xiaomi-sm8450/android_kernel_xiaomi_sm8450
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge 5.10.119 into android12-5.10-lts

Browse Source 
Changes in 5.10.119
	lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use
	staging: rtl8723bs: prevent ->Ssid overflow in rtw_wx_set_scan()
	KVM: x86: Properly handle APF vs disabled LAPIC situation
	KVM: x86/mmu: fix NULL pointer dereference on guest INVPCID
	tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time
	secure_seq: use the 64 bits of the siphash for port offset calculation
	media: vim2m: Register video device after setting up internals
	media: vim2m: initialize the media device earlier
	ACPI: sysfs: Make sparse happy about address space in use
	ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping
	random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness
	random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool
	MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c
	MAINTAINERS: add git tree for random.c
	crypto: lib/blake2s - Move selftest prototype into header file
	crypto: blake2s - define shash_alg structs using macros
	crypto: x86/blake2s - define shash_alg structs using macros
	crypto: blake2s - remove unneeded includes
	crypto: blake2s - move update and final logic to internal/blake2s.h
	crypto: blake2s - share the "shash" API boilerplate code
	crypto: blake2s - optimize blake2s initialization
	crypto: blake2s - add comment for blake2s_state fields
	crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming
	crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h>
	lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in
	lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard
	lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size
	lib/crypto: blake2s: avoid indirect calls to compression function for Clang CFI
	random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions
	random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness()
	random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction
	random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing
	random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init
	random: mix bootloader randomness into pool
	random: harmonize "crng init done" messages
	random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs
	random: early initialization of ChaCha constants
	random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction
	random: don't reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read()
	random: fix typo in comments
	random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction
	random: cleanup integer types
	random: remove incomplete last_data logic
	random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument
	random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global
	random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants
	random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants
	random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_
	random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants
	random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer
	random: selectively clang-format where it makes sense
	random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account()
	random: continually use hwgenerator randomness
	random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer
	random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng
	random: use computational hash for entropy extraction
	random: simplify entropy debiting
	random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting
	random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction
	random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe
	random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed()
	random: remove batched entropy locking
	random: fix locking in crng_fast_load()
	random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction
	random: get rid of secondary crngs
	random: inline leaves of rand_initialize()
	random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init
	random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random
	random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load
	random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys
	random: use hash function for crng_slow_load()
	random: make more consistent use of integer types
	random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read()
	random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace
	random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed()
	random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation
	random: remove ifdef'd out interrupt bench
	random: remove unused tracepoints
	random: add proper SPDX header
	random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions
	random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed()
	random: remove useless header comment
	random: remove whitespace and reorder includes
	random: group initialization wait functions
	random: group crng functions
	random: group entropy extraction functions
	random: group entropy collection functions
	random: group userspace read/write functions
	random: group sysctl functions
	random: rewrite header introductory comment
	random: defer fast pool mixing to worker
	random: do not take pool spinlock at boot
	random: unify early init crng load accounting
	random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness()
	random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h
	random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up
	random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32
	random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed
	random: cleanup UUID handling
	random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types
	random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq
	random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value
	random: don't let 644 read-only sysctls be written to
	random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one
	random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator
	random: make consistent usage of crng_ready()
	random: reseed more often immediately after booting
	random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy
	random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy
	random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle
	random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding
	random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init
	random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness()
	random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack
	random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check
	random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random
	random: allow partial reads if later user copies fail
	random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long
	random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility
	random: fix sysctl documentation nits
	init: call time_init() before rand_initialize()
	ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
	s390: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
	parisc: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
	alpha: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
	powerpc: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
	timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy()
	m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	riscv: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random
	arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	nios2: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	x86/tsc: Use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	um: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	sparc: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	xtensa: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify
	random: do not use batches when !crng_ready()
	random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init
	random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model
	random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions
	random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs
	random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments
	siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations
	random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states
	random: avoid initializing twice in credit race
	random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path
	random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness
	random: use proper jiffies comparison macro
	random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init()
	random: credit architectural init the exact amount
	random: use static branch for crng_ready()
	random: remove extern from functions in header
	random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait()
	random: make consistent use of buf and len
	random: move initialization functions out of hot pages
	random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs
	random: unify batched entropy implementations
	random: convert to using fops->read_iter()
	random: convert to using fops->write_iter()
	random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter()
	random: check for signals after page of pool writes
	ALSA: ctxfi: Add SB046x PCI ID
	Linux 5.10.119

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: I65f898474b7704881a3dd528012e7e91b09b3767
This commit is contained in:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-24 16:28:31 +02:00
parent fa7f6a5f56 56c31ac1d8
commit f2eb31a498
79 changed files with 1929 additions and 2965 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
View File

@@ -4130,6 +4130,12 @@
fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
[KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
ras=option[,option,...] [KNL] RAS-specific options
cec_disable [X86]

