loading a free space cache from disk, at __load_free_space_cache(),
if we fail to insert a bitmap entry, we still increment the number of
total bitmaps in the btrfs_free_space_ctl structure, which is incorrect
since we failed to add the bitmap entry. On error we then empty the
cache by calling __btrfs_remove_free_space_cache(), which will result
in getting the total bitmaps counter set to 1.
A failure to load a free space cache is not critical, so if a failure
happens we just rebuild the cache by scanning the extent tree, which
happens at block-group.c:caching_thread(). Yet the failure will result
in having the total bitmaps of the btrfs_free_space_ctl always bigger
by 1 then the number of bitmap entries we have. So fix this by having
the total bitmaps counter be incremented only if we successfully added
the bitmap entry.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Nikolay Borisov
|
a842fb6038 |
btrfs: replace calls to btrfs_find_free_ino with btrfs_find_free_objectid
[ Upstream commit abadc1fcd72e887a8f875dabe4a07aa8c28ac8af ] The former is going away as part of the inode map removal so switch callers to btrfs_find_free_objectid. No functional changes since with INODE_MAP disabled (default) find_free_objectid was called anyway. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Stable-dep-of: 0004ff15ea26 ("btrfs: fix space cache inconsistency after error loading it from disk") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Nikolay Borisov
|
9c69a9d058 |
btrfs: move btrfs_find_highest_objectid/btrfs_find_free_objectid to disk-io.c
[ Upstream commit ec7d6dfd73b2de1c6bc36f832542061b0ca0e0ff ] Those functions are going to be used even after inode cache is removed so moved them to a more appropriate place. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Stable-dep-of: 0004ff15ea26 ("btrfs: fix space cache inconsistency after error loading it from disk") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Anastasia Belova
|
829c20fd7a |
btrfs: print-tree: parent bytenr must be aligned to sector size
commit c87f318e6f47696b4040b58f460d5c17ea0280e6 upstream.
Check nodesize to sectorsize in alignment check in print_extent_item.
The comment states that and this is correct, similar check is done
elsewhere in the functions.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Josef Bacik
|
148b16cd30 |
btrfs: don't free qgroup space unless specified
commit d246331b78cbef86237f9c22389205bc9b4e1cc1 upstream.
Boris noticed in his simple quotas testing that he was getting a leak
with Sweet Tea's change to subvol create that stopped doing a
transaction commit. This was just a side effect of that change.
In the delayed inode code we have an optimization that will free extra
reservations if we think we can pack a dir item into an already modified
leaf. Previously this wouldn't be triggered in the subvolume create
case because we'd commit the transaction, it was still possible but
much harder to trigger. It could actually be triggered if we did a
mkdir && subvol create with qgroups enabled.
This occurs because in btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index(), which gets
called when we're adding the dir item, we do the following:
btrfs_block_rsv_release(fs_info, trans->block_rsv, bytes, NULL);
if we're able to skip reserving space.
The problem here is that trans->block_rsv points at the temporary block
rsv for the subvolume create, which has qgroup reservations in the block
rsv.
This is a problem because btrfs_block_rsv_release() will do the
following:
if (block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_reserved >= block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_size) {
qgroup_to_release = block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_reserved -
block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_size;
block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_reserved = block_rsv->qgroup_rsv_size;
}
The temporary block rsv just has ->qgroup_rsv_reserved set,
->qgroup_rsv_size == 0. The optimization in
btrfs_insert_delayed_dir_index() sets ->qgroup_rsv_reserved = 0. Then
later on when we call btrfs_subvolume_release_metadata() which has
btrfs_block_rsv_release(fs_info, rsv, (u64)-1, &qgroup_to_release);
btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta(root, qgroup_to_release);
qgroup_to_release is set to 0, and we do not convert the reserved
metadata space.
The problem here is that the block rsv code has been unconditionally
messing with ->qgroup_rsv_reserved, because the main place this is used
is delalloc, and any time we call btrfs_block_rsv_release() we do it
with qgroup_to_release set, and thus do the proper accounting.
