Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified cryptographically via dm-verity). This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing). - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key. Lots of general fixes and updates. - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via finit_module(). Distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks. Apply execstack check on thread stacks" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits) LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting seccomp: Fix comment typo ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory fs: fix over-zealous use of "const" selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration Yama: consolidate error reporting string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it selinux: Change bool variable name to index. KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command ...
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@@ -2634,15 +2634,34 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
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#endif
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extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
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#define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \
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id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \
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id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \
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id(MODULE, kernel-module) \
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id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \
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id(KEXEC_INITRAMFS, kexec-initramfs) \
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id(POLICY, security-policy) \
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id(MAX_ID, )
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#define __fid_enumify(ENUM, dummy) READING_ ## ENUM,
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#define __fid_stringify(dummy, str) #str,
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enum kernel_read_file_id {
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READING_FIRMWARE = 1,
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READING_MODULE,
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READING_KEXEC_IMAGE,
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READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS,
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READING_POLICY,
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READING_MAX_ID
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__kernel_read_file_id(__fid_enumify)
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};
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static const char * const kernel_read_file_str[] = {
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__kernel_read_file_id(__fid_stringify)
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};
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static inline const char *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
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{
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if (id < 0 || id >= READING_MAX_ID)
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return kernel_read_file_str[READING_UNKNOWN];
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return kernel_read_file_str[id];
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}
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extern int kernel_read(struct file *, loff_t, char *, unsigned long);
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extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
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enum kernel_read_file_id);
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