22
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
View File

@@ -1006,28 +1006,22 @@ This is a directory, with the following entries:
* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
unvarying after that;
* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding).
* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
on any RNG behavior;
* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
(as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
are woken up.
If ``drivers/char/random.c`` is built with ``ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH``
defined, these additional entries are present:
* ``add_interrupt_avg_cycles``: the average number of cycles between
interrupts used to feed the pool;
* ``add_interrupt_avg_deviation``: the standard deviation seen on the
number of cycles between interrupts used to feed the pool.
are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
randomize_va_space

2
MAINTAINERS
View File

@@ -14702,6 +14702,8 @@ F: arch/mips/generic/board-ranchu.c
RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER
M: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
M: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
T: git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git
S: Maintained
F: drivers/char/random.c

2
Makefile
View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 10
SUBLEVEL = 118
SUBLEVEL = 119
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Dare mighty things

1
arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
__asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret));
return ret;
}
#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif

4
arch/arm/crypto/Makefile
View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_NEON) += sha1-arm-neon.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_ARM) += sha256-arm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_ARM) += sha512-arm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_ARM) += blake2s-arm.o
obj-$(if $(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_ARM),y) += libblake2s-arm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2B_NEON) += blake2b-neon.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON) += chacha-neon.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_POLY1305_ARM) += poly1305-arm.o
@@ -31,7 +32,8 @@ sha256-arm-neon-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) := sha256_neon_glue.o
sha256-arm-y := sha256-core.o sha256_glue.o $(sha256-arm-neon-y)
sha512-arm-neon-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) := sha512-neon-glue.o
sha512-arm-y := sha512-core.o sha512-glue.o $(sha512-arm-neon-y)
blake2s-arm-y := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
blake2s-arm-y := blake2s-shash.o
libblake2s-arm-y:= blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
blake2b-neon-y := blake2b-neon-core.o blake2b-neon-glue.o
sha1-arm-ce-y := sha1-ce-core.o sha1-ce-glue.o
sha2-arm-ce-y := sha2-ce-core.o sha2-ce-glue.o

8
arch/arm/crypto/blake2s-core.S
View File

@@ -167,8 +167,8 @@
.endm
//
// void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
// const u8 *block, size_t nblocks, u32 inc);
// void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state,
// const u8 *block, size_t nblocks, u32 inc);
//
// Only the first three fields of struct blake2s_state are used:
// u32 h[8]; (inout)
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@
// u32 f[2]; (in)
//
.align 5
ENTRY(blake2s_compress_arch)
ENTRY(blake2s_compress)
push {r0-r2,r4-r11,lr} // keep this an even number
.Lnext_block:
@@ -303,4 +303,4 @@ ENTRY(blake2s_compress_arch)
str r3, [r12], #4
bne 1b
b .Lcopy_block_done
ENDPROC(blake2s_compress_arch)
ENDPROC(blake2s_compress)

73
arch/arm/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
View File

@@ -1,78 +1,7 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation
*
* Copyright 2020 Google LLC
*/
#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
/* defined in blake2s-core.S */
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_arch);
static int crypto_blake2s_update_arm(struct shash_desc *desc,
const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
{
return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, blake2s_compress_arch);
}
static int crypto_blake2s_final_arm(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, blake2s_compress_arch);
}
#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size) \
{ \
.base.cra_name = name, \
.base.cra_driver_name = driver_name, \
.base.cra_priority = 200, \
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, \
.base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE, \
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, \
.digestsize = digest_size, \
.setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey, \
.init = crypto_blake2s_init, \
.update = crypto_blake2s_update_arm, \
.final = crypto_blake2s_final_arm, \
.descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state), \
}
static struct shash_alg blake2s_arm_algs[] = {
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-arm", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-arm", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-arm", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-arm", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
};
static int __init blake2s_arm_mod_init(void)
{
return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs)) : 0;
}
static void __exit blake2s_arm_mod_exit(void)
{
if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH))
crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs));
}
module_init(blake2s_arm_mod_init);
module_exit(blake2s_arm_mod_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-arm");
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress);

75
arch/arm/crypto/blake2s-shash.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation
*
* Copyright 2020 Google LLC
*/
#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
static int crypto_blake2s_update_arm(struct shash_desc *desc,
const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
{
return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, false);
}
static int crypto_blake2s_final_arm(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, false);
}
#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size) \
{ \
.base.cra_name = name, \
.base.cra_driver_name = driver_name, \
.base.cra_priority = 200, \
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, \
.base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE, \
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, \
.digestsize = digest_size, \
.setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey, \
.init = crypto_blake2s_init, \
.update = crypto_blake2s_update_arm, \
.final = crypto_blake2s_final_arm, \
.descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state), \
}
static struct shash_alg blake2s_arm_algs[] = {
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-arm", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-arm", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-arm", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-arm", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
};
static int __init blake2s_arm_mod_init(void)
{
return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs)) : 0;
}
static void __exit blake2s_arm_mod_exit(void)
{
if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH))
crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs));
}
module_init(blake2s_arm_mod_init);
module_exit(blake2s_arm_mod_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-arm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-arm");

