Andy Shevchenko
9683a64fc3
x86/io: Make readq() / writeq() API consistent
...
Despite the following commit:
93093d099eandriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@spreadtrum.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org
Cc: wsa@the-dreams.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170630170934.83028-6-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-24 11:18:21 +02:00
Andy Shevchenko
eabc2a7c49
x86/io: Remove xlate_dev_kmem_ptr() duplication
...
Generic header defines xlate_dev_kmem_ptr().
Reuse it from generic header and remove in x86 code.
Move a description to the generic header as well.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@spreadtrum.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org
Cc: wsa@the-dreams.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170630170934.83028-5-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-24 11:18:21 +02:00
Andy Shevchenko
c2327da06b
x86/io: Remove mem*io() duplications
...
Generic header defines memset_io, memcpy_fromio(). and memcpy_toio().
Reuse them from generic header and remove in x86 code.
Move the descriptions to the generic header as well.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@spreadtrum.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org
Cc: wsa@the-dreams.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170630170934.83028-4-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-24 11:18:21 +02:00
Andy Shevchenko
3195201198
x86/io: Include asm-generic/io.h to architectural code
...
asm-generic/io.h defines few helpers which would be useful in the drivers,
such as writesb() and readsb().
Include it to the asm/io.h in architectural folder.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com >
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de >
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@spreadtrum.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170630170934.83028-3-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-24 11:18:21 +02:00
Andy Shevchenko
80b9ece133
x86/io: Define IO accessors by preprocessor
...
As a preparatory to use generic IO accessor helpers we need to define
architecture dependent functions via preprocessor to let world know we
have them.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com >
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de >
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@spreadtrum.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170630170934.83028-2-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-24 11:18:20 +02:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
24a81a2c25
Merge 4.13-rc2 into char-misc-next
...
We want the char/misc driver fixes in here as well to handle future
changes.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org >
2017-07-23 19:58:30 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
4ec9f7a18b
Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
...
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Half of the fixes are for various build time warnings triggered by
randconfig builds. Most (but not all...) were harmless.
There's also:
- ACPI boundary condition fixes
- UV platform fixes
- defconfig updates
- an AMD K6 CPU init fix
- a %pOF printk format related preparatory change
- .. and a warning fix related to the tlb/PCID changes"
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/devicetree: Convert to using %pOF instead of ->full_name
x86/platform/uv/BAU: Disable BAU on single hub configurations
x86/platform/intel-mid: Fix a format string overflow warning
x86/platform: Add PCI dependency for PUNIT_ATOM_DEBUG
x86/build: Silence the build with "make -s"
x86/io: Add "memory" clobber to insb/insw/insl/outsb/outsw/outsl
x86/fpu/math-emu: Avoid bogus -Wint-in-bool-context warning
x86/fpu/math-emu: Fix possible uninitialized variable use
perf/x86: Shut up false-positive -Wmaybe-uninitialized warning
x86/defconfig: Remove stale, old Kconfig options
x86/ioapic: Pass the correct data to unmask_ioapic_irq()
x86/acpi: Prevent out of bound access caused by broken ACPI tables
x86/mm, KVM: Fix warning when !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT
x86/platform/uv/BAU: Fix congested_response_us not taking effect
x86/cpu: Use indirect call to measure performance in init_amd_k6()
2017-07-21 11:20:58 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
0a6109fd1b
Merge branch 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
...
Pull core fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"A fix to WARN_ON_ONCE() done by modules, plus a MAINTAINERS update"
* 'core-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
debug: Fix WARN_ON_ONCE() for modules
MAINTAINERS: Update the PTRACE entry
2017-07-21 10:41:19 -07:00
Kirill A. Shutemov
ee00f4a32a
x86/mm: Allow userspace have mappings above 47-bit
...
All bits and pieces are now in place and we can allow userspace to have VMAs
above 47 bits.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net >
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-8-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-21 10:05:19 +02:00
Kirill A. Shutemov
b569bab78d
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace
...
On x86, 5-level paging enables 56-bit userspace virtual address space.
Not all user space is ready to handle wide addresses. It's known that
at least some JIT compilers use higher bits in pointers to encode their
information. It collides with valid pointers with 5-level paging and
leads to crashes.