The subvolume code is the only other code that uses the qgroup
reservation stuff, but it's intermingled with the above optimization,
and thus was getting its reservation freed out from underneath it and
thus leaking the reserved space.
The solution is to simply not mess with the qgroup reservations if we
don't have qgroup_to_release set. This works with the existing code as
anything that messes with the delalloc reservations always have
qgroup_to_release set. This fixes the leak that Boris was observing.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
08fa23adbd |
btrfs: fix btrfs_prev_leaf() to not return the same key twice
commit 6f932d4ef007d6a4ae03badcb749fbb8f49196f6 upstream.
A call to btrfs_prev_leaf() may end up returning a path that points to the
same item (key) again. This happens if while btrfs_prev_leaf(), after we
release the path, a concurrent insertion happens, which moves items off
from a sibling into the front of the previous leaf, and an item with the
computed previous key does not exists.
For example, suppose we have the two following leaves:
Leaf A
-------------------------------------------------------------
| ... key (300 96 10) key (300 96 15) key (300 96 16) |
-------------------------------------------------------------
slot 20 slot 21 slot 22
Leaf B
-------------------------------------------------------------
| key (300 96 20) key (300 96 21) key (300 96 22) ... |
-------------------------------------------------------------
slot 0 slot 1 slot 2
If we call btrfs_prev_leaf(), from btrfs_previous_item() for example, with
a path pointing to leaf B and slot 0 and the following happens:
1) At btrfs_prev_leaf() we compute the previous key to search as:
(300 96 19), which is a key that does not exists in the tree;
2) Then we call btrfs_release_path() at btrfs_prev_leaf();
3) Some other task inserts a key at leaf A, that sorts before the key at
slot 20, for example it has an objectid of 299. In order to make room
for the new key, the key at slot 22 is moved to the front of leaf B.
This happens at push_leaf_right(), called from split_leaf().
After this leaf B now looks like:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| key (300 96 16) key (300 96 20) key (300 96 21) key (300 96 22) ... |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
slot 0 slot 1 slot 2 slot 3
4) At btrfs_prev_leaf() we call btrfs_search_slot() for the computed
previous key: (300 96 19). Since the key does not exists,
btrfs_search_slot() returns 1 and with a path pointing to leaf B
and slot 1, the item with key (300 96 20);
5) This makes btrfs_prev_leaf() return a path that points to slot 1 of
leaf B, the same key as before it was called, since the key at slot 0
of leaf B (300 96 16) is less than the computed previous key, which is
(300 96 19);
6) As a consequence btrfs_previous_item() returns a path that points again
to the item with key (300 96 20).
For some users of btrfs_prev_leaf() or btrfs_previous_item() this may not
be functional a problem, despite not making sense to return a new path
pointing again to the same item/key. However for a caller such as
tree-log.c:log_dir_items(), this has a bad consequence, as it can result
in not logging some dir index deletions in case the directory is being
logged without holding the inode's VFS lock (logging triggered while
logging a child inode for example) - for the example scenario above, in
case the dir index keys 17, 18 and 19 were deleted in the current
transaction.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Qu Wenruo
|
c96807a4ad |
btrfs: scrub: reject unsupported scrub flags
commit 604e6681e114d05a2e384c4d1e8ef81918037ef5 upstream. Since the introduction of scrub interface, the only flag that we support is BTRFS_SCRUB_READONLY. Thus there is no sanity checks, if there are some undefined flags passed in, we just ignore them. This is problematic if we want to introduce new scrub flags, as we have no way to determine if such flags are supported. Address the problem by introducing a check for the flags, and if unsupported flags are set, return -EOPNOTSUPP to inform the user space. This check should be backported for all supported kernels before any new scrub flags are introduced. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Christoph Hellwig
|
5635e69406 |
btrfs: fix fast csum implementation detection
commit 68d99ab0e9221ef54506f827576c5a914680eeaf upstream. The BTRFS_FS_CSUM_IMPL_FAST flag is currently set whenever a non-generic crc32c is detected, which is the incorrect check if the file system uses a different checksumming algorithm. Refactor the code to only check this if crc32c is actually used. Note that in an ideal world the information if an algorithm is hardware accelerated or not should be provided by the crypto API instead, but that's left for another day. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4.x: c8a5f8ca9a9c: btrfs: print checksum type and implementation at mount time CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4.x Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
David Sterba
|
3576e08f19 |
btrfs: print checksum type and implementation at mount time
commit c8a5f8ca9a9c7d5c5bc31d54f47ea9d86f93ed69 upstream. Per user request, print the checksum type and implementation at mount time among the messages. The checksum is user configurable and the actual crypto implementation is useful to see for performance reasons. The same information is also available after mount in /sys/fs/FSID/checksum file. Example: [25.323662] BTRFS info (device vdb): using sha256 (sha256-generic) checksum algorithm Link: https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs/issues/483 Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Anand Jain
|
b51e442295 |
btrfs: scan device in non-exclusive mode
commit 50d281fc434cb8e2497f5e70a309ccca6b1a09f0 upstream.