1
arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -11,5 +11,6 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
#define get_cycles() ({ cycles_t c; read_current_timer(&c) ? 0 : c; })
#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
#endif

1
arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ get_cycles (void)
ret = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_AR_ITC);
return ret;
}
#define get_cycles get_cycles
extern void ia64_cpu_local_tick (void);
extern unsigned long long ia64_native_sched_clock (void);

2
arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
{
if (mach_random_get_entropy)
return mach_random_get_entropy();
return 0;
return random_get_entropy_fallback();
}
#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy

17
arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -76,25 +76,24 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
else
return 0; /* no usable counter */
}
#define get_cycles get_cycles
/*
* Like get_cycles - but where c0_count is not available we desperately
* use c0_random in an attempt to get at least a little bit of entropy.
*
* R6000 and R6000A neither have a count register nor a random register.
* That leaves no entropy source in the CPU itself.
*/
static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
{
unsigned int prid = read_c0_prid();
unsigned int imp = prid & PRID_IMP_MASK;
unsigned int c0_random;
if (can_use_mips_counter(prid))
if (can_use_mips_counter(read_c0_prid()))
return read_c0_count();
else if (likely(imp != PRID_IMP_R6000 && imp != PRID_IMP_R6000A))
return read_c0_random();
if (cpu_has_3kex)
c0_random = (read_c0_random() >> 8) & 0x3f;
else
return 0; /* no usable register */
c0_random = read_c0_random() & 0x3f;
return (random_get_entropy_fallback() << 6) | (0x3f - c0_random);
}
#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy

3
arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -8,5 +8,8 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
extern cycles_t get_cycles(void);
#define get_cycles get_cycles
#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
#endif

3
arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
return mfctl(16);
}
#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif

1
arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
return mftb();
}
#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_TIMEX_H */

2
arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static inline u32 get_cycles_hi(void)
static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
{
if (unlikely(clint_time_val == NULL))
return 0;
return random_get_entropy_fallback();
return get_cycles();
}
#define random_get_entropy() random_get_entropy()

1
arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
return (cycles_t) get_tod_clock() >> 2;
}
#define get_cycles get_cycles
int get_phys_clock(unsigned long *clock);
void init_cpu_timer(void);

4
arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
View File

@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE 1193180 /* Underlying HZ */
/* XXX Maybe do something better at some point... -DaveM */
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
#define get_cycles() (0)
#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
#endif

9
arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -2,13 +2,8 @@
#ifndef __UM_TIMEX_H
#define __UM_TIMEX_H
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
{
return 0;
}
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE (HZ)
#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
#endif

4
arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
View File

@@ -66,7 +66,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_SSSE3) += sha512-ssse3.o
sha512-ssse3-y := sha512-ssse3-asm.o sha512-avx-asm.o sha512-avx2-asm.o sha512_ssse3_glue.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86) += blake2s-x86_64.o
blake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
blake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-shash.o
obj-$(if $(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86),y) += libblake2s-x86_64.o
libblake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_CLMUL_NI_INTEL) += ghash-clmulni-intel.o
ghash-clmulni-intel-y := ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.o ghash-clmulni-intel_glue.o

68
arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
@@ -28,9 +27,8 @@ asmlinkage void blake2s_compress_avx512(struct blake2s_state *state,
static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_ssse3);
static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_avx512);
void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
const u8 *block, size_t nblocks,
const u32 inc)
void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
{
/* SIMD disables preemption, so relax after processing each page. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(SZ_4K / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE < 8);
@@ -56,49 +54,12 @@ void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
block += blocks * BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
} while (nblocks);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_arch);
static int crypto_blake2s_update_x86(struct shash_desc *desc,
const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
{
return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, blake2s_compress_arch);
}
static int crypto_blake2s_final_x86(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, blake2s_compress_arch);
}
#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size) \
{ \
.base.cra_name = name, \
.base.cra_driver_name = driver_name, \
.base.cra_priority = 200, \
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, \
.base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE, \
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, \
.digestsize = digest_size, \
.setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey, \
.init = crypto_blake2s_init, \
.update = crypto_blake2s_update_x86, \
.final = crypto_blake2s_final_x86, \
.descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state), \
}
static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-x86", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-x86", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-x86", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-x86", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress);
static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
return 0;
static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_ssse3);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_ssse3);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
@@ -109,26 +70,9 @@ static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512, NULL))
static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_avx512);
return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs,
ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs)) : 0;
}
static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
{
if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
return 0;
}
module_init(blake2s_mod_init);
module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit);
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-x86");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-x86");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-x86");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-x86");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");

77
arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-shash.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
/*
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
*/
#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sizes.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
static int crypto_blake2s_update_x86(struct shash_desc *desc,
const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
{
return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, false);
}
static int crypto_blake2s_final_x86(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, false);
}
#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size) \
{ \
.base.cra_name = name, \
.base.cra_driver_name = driver_name, \
.base.cra_priority = 200, \
.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, \
.base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE, \
.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, \
.digestsize = digest_size, \
.setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey, \
.init = crypto_blake2s_init, \
.update = crypto_blake2s_update_x86, \
.final = crypto_blake2s_final_x86, \
.descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state), \
}
static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-x86", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-x86", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-x86", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-x86", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
};
static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
{
if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
return crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
return 0;
}
static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
{
if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
}
module_init(blake2s_mod_init);
module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit);
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-x86");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-x86");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-x86");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-x86");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");