To mitigate this, we are not going to allocate virtual address space
above 47-bit by default.
But userspace can ask for allocation from full address space by
specifying hint address (with or without MAP_FIXED) above 47-bits.
If hint address set above 47-bit, but MAP_FIXED is not specified, we try
to look for unmapped area by specified address. If it's already
occupied, we look for unmapped area in *full* address space, rather than
from 47-bit window.
A high hint address would only affect the allocation in question, but not
any future mmap()s.
Specifying high hint address on older kernel or on machine without 5-level
paging support is safe. The hint will be ignored and kernel will fall back
to allocation from 47-bit address space.
This approach helps to easily make application's memory allocator aware
about large address space without manually tracking allocated virtual
address space.
The patch puts all machinery in place, but not yet allows userspace to have
mappings above 47-bit -- TASK_SIZE_MAX has to be raised to get the effect.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net >
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-21 10:05:18 +02:00
Kirill A. Shutemov
44b04912fa
x86/mpx: Do not allow MPX if we have mappings above 47-bit
...
MPX (without MAWA extension) cannot handle addresses above 47 bits, so we
need to make sure that MPX cannot be enabled if we already have a VMA above
the boundary and forbid creating such VMAs once MPX is enabled.
The patch implements mpx_unmapped_area_check() which is called from all
variants of get_unmapped_area() to check if the requested address fits
mpx.
On enabling MPX, we check if we already have any vma above 47-bit
boundary and forbit the enabling if we do.
As long as DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW is equal to TASK_SIZE_MAX, the change is
nop. It will change when we allow userspace to have mappings above
47-bits.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net >
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-6-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
[ Readability edits. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-21 10:05:18 +02:00
Kirill A. Shutemov
e8f01a8dad
x86/mm: Rename tasksize_32bit/64bit to task_size_32bit/64bit()
...
Rename these helpers to be consistent with spelling of TASK_SIZE and
related constants.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net >
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170716225954.74185-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-21 10:05:18 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
54a7d50b92
x86: mark kprobe templates as character arrays, not single characters
...
They really are, and the "take the address of a single character" makes
the string fortification code unhappy (it believes that you can now only
acccess one byte, rather than a byte range, and then raises errors for
the memory copies going on in there).
We could now remove a few 'addressof' operators (since arrays naturally
degrade to pointers), but this is the minimal patch that just changes
the C prototypes of those template arrays (the templates themselves are
defined in inline asm).
Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com >
Acked-and-tested-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org >
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com >
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
2017-07-20 11:34:47 -07:00
Josh Poimboeuf
325cdacd03
debug: Fix WARN_ON_ONCE() for modules
...
Mike Galbraith reported a situation where a WARN_ON_ONCE() call in DRM
code turned into an oops. As it turns out, WARN_ON_ONCE() seems to be
completely broken when called from a module.
The bug was introduced with the following commit:
19d436268default@gmx.de >
Tested-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org >
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com >
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Fixes: 19d436268dhttp://lkml.kernel.org/r/a53b04235a65478dd9afc51f5b329fdc65c84364.1500095401.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-20 12:31:04 +02:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
91c17449fe
Revert "x86/hyper-v: include hyperv/ only when CONFIG_HYPERV is set"
...
This reverts commit 2e252fbf77colin.king@canonical.com >
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au >
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com >
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com >
Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com >
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org >
2017-07-20 11:12:33 +02:00
Arnd Bergmann
7206f9bf10
x86/io: Add "memory" clobber to insb/insw/insl/outsb/outsw/outsl
...
The x86 version of insb/insw/insl uses an inline assembly that does
not have the target buffer listed as an output. This can confuse
the compiler, leading it to think that a subsequent access of the
buffer is uninitialized:
drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.c: In function ‘wl3501_mgmt_scan_confirm’:
drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.c:665:9: error: ‘sig.status’ is used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=uninitialized]
drivers/net/wireless/wl3501_cs.c:668:12: error: ‘sig.cap_info’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
drivers/net/sb1000.c: In function 'sb1000_rx':
drivers/net/sb1000.c:775:9: error: 'st[0]' is used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=uninitialized]
drivers/net/sb1000.c:776:10: error: 'st[1]' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
drivers/net/sb1000.c:784:11: error: 'st[1]' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
I tried to mark the exact input buffer as an output here, but couldn't
figure it out. As suggested by Linus, marking all memory as clobbered
however is good enough too. For the outs operations, I also add the
memory clobber, to force the input to be written to local variables.