This fixes mkfs/mount/check failures due to race with systemd-udevd
scan.
During the device scan initiated by systemd-udevd, other user space
EXCL operations such as mkfs, mount, or check may get blocked and result
in a "Device or resource busy" error. This is because the device
scan process opens the device with the EXCL flag in the kernel.
Two reports were received:
- btrfs/179 test case, where the fsck command failed with the -EBUSY
error
- LTP pwritev03 test case, where mkfs.vfs failed with
the -EBUSY error, when mkfs.vfs tried to overwrite old btrfs filesystem
on the device.
In both cases, fsck and mkfs (respectively) were racing with a
systemd-udevd device scan, and systemd-udevd won, resulting in the
-EBUSY error for fsck and mkfs.
Reproducing the problem has been difficult because there is a very
small window during which these userspace threads can race to
acquire the exclusive device open. Even on the system where the problem
was observed, the problem occurrences were anywhere between 10 to 400
iterations and chances of reproducing decreases with debug printk()s.
However, an exclusive device open is unnecessary for the scan process,
as there are no write operations on the device during scan. Furthermore,
during the mount process, the superblock is re-read in the below
function call chain:
btrfs_mount_root
btrfs_open_devices
open_fs_devices
btrfs_open_one_device
btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb
So, to fix this issue, removes the FMODE_EXCL flag from the scan
operation, and add a comment.
The case where mkfs may still write to the device and a scan is running,
the btrfs signature is not written at that time so scan will not
recognize such device.
Reported-by: Sherry Yang <sherry.yang@oracle.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202303170839.fdf23068-oliver.sang@intel.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
5f63470343 |
btrfs: fix race between quota disable and quota assign ioctls
commit 2f1a6be12ab6c8470d5776e68644726c94257c54 upstream. The quota assign ioctl can currently run in parallel with a quota disable ioctl call. The assign ioctl uses the quota root, while the disable ioctl frees that root, and therefore we can have a use-after-free triggered in the assign ioctl, leading to a trace like the following when KASAN is enabled: [672.723][T736] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0 [672.723][T736] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888022ec0208 by task btrfs_search_sl/27736 [672.724][T736] [672.725][T736] CPU: 1 PID: 27736 Comm: btrfs_search_sl Not tainted 6.3.0-rc3 #37 [672.723][T736] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [672.727][T736] Call Trace: [672.728][T736] <TASK> [672.728][T736] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 [672.725][T736] print_report+0xc1/0x5e0 [672.720][T736] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x61/0x2e0 [672.727][T736] ? __phys_addr+0xc9/0x150 [672.725][T736] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0 [672.722][T736] kasan_report+0xc0/0xf0 [672.729][T736] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0 [672.724][T736] btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0 [672.723][T736] ? fs_reclaim_acquire+0xba/0x160 [672.722][T736] ? split_leaf+0x13d0/0x13d0 [672.726][T736] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0 [672.723][T736] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x338/0x3c0 [672.722][T736] update_qgroup_status_item+0xf7/0x320 [672.724][T736] ? add_qgroup_rb+0x3d0/0x3d0 [672.739][T736] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x2b0 [672.730][T736] ? spin_bug+0x1d0/0x1d0 [672.737][T736] btrfs_run_qgroups+0x5de/0x840 [672.730][T736] ? btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xa70/0xa70 [672.738][T736] ? __del_qgroup_relation+0x4ba/0xe00 [672.738][T736] btrfs_ioctl+0x3d58/0x5d80 [672.735][T736] ? tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x16a/0x550 [672.737][T736] ? tomoyo_execute_permission+0x4a0/0x4a0 [672.731][T736] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x50/0x50 [672.737][T736] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x54/0x90 [672.734][T736] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x132/0x1660 [672.730][T736] ? vfs_fileattr_set+0xc40/0xc40 [672.730][T736] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2e/0x50 [672.732][T736] ? sigprocmask+0xf2/0x340 [672.737][T736] ? __fget_files+0x26a/0x480 [672.732][T736] ? bpf_lsm_file_ioctl+0x9/0x10 [672.738][T736] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x50/0x50 [672.736][T736] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210 [672.736][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 [672.731][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [672.739][T736] RIP: 0033:0x4556ad [672.742][T736] </TASK> [672.743][T736] [672.748][T736] Allocated by task 27677: [672.743][T736] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 [672.741][T736] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [672.741][T736] __kasan_kmalloc+0xa4/0xb0 [672.749][T736] btrfs_alloc_root+0x48/0x90 [672.746][T736] btrfs_create_tree+0x146/0xa20 [672.744][T736] btrfs_quota_enable+0x461/0x1d20 [672.743][T736] btrfs_ioctl+0x4a1c/0x5d80 [672.747][T736] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210 [672.749][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 [672.744][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [672.756][T736] [672.757][T736] Freed by task 27677: [672.759][T736] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 [672.759][T736] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [672.756][T736] kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 [672.751][T736] ____kasan_slab_free+0x162/0x1c0 [672.758][T736] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x89/0x1c0 [672.752][T736] __kmem_cache_free+0xaf/0x2e0 [672.752][T736] btrfs_put_root+0x1ff/0x2b0 [672.759][T736] btrfs_quota_disable+0x80a/0xbc0 [672.752][T736] btrfs_ioctl+0x3e5f/0x5d80 [672.756][T736] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210 [672.753][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 [672.765][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [672.769][T736] [672.768][T736] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888022ec0000 [672.768][T736] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096 [672.769][T736] The buggy address is located 520 bytes inside of [672.769][T736] freed 4096-byte region [ffff888022ec0000, ffff888022ec1000) [672.760][T736] [672.764][T736] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [672.761][T736] page:ffffea00008bb000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x22ec0 [672.766][T736] head:ffffea00008bb000 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 [672.779][T736] flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) [672.770][T736] raw: 00fff00000010200 ffff888012842140 ffffea000054ba00 dead000000000002 [672.770][T736] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [672.771][T736] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [672.778][T736] page_owner tracks the page as allocated [672.777][T736] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2040(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 88 [672.779][T736] get_page_from_freelist+0x119c/0x2d50 [672.779][T736] __alloc_pages+0x1cb/0x4a0 [672.776][T736] alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x270 [672.773][T736] allocate_slab+0x260/0x390 [672.771][T736] ___slab_alloc+0xa9a/0x13e0 [672.778][T736] __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xb0 [672.771][T736] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x136/0x320 [672.789][T736] __kmalloc+0x4e/0x1a0 [672.783][T736] tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0xc3/0x600 [672.781][T736] tomoyo_path_perm+0x22f/0x420 [672.782][T736] tomoyo_path_unlink+0x92/0xd0 [672.780][T736] security_path_unlink+0xdb/0x150 [672.788][T736] do_unlinkat+0x377/0x680 [672.788][T736] __x64_sys_unlink+0xca/0x110 [672.789][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 [672.783][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [672.784][T736] page last free stack trace: [672.787][T736] free_pcp_prepare+0x4e5/0x920 [672.787][T736] free_unref_page+0x1d/0x4e0 [672.784][T736] __unfreeze_partials+0x17c/0x1a0 [672.797][T736] qlist_free_all+0x6a/0x180 [672.796][T736] kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x189/0x1d0 [672.797][T736] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x64/0x90 [672.793][T736] kmem_cache_alloc+0x17c/0x3c0 [672.799][T736] getname_flags.part.0+0x50/0x4e0 [672.799][T736] getname_flags+0x9e/0xe0 [672.792][T736] vfs_fstatat+0x77/0xb0 [672.791][T736] __do_sys_newlstat+0x84/0x100 [672.798][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 [672.796][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [672.790][T736] [672.791][T736] Memory state around the buggy address: [672.799][T736] ffff888022ec0100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [672.805][T736] ffff888022ec0180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [672.802][T736] >ffff888022ec0200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [672.809][T736] ^ [672.809][T736] ffff888022ec0280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [672.809][T736] ffff888022ec0300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fix this by having the qgroup assign ioctl take the qgroup ioctl mutex before calling btrfs_run_qgroups(), which is what all qgroup ioctls should call. Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAFcO6XN3VD8ogmHwqRk4kbiwtpUSNySu2VAxN8waEPciCHJvMA@mail.gmail.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
David Sterba
|
6195cea4c7 |
btrfs: send: limit number of clones and allocated memory size
[ Upstream commit 33e17b3f5ab74af12aca58c515bc8424ff69a343 ] The arg->clone_sources_count is u64 and can trigger a warning when a huge value is passed from user space and a huge array is allocated. Limit the allocated memory to 8MiB (can be increased if needed), which in turn limits the number of clone sources to 8M / sizeof(struct clone_root) = 8M / 40 = 209715. Real world number of clones is from tens to hundreds, so this is future proof. Reported-by: syzbot+4376a9a073770c173269@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Anand Jain
|
dd965ad39d |
btrfs: free device in btrfs_close_devices for a single device filesystem
commit 5f58d783fd7823b2c2d5954d1126e702f94bfc4c upstream. We have this check to make sure we don't accidentally add older devices that may have disappeared and re-appeared with an older generation from being added to an fs_devices (such as a replace source device). This makes sense, we don't want stale disks in our file system. However for single disks this doesn't really make sense. I've seen this in testing, but I was provided a reproducer from a project that builds btrfs images on loopback devices. The loopback device gets cached with the new generation, and then if it is re-used to generate a new file system we'll fail to mount it because the new fs is "older" than what we have in cache. Fix this by freeing the cache when closing the device for a single device filesystem. This will ensure that the mount command passed device path is scanned successfully during the next mount. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reported-by: Daan De Meyer <daandemeyer@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Alexander Potapenko
|
f1fd16cd97 |
btrfs: zlib: zero-initialize zlib workspace
commit eadd7deca0ad8a83edb2b894d8326c78e78635d6 upstream. KMSAN reports uses of uninitialized memory in zlib's longest_match() called on memory originating from zlib_alloc_workspace(). This issue is known by zlib maintainers and is claimed to be harmless, but to be on the safe side we'd better initialize the memory. Link: https://zlib.net/zlib_faq.html#faq36 Reported-by: syzbot+14d9e7602ebdf7ec0a60@syzkaller.appspotmail.com CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Josef Bacik
|
a1406d5aa3 |
btrfs: limit device extents to the device size
commit 3c538de0f2a74d50aff7278c092f88ae59cee688 upstream.
There was a recent regression in btrfs/177 that started happening with
the size class patches ("btrfs: introduce size class to block group
allocator"). This however isn't a regression introduced by those
patches, but rather the bug was uncovered by a change in behavior in
these patches. The patches triggered more chunk allocations in the
^free-space-tree case, which uncovered a race with device shrink.