9
arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/tsc.h>
static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
{
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
return random_get_entropy_fallback();
return rdtsc();
}
#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
/* Assume we use the PIT time source for the clock tick */
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE PIT_TICK_RATE

7
arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
View File

@@ -20,13 +20,12 @@ extern void disable_TSC(void);
static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_TSC
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
return 0;
#endif
return rdtsc();
}
#define get_cycles get_cycles
extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_to_tsc(u64 art);
extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_ns_to_tsc(u64 art_ns);

2
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
View File

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_hyperv_stimer0)
inc_irq_stat(hyperv_stimer0_count);
if (hv_stimer0_handler)
hv_stimer0_handler();
add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR, 0);
add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR);
ack_APIC_irq();
set_irq_regs(old_regs);

6
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
View File

@@ -297,6 +297,10 @@ static inline void apic_set_spiv(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 val)
atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
}
/* Check if there are APF page ready requests pending */
if (enabled)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, apic->vcpu);
}
static inline void kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u8 id)
@@ -2260,6 +2264,8 @@ void kvm_lapic_set_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 value)
if (value & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE) {
kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
static_key_slow_dec_deferred(&apic_hw_disabled);
/* Check if there are APF page ready requests pending */
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, vcpu);
} else {
static_key_slow_inc(&apic_hw_disabled.key);
atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);

6
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
View File

@@ -5178,14 +5178,16 @@ void kvm_mmu_invpcid_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, unsigned long pcid)
uint i;
if (pcid == kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu)) {
mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->root_hpa);
if (mmu->invlpg)
mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->root_hpa);
tlb_flush = true;
}
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) {
if (VALID_PAGE(mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa) &&
pcid == kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, mmu->prev_roots[i].pgd)) {
mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa);
if (mmu->invlpg)
mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa);
tlb_flush = true;
}
}

2
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
View File

@@ -11146,7 +11146,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_can_dequeue_async_page_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(vcpu))
return true;
else
return apf_pageready_slot_free(vcpu);
return kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu) && apf_pageready_slot_free(vcpu);
}
void kvm_arch_start_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)

6
arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
View File

@@ -29,10 +29,6 @@
extern unsigned long ccount_freq;
typedef unsigned long long cycles_t;
#define get_cycles() (0)
void local_timer_setup(unsigned cpu);
/*
@@ -59,4 +55,6 @@ static inline void set_linux_timer (unsigned long ccompare)
xtensa_set_sr(ccompare, SREG_CCOMPARE + LINUX_TIMER);
}
#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
#endif /* _XTENSA_TIMEX_H */

3
crypto/Kconfig
View File

@@ -1966,9 +1966,10 @@ config CRYPTO_STATS
config CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
bool
source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
source "certs/Kconfig"
endif # if CRYPTO
source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"

4
crypto/blake2s_generic.c
View File

@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@
static int crypto_blake2s_update_generic(struct shash_desc *desc,
const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
{
return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, blake2s_compress_generic);
return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, true);
}
static int crypto_blake2s_final_generic(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, blake2s_compress_generic);
return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, true);
}
#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size) \

17
crypto/drbg.c
View File

@@ -1491,12 +1491,13 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
return 0;
}
static void drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
static int drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void *data)
{
struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(rdy, struct drbg_state,
struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(nb, struct drbg_state,
random_ready);
schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work);
return 0;
}
static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
@@ -1511,10 +1512,8 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed);
drbg->random_ready.owner = THIS_MODULE;
drbg->random_ready.func = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
err = add_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
err = register_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready);
switch (err) {
case 0:
@@ -1525,7 +1524,7 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
fallthrough;
default:
drbg->random_ready.func = NULL;
drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = NULL;
return err;
}
@@ -1629,8 +1628,8 @@ free_everything:
*/
static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
if (drbg->random_ready.notifier_call) {
unregister_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready);
cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
}

23
drivers/acpi/sysfs.c
View File

@@ -439,18 +439,29 @@ static ssize_t acpi_data_show(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
{
struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr;
void __iomem *base;
ssize_t rc;
ssize_t size;
data_attr = container_of(bin_attr, struct acpi_data_attr, attr);
size = data_attr->attr.size;
base = acpi_os_map_memory(data_attr->addr, data_attr->attr.size);
if (offset < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (offset >= size)
return 0;
if (count > size - offset)
count = size - offset;
base = acpi_os_map_iomem(data_attr->addr, size);
if (!base)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &offset, base,
data_attr->attr.size);
acpi_os_unmap_memory(base, data_attr->attr.size);
return rc;
memcpy_fromio(buf, base + offset, count);
acpi_os_unmap_iomem(base, size);
return count;
}
static int acpi_bert_data_init(void *th, struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr)

3
drivers/char/Kconfig
View File

@@ -495,4 +495,5 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the
booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy
pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that
only mixes the entropy pool.
only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with
"random.trust_bootloader=on/off".