This is probably already guaranteed by the "asm volatile", but it can't
hurt to do this for symmetry.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170719125310.2487451-5-arnd@arndb.de
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/7/12/605
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-20 10:46:24 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
e06fdaf40a
Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
...
Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
"Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.
This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
comes in three patches, largest first:
- mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout
- mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
__randomize_layout section
- mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
later)
And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
s390 for me"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
task_struct: Allow randomized layout
randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
2017-07-19 08:55:18 -07:00
Tom Lendacky
aca20d5462
x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
...
Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
configuration of the default state). If memory encryption is to be
activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
"in place."
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5f0da2fd4cce63f556117549e2c89c170072209f.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 20:23:26 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
e505371dd8
x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
...
Add a cmdline_find_option() function to look for cmdline options that
take arguments. The argument is returned in a supplied buffer and the
argument length (regardless of whether it fits in the supplied buffer)
is returned, with -1 indicating not found.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/36b5f97492a9745dce27682305f990fc20e5cf8a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:06 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
6ebcb06071
x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
...
Add the support to encrypt the kernel in-place. This is done by creating
new page mappings for the kernel - a decrypted write-protected mapping
and an encrypted mapping. The kernel is encrypted by copying it through
a temporary buffer.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c039bf9412ef95e1e6bf4fdf8facab95e00c717b.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:05 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
db516997a9
x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4
...
Currently, native_make_p4d() is only defined when CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS
is greater than 4. Create a macro that will allow for defining and using
native_make_p4d() when CONFIG_PGTABLES_LEVELS is not greater than 4.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b645e14f9e73731023694494860ceab73feff777.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:05 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
8458bf94b0
x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
...
When accessing memory using /dev/mem (or /dev/kmem) use the proper
encryption attributes when mapping the memory.
To insure the proper attributes are applied when reading or writing
/dev/mem, update the xlate_dev_mem_ptr() function to use memremap()
which will essentially perform the same steps of applying __va for
RAM or using ioremap() if not RAM.
To insure the proper attributes are applied when mmapping /dev/mem,
update the phys_mem_access_prot() to call phys_mem_access_encrypted(),
a new function which will check if the memory should be mapped encrypted
or not. If it is not to be mapped encrypted then the VMA protection
value is updated to remove the encryption bit.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c917f403ab9f61cbfd455ad6425ed8429a5e7b54.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:05 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
bba4ed011a
x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
...
Provide support so that kexec can be used to boot a kernel when SME is
enabled.
Support is needed to allocate pages for kexec without encryption. This
is needed in order to be able to reboot in the kernel in the same manner
as originally booted.
Additionally, when shutting down all of the CPUs we need to be sure to
flush the caches and then halt. This is needed when booting from a state
where SME was not active into a state where SME is active (or vice-versa).
Without these steps, it is possible for cache lines to exist for the same
physical location but tagged both with and without the encryption bit. This
can cause random memory corruption when caches are flushed depending on
which cacheline is written last.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: <kexec@lists.infradead.org >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b95ff075db3e7cd545313f2fb609a49619a09625.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:04 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
d0ec49d4de
kvm/x86/svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
...
Update the KVM support to work with SME. The VMCB has a number of fields
where physical addresses are used and these addresses must contain the
memory encryption mask in order to properly access the encrypted memory.
Also, use the memory encryption mask when creating and using the nested
page tables.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/89146eccfa50334409801ff20acd52a90fb5efcf.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:04 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
95cf9264d5
x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
...
Since video memory needs to be accessed decrypted, be sure that the
memory encryption mask is not set for the video ranges.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a19436f30424402e01f63a09b32ab103272acced.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:04 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
46d010e04a
x86/boot/realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
...
