Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

 1) Fix sk_psock reference count leak on receive, from Xiyu Yang.

 2) CONFIG_HNS should be invisible, from Geert Uytterhoeven.

 3) Don't allow locking route MTUs in ipv6, RFCs actually forbid this,
    from Maciej Żenczykowski.

 4) ipv4 route redirect backoff wasn't actually enforced, from Paolo
    Abeni.

 5) Fix netprio cgroup v2 leak, from Zefan Li.

 6) Fix infinite loop on rmmod in conntrack, from Florian Westphal.

 7) Fix tcp SO_RCVLOWAT hangs, from Eric Dumazet.

 8) Various bpf probe handling fixes, from Daniel Borkmann.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (68 commits)
  selftests: mptcp: pm: rm the right tmp file
  dpaa2-eth: properly handle buffer size restrictions
  bpf: Restrict bpf_trace_printk()'s %s usage and add %pks, %pus specifier
  bpf: Add bpf_probe_read_{user, kernel}_str() to do_refine_retval_range
  bpf: Restrict bpf_probe_read{, str}() only to archs where they work
  MAINTAINERS: Mark networking drivers as Maintained.
  ipmr: Add lockdep expression to ipmr_for_each_table macro
  ipmr: Fix RCU list debugging warning
  drivers: net: hamradio: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in bpqether.c
  net: phy: broadcom: fix BCM54XX_SHD_SCR3_TRDDAPD value for BCM54810
  tcp: fix error recovery in tcp_zerocopy_receive()
  MAINTAINERS: Add Jakub to networking drivers.
  MAINTAINERS: another add of Karsten Graul for S390 networking
  drivers: ipa: fix typos for ipa_smp2p structure doc
  pppoe: only process PADT targeted at local interfaces
  selftests/bpf: Enforce returning 0 for fentry/fexit programs
  bpf: Enforce returning 0 for fentry/fexit progs
  net: stmmac: fix num_por initialization
  security: Fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook
  libbpf: Fix register naming in PT_REGS s390 macros
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
2020-05-15 13:10:06 -07:00
78 changed files with 460 additions and 205 deletions

View File

@@ -323,17 +323,15 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_get_probe_write_proto(void)
/*
* Only limited trace_printk() conversion specifiers allowed:
* %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %s
* %d %i %u %x %ld %li %lu %lx %lld %lli %llu %llx %p %pks %pus %s
*/
BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
u64, arg2, u64, arg3)
{
int i, mod[3] = {}, fmt_cnt = 0;
char buf[64], fmt_ptype;
void *unsafe_ptr = NULL;
bool str_seen = false;
int mod[3] = {};
int fmt_cnt = 0;
u64 unsafe_addr;
char buf[64];
int i;
/*
* bpf_check()->check_func_arg()->check_stack_boundary()
@@ -359,40 +357,71 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
if (fmt[i] == 'l') {
mod[fmt_cnt]++;
i++;
} else if (fmt[i] == 'p' || fmt[i] == 's') {
} else if (fmt[i] == 'p') {
mod[fmt_cnt]++;
if ((fmt[i + 1] == 'k' ||
fmt[i + 1] == 'u') &&
fmt[i + 2] == 's') {
fmt_ptype = fmt[i + 1];
i += 2;
goto fmt_str;
}
/* disallow any further format extensions */
if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 &&
!isspace(fmt[i + 1]) &&
!ispunct(fmt[i + 1]))
return -EINVAL;
fmt_cnt++;
if (fmt[i] == 's') {
if (str_seen)
/* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */
return -EINVAL;
str_seen = true;
switch (fmt_cnt) {
case 1:
unsafe_addr = arg1;
arg1 = (long) buf;
break;
case 2:
unsafe_addr = arg2;
arg2 = (long) buf;
break;
case 3:
unsafe_addr = arg3;
arg3 = (long) buf;
break;
}
buf[0] = 0;
strncpy_from_unsafe(buf,
(void *) (long) unsafe_addr,
sizeof(buf));
goto fmt_next;
} else if (fmt[i] == 's') {
mod[fmt_cnt]++;
fmt_ptype = fmt[i];
fmt_str:
if (str_seen)
/* allow only one '%s' per fmt string */
return -EINVAL;
str_seen = true;
if (fmt[i + 1] != 0 &&
!isspace(fmt[i + 1]) &&
!ispunct(fmt[i + 1]))
return -EINVAL;
switch (fmt_cnt) {
case 0:
unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg1;
arg1 = (long)buf;
break;
case 1:
unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg2;
arg2 = (long)buf;
break;
case 2:
unsafe_ptr = (void *)(long)arg3;
arg3 = (long)buf;
break;
}
continue;
buf[0] = 0;
switch (fmt_ptype) {
case 's':
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
strncpy_from_unsafe(buf, unsafe_ptr,
sizeof(buf));
break;
#endif
case 'k':
strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(buf, unsafe_ptr,
sizeof(buf));
break;
case 'u':
strncpy_from_unsafe_user(buf,
(__force void __user *)unsafe_ptr,
sizeof(buf));
break;
}
goto fmt_next;
}
if (fmt[i] == 'l') {
@@ -403,6 +432,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_trace_printk, char *, fmt, u32, fmt_size, u64, arg1,
if (fmt[i] != 'i' && fmt[i] != 'd' &&
fmt[i] != 'u' && fmt[i] != 'x')
return -EINVAL;
fmt_next:
fmt_cnt++;
}
@@ -825,14 +855,16 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel:
return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read:
return &bpf_probe_read_compat_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto;
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read:
return &bpf_probe_read_compat_proto;
case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str:
return &bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
case BPF_FUNC_get_current_cgroup_id:
return &bpf_get_current_cgroup_id_proto;