1
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
View File

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/hw_random.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>

3301
drivers/char/random.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

2
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
View File

@@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void)
tasklet_schedule(&hv_cpu->msg_dpc);
}
add_interrupt_randomness(hv_get_vector(), 0);
add_interrupt_randomness(hv_get_vector());
}
/*

22
drivers/media/test-drivers/vim2m.c
View File

@@ -1325,12 +1325,6 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
vfd->lock = &dev->dev_mutex;
vfd->v4l2_dev = &dev->v4l2_dev;
ret = video_register_device(vfd, VFL_TYPE_VIDEO, 0);
if (ret) {
v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to register video device\n");
goto error_v4l2;
}
video_set_drvdata(vfd, dev);
v4l2_info(&dev->v4l2_dev,
"Device registered as /dev/video%d\n", vfd->num);
@@ -1353,12 +1347,20 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
media_device_init(&dev->mdev);
dev->mdev.ops = &m2m_media_ops;
dev->v4l2_dev.mdev = &dev->mdev;
#endif
ret = video_register_device(vfd, VFL_TYPE_VIDEO, 0);
if (ret) {
v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to register video device\n");
goto error_m2m;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MEDIA_CONTROLLER
ret = v4l2_m2m_register_media_controller(dev->m2m_dev, vfd,
MEDIA_ENT_F_PROC_VIDEO_SCALER);
if (ret) {
v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to init mem2mem media controller\n");
goto error_dev;
goto error_v4l2;
}
ret = media_device_register(&dev->mdev);
@@ -1373,11 +1375,13 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
error_m2m_mc:
v4l2_m2m_unregister_media_controller(dev->m2m_dev);
#endif
error_dev:
error_v4l2:
video_unregister_device(&dev->vfd);
/* vim2m_device_release called by video_unregister_device to release various objects */
return ret;
error_v4l2:
error_m2m:
v4l2_m2m_release(dev->m2m_dev);
error_dev:
v4l2_device_unregister(&dev->v4l2_dev);
error_free:
kfree(dev);

1
drivers/net/Kconfig
View File

@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ config WIREGUARD
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S
select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86 if X86 && 64BIT

45
drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
View File

@@ -302,6 +302,41 @@ void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(
static_identity->static_public, private_key);
}
static void hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen, const size_t keylen)
{
struct blake2s_state state;
u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
int i;
if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
} else
memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
}
/* This is Hugo Krawczyk's HKDF:
* - https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf
* - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
@@ -322,14 +357,14 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
((third_len || third_dst) && (!second_len || !second_dst))));
/* Extract entropy from data into secret */
blake2s256_hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
if (!first_dst || !first_len)
goto out;
/* Expand first key: key = secret, data = 0x1 */
output[0] = 1;
blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
memcpy(first_dst, output, first_len);
if (!second_dst || !second_len)
@@ -337,8 +372,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
/* Expand second key: key = secret, data = first-key || 0x2 */
output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2;
blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
memcpy(second_dst, output, second_len);
if (!third_dst || !third_len)
@@ -346,8 +380,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
/* Expand third key: key = secret, data = second-key || 0x3 */
output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3;
blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
memcpy(third_dst, output, third_len);
out:

6
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
View File

@@ -1351,9 +1351,11 @@ static int rtw_wx_set_scan(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_request_info *a,
sec_len = *(pos++); len -= 1;
if (sec_len > 0 && sec_len <= len) {
if (sec_len > 0 &&
sec_len <= len &&
sec_len <= 32) {
ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength = sec_len;
memcpy(ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, pos, ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength);
memcpy(ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, pos, sec_len);
/* DBG_871X("%s COMBO_SCAN with specific ssid:%s, %d\n", __func__ */
/* , ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength); */
ssid_index++;

3
include/crypto/blake2s.h
View File

@@ -101,7 +101,4 @@ static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
blake2s_final(&state, out);
}
void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
const size_t keylen);
#endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */

15
include/crypto/chacha.h
View File

@@ -47,12 +47,19 @@ static inline void hchacha_block(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds)
hchacha_block_generic(state, out, nrounds);
}
enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */
CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U,
CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU,
CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U,
CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U
};
static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state)
{
state[0] = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */
state[1] = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */
state[2] = 0x79622d32; /* "2-by" */
state[3] = 0x6b206574; /* "te k" */
state[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA;
state[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3;
state[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY;
state[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K;
}
void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv);

2
include/crypto/drbg.h
View File

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ struct drbg_state {
const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops;
const struct drbg_core *core;
struct drbg_string test_data;
struct random_ready_callback random_ready;
struct notifier_block random_ready;
};
static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg)