Add support to check if memory encryption is active in the kernel and that
it has been enabled on the AP. If memory encryption is active in the kernel
but has not been enabled on the AP, then set the memory encryption bit (bit
23) of MSR_K8_SYSCFG to enable memory encryption on that AP and allow the
AP to continue start up.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/37e29b99c395910f56ca9f8ecf7b0439b28827c8.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:04 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
c7753208a9
x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
...
Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the
memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the
device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be
initialized to create decrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/aa2d29b78ae7d508db8881e46a3215231b9327a7.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:03 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
77bd2342d4
x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
...
Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute for one or more
memory pages. This will be useful when we have to change the AP trampoline
area to not be encrypted. Or when we need to change the SWIOTLB area to
not be encrypted in support of devices that can't support the encryption
mask range.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/924ae0d1f6d4c90c5a0e366c291b90a2d86aa79e.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:02 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
8f716c9b5f
x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
...
Boot data (such as EFI related data) is not encrypted when the system is
booted because UEFI/BIOS does not run with SME active. In order to access
this data properly it needs to be mapped decrypted.
Update early_memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to modify the
pagetable protection attributes before they are applied to the new
mapping. This is used to remove the encryption mask for boot related data.
Update memremap() to provide an arch specific routine to determine if RAM
remapping is allowed. RAM remapping will cause an encrypted mapping to be
generated. By preventing RAM remapping, ioremap_cache() will be used
instead, which will provide a decrypted mapping of the boot related data.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/81fb6b4117a5df6b9f2eda342f81bbef4b23d2e5.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:02 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
d68baa3fa6
x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
...
Add a function that will return the E820 type associated with an address
range.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b797aaa588803bf33263d5dd8c32377668fa931a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:01 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
b9d05200bc
x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
...
The boot data and command line data are present in memory in a decrypted
state and are copied early in the boot process. The early page fault
support will map these areas as encrypted, so before attempting to copy
them, add decrypted mappings so the data is accessed properly when copied.
For the initrd, encrypt this data in place. Since the future mapping of
the initrd area will be mapped as encrypted the data will be accessed
properly.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/bb0d430b41efefd45ee515aaf0979dcfda8b6a44.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:01 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
7f8b7e7f4c
x86/mm: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory
...
Add support to be able to either encrypt or decrypt data in place during
the early stages of booting the kernel. This does not change the memory
encryption attribute - it is used for ensuring that data present in either
an encrypted or decrypted memory area is in the proper state (for example
the initrd will have been loaded by the boot loader and will not be
encrypted, but the memory that it resides in is marked as encrypted).
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f9968e9432cd6c4b57ef245729be04ff18852225.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:01 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
f88a68facd
x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
...
Add early_memremap() support to be able to specify encrypted and
decrypted mappings with and without write-protection. The use of
write-protection is necessary when encrypting data "in place". The
write-protect attribute is considered cacheable for loads, but not
stores. This implies that the hardware will never give the core a
dirty line with this memtype.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/479b5832c30fae3efa7932e48f81794e86397229.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:00 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
eef9c4abe7
x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
...
The CR3 register entry can contain the SME encryption mask that indicates
the PGD is encrypted. The encryption mask should not be used when
creating a virtual address from the CR3 register, so remove the SME
encryption mask in the read_cr3_pa() function.
During early boot SME will need to use a native version of read_cr3_pa(),
so create native_read_cr3_pa().
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/767b085c384a46f67f451f8589903a462c7ff68a.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:00 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
21729f81ce
x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
...
Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization
without the encryption mask before SME becomes active. Two new pgprot()
macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask.
The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO. SME does
not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption
mask from the page attribute.
Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow
creating a physical address with the encryption mask. These are used when
working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current
__va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off
of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same
virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled
for that physical location or not.
Also, an early initialization function is added for SME. If SME is active,
this function:
- Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings
with the encryption mask.
- Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask.
- Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so
that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask
applied.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:00 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
fd7e315988
x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
...
Create a pgd_pfn() macro similar to the p[4um]d_pfn() macros and then
use the p[g4um]d_pfn() macros in the p[g4um]d_page() macros instead of
duplicating the code.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e61eb533a6d0aac941db2723d8aa63ef6b882dee.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:38:00 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
5868f3651f
x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
...