The problem is we will set the device total size to the new size, and
use this to find a hole for a device extent. However during shrink we
may have device extents allocated past this range, so we could
potentially find a hole in a range past our new shrink size. We don't
actually limit our found extent to the device size anywhere, we assume
that we will not find a hole past our device size. This isn't true with
shrink as we're relocating block groups and thus creating holes past the
device size.
Fix this by making sure we do not search past the new device size, and
if we wander into any device extents that start after our device size
simply break from the loop and use whatever hole we've already found.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
3bd4337485 |
btrfs: fix race between quota rescan and disable leading to NULL pointer deref
commit b7adbf9ada3513d2092362c8eac5cddc5b651f5c upstream. If we have one task trying to start the quota rescan worker while another one is trying to disable quotas, we can end up hitting a race that results in the quota rescan worker doing a NULL pointer dereference. The steps for this are the following: 1) Quotas are enabled; 2) Task A calls the quota rescan ioctl and enters btrfs_qgroup_rescan(). It calls qgroup_rescan_init() which returns 0 (success) and then joins a transaction and commits it; 3) Task B calls the quota disable ioctl and enters btrfs_quota_disable(). It clears the bit BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED from fs_info->flags and calls btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion(), which returns immediately since the rescan worker is not yet running. Then it starts a transaction and locks fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock; 4) Task A queues the rescan worker, by calling btrfs_queue_work(); 5) The rescan worker starts, and calls rescan_should_stop() at the start of its while loop, which results in 0 iterations of the loop, since the flag BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED was cleared from fs_info->flags by task B at step 3); 6) Task B sets fs_info->quota_root to NULL; 7) The rescan worker tries to start a transaction and uses fs_info->quota_root as the root argument for btrfs_start_transaction(). This results in a NULL pointer dereference down the call chain of btrfs_start_transaction(). The stack trace is something like the one reported in Link tag below: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000041: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000208-0x000000000000020f] CPU: 1 PID: 34 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 6.1.0-syzkaller-13872-gb6bb9676f216 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Workqueue: btrfs-qgroup-rescan btrfs_work_helper RIP: 0010:start_transaction+0x48/0x10f0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:564 Code: 48 89 fb 48 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ab7ab0 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000041 RBX: 0000000000000208 RCX: ffff88801779ba80 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52000156f5d R10: fffff52000156f5d R11: 1ffff92000156f5c R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2bea75b718 CR3: 000000001d0cc000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x3bb/0x6a0 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:3402 btrfs_work_helper+0x312/0x850 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:280 process_one_work+0x877/0xdb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0xb14/0x1330 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x266/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> Modules linked in: So fix this by having the rescan worker function not attempt to start a transaction if it didn't do any rescan work. Reported-by: syzbot+96977faa68092ad382c4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000e5454b05f065a803@google.com/ Fixes: e804861bd4e6 ("btrfs: fix deadlock between quota disable and qgroup rescan worker") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Qu Wenruo
|
18bd1c9c02 |
btrfs: always report error in run_one_delayed_ref()
[ Upstream commit 39f501d68ec1ed5cd5c66ac6ec2a7131c517bb92 ]
Currently we have a btrfs_debug() for run_one_delayed_ref() failure, but
if end users hit such problem, there will be no chance that
btrfs_debug() is enabled. This can lead to very little useful info for
debugging.
This patch will:
- Add extra info for error reporting
Including:
* logical bytenr
* num_bytes
* type
* action
* ref_mod
- Replace the btrfs_debug() with btrfs_err()
- Move the error reporting into run_one_delayed_ref()
This is to avoid use-after-free, the @node can be freed in the caller.
This error should only be triggered at most once.
As if run_one_delayed_ref() failed, we trigger the error message, then
causing the call chain to error out:
btrfs_run_delayed_refs()
`- btrfs_run_delayed_refs()
`- btrfs_run_delayed_refs_for_head()
`- run_one_delayed_ref()
And we will abort the current transaction in btrfs_run_delayed_refs().
If we have to run delayed refs for the abort transaction,
run_one_delayed_ref() will just cleanup the refs and do nothing, thus no
new error messages would be output.
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|