46
include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
View File

@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
bool blake2s_selftest(void);
@@ -24,14 +24,11 @@ static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state)
state->f[0] = -1;
}
typedef void (*blake2s_compress_t)(struct blake2s_state *state,
const u8 *block, size_t nblocks, u32 inc);
/* Helper functions for BLAKE2s shared by the library and shash APIs */
static inline void __blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state,
const u8 *in, size_t inlen,
blake2s_compress_t compress)
static __always_inline void
__blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen,
bool force_generic)
{
const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
@@ -39,7 +36,12 @@ static inline void __blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state,
return;
if (inlen > fill) {
memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
(*compress)(state, state->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (force_generic)
blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1,
BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
else
blake2s_compress(state, state->buf, 1,
BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
state->buflen = 0;
in += fill;
inlen -= fill;
@@ -47,7 +49,12 @@ static inline void __blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state,
if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
(*compress)(state, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (force_generic)
blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1,
BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
else
blake2s_compress(state, in, nblocks - 1,
BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
}
@@ -55,13 +62,16 @@ static inline void __blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state,
state->buflen += inlen;
}
static inline void __blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out,
blake2s_compress_t compress)
static __always_inline void
__blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out, bool force_generic)
{
blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
(*compress)(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
if (force_generic)
blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
else
blake2s_compress(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
}
@@ -99,20 +109,20 @@ static inline int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
static inline int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen,
blake2s_compress_t compress)
bool force_generic)
{
struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
__blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, compress);
__blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, force_generic);
return 0;
}
static inline int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out,
blake2s_compress_t compress)
bool force_generic)
{
struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
__blake2s_final(state, out, compress);
__blake2s_final(state, out, force_generic);
return 0;
}

2
include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
View File

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
CPUHP_LUSTRE_CFS_DEAD,
CPUHP_AP_ARM_CACHE_B15_RAC_DEAD,
CPUHP_PADATA_DEAD,
CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE,
CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP,
CPUHP_POWER_NUMA_PREPARE,
CPUHP_HRTIMERS_PREPARE,
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_HV_GPCI_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_WATCHDOG_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,

2
include/linux/hw_random.h
View File

@@ -60,7 +60,5 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct device *dev, struct hwrng *rng);
/** Unregister a Hardware Random Number Generator driver. */
extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng);
extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng);
/** Feed random bits into the pool. */
extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
#endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */

1
include/linux/mm.h
View File

@@ -2735,6 +2735,7 @@ extern int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long flags, struct page **pages);
unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top);
unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);

23
include/linux/prandom.h
View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/siphash.h>
u32 prandom_u32(void);
void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
@@ -27,15 +28,10 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
* The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
* parallel given enough CPU resources.
*/
#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \
v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \
)
#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2)
#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3)
#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
/*
@@ -43,14 +39,9 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
* This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
* applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
*/
#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \
v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \
v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \
)
#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2)
#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3)
#else
#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG

100
include/linux/random.h
View File

@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* include/linux/random.h
*
* Include file for the random number generator.
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H
#define _LINUX_RANDOM_H
@@ -14,41 +10,26 @@
#include <uapi/linux/random.h>
struct random_ready_callback {
struct list_head list;
void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
struct module *owner;
};
struct notifier_block;
extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
{
add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
sizeof(latent_entropy));
add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
}
#else
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
#endif
extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
extern int __init rand_initialize(void);
extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
#ifndef MODULE
extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
#endif
void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len);
u32 get_random_u32(void);
u64 get_random_u64(void);
static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
@@ -80,36 +61,38 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
{
unsigned long val = get_random_long();
return val & CANARY_MASK;
return get_random_long() & CANARY_MASK;
}
int __init random_init(const char *command_line);
bool rng_is_initialized(void);
int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
* Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
return ret;
}
#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
if (unlikely(ret)) \
return ret; \
*out = get_random_ ## var(); \
*out = get_random_ ## name(); \
return 0; \
}
declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
#undef declare_get_random_var
unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
/*
* This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
* users, but for now we include it from <linux/random.h>
@@ -120,22 +103,10 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
# include <asm/archrandom.h>
#else
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
return false;
}
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
{
return false;
}
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
return false;
}
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
{
return false;
}
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
#endif
/*
@@ -158,4 +129,13 @@ static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v)
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
#endif
#ifndef MODULE
extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
#endif
#endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */

2
include/linux/security.h
View File

@@ -121,10 +121,12 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS,
LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR,
LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER,
LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL,
LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL,
LOCKDOWN_PERF,
LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS,
LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW,