Add support to the early boot code to use Secure Memory Encryption (SME).
Since the kernel has been loaded into memory in a decrypted state, encrypt
the kernel in place and update the early pagetables with the memory
encryption mask so that new pagetable entries will use memory encryption.
The routines to set the encryption mask and perform the encryption are
stub routines for now with functionality to be added in a later patch.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e52ad781f085224bf835b3caff9aa3aee6febccb.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:37:59 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
7744ccdbc1
x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
...
Add support for Secure Memory Encryption (SME). This initial support
provides a Kconfig entry to build the SME support into the kernel and
defines the memory encryption mask that will be used in subsequent
patches to mark pages as encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a6c34d16caaed3bc3e2d6f0987554275bd291554.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:37:59 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
872cbefd2d
x86/cpu/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
...
Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the
Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME is identified by CPUID
0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of
MSR_K8_SYSCFG). Only show the SME feature as available if reported by
CPUID, enabled by BIOS and not configured as CONFIG_X86_32=y.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/85c17ff450721abccddc95e611ae8df3f4d9718b.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:37:59 +02:00
Tom Lendacky
f7750a7956
x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap() for RAM mappings
...
The ioremap() function is intended for mapping MMIO. For RAM, the
memremap() function should be used. Convert calls from ioremap() to
memremap() when re-mapping RAM.
This will be used later by SME to control how the encryption mask is
applied to memory mappings, with certain memory locations being mapped
decrypted vs encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com >
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de >
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com >
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com >
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com >
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com >
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net >
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com >
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk >
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com >
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b13fccb9abbd547a7eef7b1fdfc223431b211c88.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:37:58 +02:00
Ingo Molnar
1ed7d32763
Merge branch 'x86/boot' into x86/mm, to pick up interacting changes
...
The SME patches we are about to apply add some E820 logic, so merge in
pending E820 code changes first, to have a single code base.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 11:36:53 +02:00
Josh Poimboeuf
76846bf3cb
x86/asm: Add unwind hint annotations to sync_core()
...
This enables objtool to grok the iret in the middle of a C function.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com >
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com >
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com >
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b057be26193c11d2ed3337b2107bc7adcba42c99.1499786555.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 10:57:44 +02:00
Josh Poimboeuf
39358a033b
objtool, x86: Add facility for asm code to provide unwind hints
...
Some asm (and inline asm) code does special things to the stack which
objtool can't understand. (Nor can GCC or GNU assembler, for that
matter.) In such cases we need a facility for the code to provide
annotations, so the unwinder can unwind through it.
This provides such a facility, in the form of unwind hints. They're
similar to the GNU assembler .cfi* directives, but they give more
information, and are needed in far fewer places, because objtool can
fill in the blanks by following branches and adjusting the stack pointer
for pushes and pops.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de >
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com >
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com >
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com >
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0f5f3c9104fca559ff4088bece1d14ae3bca52d5.1499786555.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 10:57:44 +02:00
Roman Kagan
4c07f9046e
x86/mm, KVM: Fix warning when !CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT
...
A recent commit:
d6e41f1151rkagan@virtuozzo.com >
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org >
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com >
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de >
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com >
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org >
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de >
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com >
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com >
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com >
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com >
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de >
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Fixes: d6e41f1151mingo@kernel.org >
2017-07-18 10:49:18 +02:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
dd018597a0
x86/hyper-v: stash the max number of virtual/logical processor
...
Max virtual processor will be needed for 'extended' hypercalls supporting
more than 64 vCPUs. While on it, unify on 'Hyper-V' in mshyperv.c as we
currently have a mix, report acquired misc features as well.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com >
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com >
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com >
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org >
2017-07-17 17:20:28 +02:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
2e252fbf77
x86/hyper-v: include hyperv/ only when CONFIG_HYPERV is set
...
Code is arch/x86/hyperv/ is only needed when CONFIG_HYPERV is set, the
'basic' support and detection lives in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
which is included when CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST is set.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com >
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com >
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com >
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org >
2017-07-17 17:19:42 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
89cbec71fe
Merge branch 'work.uaccess-unaligned' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
...