28
include/linux/siphash.h
View File

@@ -136,4 +136,32 @@ static inline u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len,
return ___hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key);
}
/*
* These macros expose the raw SipHash and HalfSipHash permutations.
* Do not use them directly! If you think you have a use for them,
* be sure to CC the maintainer of this file explaining why.
*/
#define SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
(a) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 13), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol64((a), 32), \
(c) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 16), (d) ^= (c), \
(a) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 21), (d) ^= (a), \
(c) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 17), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol64((c), 32))
#define SIPHASH_CONST_0 0x736f6d6570736575ULL
#define SIPHASH_CONST_1 0x646f72616e646f6dULL
#define SIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c7967656e657261ULL
#define SIPHASH_CONST_3 0x7465646279746573ULL
#define HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
(a) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 5), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol32((a), 16), \
(c) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 8), (d) ^= (c), \
(a) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 7), (d) ^= (a), \
(c) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 13), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol32((c), 16))
#define HSIPHASH_CONST_0 0U
#define HSIPHASH_CONST_1 0U
#define HSIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c796765U
#define HSIPHASH_CONST_3 0x74656462U
#endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */

10
include/linux/timex.h
View File

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/param.h>
unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void);
#include <asm/timex.h>
#ifndef random_get_entropy
@@ -74,8 +76,14 @@
*
* By default we use get_cycles() for this purpose, but individual
* architectures may override this in their asm/timex.h header file.
* If a given arch does not have get_cycles(), then we fallback to
* using random_get_entropy_fallback().
*/
#define random_get_entropy() get_cycles()
#ifdef get_cycles
#define random_get_entropy() ((unsigned long)get_cycles())
#else
#define random_get_entropy() random_get_entropy_fallback()
#endif
#endif
/*

2
include/net/inet_hashtables.h
View File

@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static inline void sk_rcv_saddr_set(struct sock *sk, __be32 addr)
}
int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
struct sock *, __u16,
struct inet_timewait_sock **));

4
include/net/secure_seq.h
View File

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
__be16 dport);
u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport);

330
include/trace/events/random.h
View File

@@ -1,330 +0,0 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
#define TRACE_SYSTEM random
#if !defined(_TRACE_RANDOM_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
#define _TRACE_RANDOM_H
#include <linux/writeback.h>
#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, bytes )
__field(unsigned long, IP )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->bytes = bytes;
__entry->IP = IP;
),
TP_printk("bytes %d caller %pS",
__entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
);
DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( const char *, pool_name )
__field( int, bytes )
__field(unsigned long, IP )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->pool_name = pool_name;
__entry->bytes = bytes;
__entry->IP = IP;
),
TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
__entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
);
TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count,
unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, IP),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( const char *, pool_name )
__field( int, bits )
__field( int, entropy_count )
__field(unsigned long, IP )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->pool_name = pool_name;
__entry->bits = bits;
__entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
__entry->IP = IP;
),
TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
__entry->pool_name, __entry->bits,
__entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
);
TRACE_EVENT(push_to_pool,
TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int pool_bits, int input_bits),
TP_ARGS(pool_name, pool_bits, input_bits),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( const char *, pool_name )
__field( int, pool_bits )
__field( int, input_bits )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->pool_name = pool_name;
__entry->pool_bits = pool_bits;
__entry->input_bits = input_bits;
),
TP_printk("%s: pool_bits %d input_pool_bits %d",
__entry->pool_name, __entry->pool_bits,
__entry->input_bits)
);
TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy,
TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits),
TP_ARGS(pool_name, debit_bits),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( const char *, pool_name )
__field( int, debit_bits )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->pool_name = pool_name;
__entry->debit_bits = debit_bits;
),
TP_printk("%s: debit_bits %d", __entry->pool_name,
__entry->debit_bits)
);
TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
TP_ARGS(input_bits),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, input_bits )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->input_bits = input_bits;
),
TP_printk("input_pool_bits %d", __entry->input_bits)
);
TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, int input_bits),
TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( dev_t, dev )
__field( int, input_bits )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->dev = dev;
__entry->input_bits = input_bits;
),
TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %d", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits)
);
TRACE_EVENT(xfer_secondary_pool,
TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int xfer_bits, int request_bits,
int pool_entropy, int input_entropy),
TP_ARGS(pool_name, xfer_bits, request_bits, pool_entropy,
input_entropy),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( const char *, pool_name )
__field( int, xfer_bits )
__field( int, request_bits )
__field( int, pool_entropy )
__field( int, input_entropy )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->pool_name = pool_name;
__entry->xfer_bits = xfer_bits;
__entry->request_bits = request_bits;
__entry->pool_entropy = pool_entropy;
__entry->input_entropy = input_entropy;
),
TP_printk("pool %s xfer_bits %d request_bits %d pool_entropy %d "
"input_entropy %d", __entry->pool_name, __entry->xfer_bits,
__entry->request_bits, __entry->pool_entropy,
__entry->input_entropy)
);
DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes,
TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, nbytes )
__field(unsigned long, IP )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->nbytes = nbytes;
__entry->IP = IP;
),
TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes,
TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
);
DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( const char *, pool_name )
__field( int, nbytes )
__field( int, entropy_count )
__field(unsigned long, IP )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->pool_name = pool_name;
__entry->nbytes = nbytes;
__entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
__entry->IP = IP;
),
TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
__entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count,
(void *)__entry->IP)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
);
DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy_user,
TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
unsigned long IP),
TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
);
TRACE_EVENT(random_read,
TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int need_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
TP_ARGS(got_bits, need_bits, pool_left, input_left),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, got_bits )
__field( int, need_bits )
__field( int, pool_left )
__field( int, input_left )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->got_bits = got_bits;
__entry->need_bits = need_bits;
__entry->pool_left = pool_left;
__entry->input_left = input_left;
),
TP_printk("got_bits %d still_needed_bits %d "
"blocking_pool_entropy_left %d input_entropy_left %d",
__entry->got_bits, __entry->got_bits, __entry->pool_left,
__entry->input_left)
);
TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
TP_ARGS(got_bits, pool_left, input_left),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( int, got_bits )
__field( int, pool_left )
__field( int, input_left )
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->got_bits = got_bits;
__entry->pool_left = pool_left;
__entry->input_left = input_left;
),
TP_printk("got_bits %d nonblocking_pool_entropy_left %d "
"input_entropy_left %d", __entry->got_bits,
__entry->pool_left, __entry->input_left)
);
TRACE_EVENT(prandom_u32,
TP_PROTO(unsigned int ret),
TP_ARGS(ret),
TP_STRUCT__entry(
__field( unsigned int, ret)
),
TP_fast_assign(
__entry->ret = ret;
),
TP_printk("ret=%u" , __entry->ret)
);
#endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */
/* This part must be outside protection */
#include <trace/define_trace.h>