Pull uacess-unaligned removal from Al Viro:
"That stuff had just one user, and an exotic one, at that - binfmt_flat
on arm and m68k"
* 'work.uaccess-unaligned' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
kill {__,}{get,put}_user_unaligned()
binfmt_flat: flat_{get,put}_addr_from_rp() should be able to fail
2017-07-15 11:17:52 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
e37a07e0c2
Merge tag 'kvm-4.13-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
...
Pull more KVM updates from Radim Krčmář:
"Second batch of KVM updates for v4.13
Common:
- add uevents for VM creation/destruction
- annotate and properly access RCU-protected objects
s390:
- rename IOCTL added in the first v4.13 merge
x86:
- emulate VMLOAD VMSAVE feature in SVM
- support paravirtual asynchronous page fault while nested
- add Hyper-V userspace interfaces for better migration
- improve master clock corner cases
- extend internal error reporting after EPT misconfig
- correct single-stepping of emulated instructions in SVM
- handle MCE during VM entry
- fix nVMX VM entry checks and nVMX VMCS shadowing"
* tag 'kvm-4.13-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (28 commits)
kvm: x86: hyperv: make VP_INDEX managed by userspace
KVM: async_pf: Let guest support delivery of async_pf from guest mode
KVM: async_pf: Force a nested vmexit if the injected #PF is async_pf
KVM: async_pf: Add L1 guest async_pf #PF vmexit handler
KVM: x86: Simplify kvm_x86_ops->queue_exception parameter list
kvm: x86: hyperv: add KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2
KVM: x86: make backwards_tsc_observed a per-VM variable
KVM: trigger uevents when creating or destroying a VM
KVM: SVM: Enable Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE feature
KVM: SVM: Add Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE feature definition
KVM: SVM: Rename lbr_ctl field in the vmcb control area
KVM: SVM: Prepare for new bit definition in lbr_ctl
KVM: SVM: handle singlestep exception when skipping emulated instructions
KVM: x86: take slots_lock in kvm_free_pit
KVM: s390: Fix KVM_S390_GET_CMMA_BITS ioctl definition
kvm: vmx: Properly handle machine check during VM-entry
KVM: x86: update master clock before computing kvmclock_offset
kvm: nVMX: Shadow "high" parts of shadowed 64-bit VMCS fields
kvm: nVMX: Fix nested_vmx_check_msr_bitmap_controls
kvm: nVMX: Validate the I/O bitmaps on nested VM-entry
...
2017-07-15 10:18:16 -07:00
Roman Kagan
d3457c877b
kvm: x86: hyperv: make VP_INDEX managed by userspace
...
Hyper-V identifies vCPUs by Virtual Processor Index, which can be
queried via HV_X64_MSR_VP_INDEX msr. It is defined by the spec as a
sequential number which can't exceed the maximum number of vCPUs per VM.
APIC ids can be sparse and thus aren't a valid replacement for VP
indices.
Current KVM uses its internal vcpu index as VP_INDEX. However, to make
it predictable and persistent across VM migrations, the userspace has to
control the value of VP_INDEX.
This patch achieves that, by storing vp_index explicitly on vcpu, and
allowing HV_X64_MSR_VP_INDEX to be set from the host side. For
compatibility it's initialized to KVM vcpu index. Also a few variables
are renamed to make clear distinction betweed this Hyper-V vp_index and
KVM vcpu_id (== APIC id). Besides, a new capability,
KVM_CAP_HYPERV_VP_INDEX, is added to allow the userspace to skip
attempting msr writes where unsupported, to avoid spamming error logs.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com >
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
2017-07-14 16:28:18 +02:00
Wanpeng Li
52a5c155cf
KVM: async_pf: Let guest support delivery of async_pf from guest mode
...
Adds another flag bit (bit 2) to MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN. If bit 2 is 1,
async page faults are delivered to L1 as #PF vmexits; if bit 2 is 0,
kvm_can_do_async_pf returns 0 if in guest mode.
This is similar to what svm.c wanted to do all along, but it is only
enabled for Linux as L1 hypervisor. Foreign hypervisors must never
receive async page faults as vmexits, because they'd probably be very
confused about that.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com >
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com >
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com >
2017-07-14 14:26:16 +02:00