13
init/main.c
View File

@@ -947,21 +947,18 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
softirq_init();
timekeeping_init();
kfence_init();
time_init();
/*
* For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
* - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
* - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize()
* - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND
* - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy
* - adding command line entropy
* - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in random_init()
* - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms
* - random_init() to initialize the RNG from from early entropy sources
*/
rand_initialize();
add_latent_entropy();
add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
random_init(command_line);
boot_init_stack_canary();
time_init();
perf_event_init();
profile_init();
call_function_init();

11
kernel/cpu.c
View File

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/scs.h>
#include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h>
#include <linux/cpuset.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <uapi/linux/sched/types.h>
#include <trace/events/power.h>
@@ -1882,6 +1883,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
.startup.single = perf_event_init_cpu,
.teardown.single = perf_event_exit_cpu,
},
[CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE] = {
.name = "random:prepare",
.startup.single = random_prepare_cpu,
.teardown.single = NULL,
},
[CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP] = {
.name = "workqueue:prepare",
.startup.single = workqueue_prepare_cpu,
@@ -1998,6 +2004,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
.startup.single = workqueue_online_cpu,
.teardown.single = workqueue_offline_cpu,
},
[CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE] = {
.name = "random:online",
.startup.single = random_online_cpu,
.teardown.single = NULL,
},
[CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE] = {
.name = "RCU/tree:online",
.startup.single = rcutree_online_cpu,

24
kernel/debug/debug_core.c
View File

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include <linux/vmacache.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/irq.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
@@ -756,6 +757,29 @@ cpu_master_loop:
continue;
kgdb_connected = 0;
} else {
/*
* This is a brutal way to interfere with the debugger
* and prevent gdb being used to poke at kernel memory.
* This could cause trouble if lockdown is applied when
* there is already an active gdb session. For now the
* answer is simply "don't do that". Typically lockdown
* *will* be applied before the debug core gets started
* so only developers using kgdb for fairly advanced
* early kernel debug can be biten by this. Hopefully
* they are sophisticated enough to take care of
* themselves, especially with help from the lockdown
* message printed on the console!
*/
if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL)) {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KGDB_KDB)) {
/* Switch back to kdb if possible... */
dbg_kdb_mode = 1;
continue;
} else {
/* ... otherwise just bail */
break;
}
}
error = gdb_serial_stub(ks);
}

62
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
View File

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include "kdb_private.h"
#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
@@ -197,10 +198,62 @@ struct task_struct *kdb_curr_task(int cpu)
}
/*
* Check whether the flags of the current command and the permissions
* of the kdb console has allow a command to be run.
* Update the permissions flags (kdb_cmd_enabled) to match the
* current lockdown state.
*
* Within this function the calls to security_locked_down() are "lazy". We
* avoid calling them if the current value of kdb_cmd_enabled already excludes
* flags that might be subject to lockdown. Additionally we deliberately check
* the lockdown flags independently (even though read lockdown implies write
* lockdown) since that results in both simpler code and clearer messages to
* the user on first-time debugger entry.
*
* The permission masks during a read+write lockdown permits the following
* flags: INSPECT, SIGNAL, REBOOT (and ALWAYS_SAFE).
*
* The INSPECT commands are not blocked during lockdown because they are
* not arbitrary memory reads. INSPECT covers the backtrace family (sometimes
* forcing them to have no arguments) and lsmod. These commands do expose
* some kernel state but do not allow the developer seated at the console to
* choose what state is reported. SIGNAL and REBOOT should not be controversial,
* given these are allowed for root during lockdown already.
*/
static inline bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions,
static void kdb_check_for_lockdown(void)
{
const int write_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_WRITE |
KDB_ENABLE_REG_WRITE |
KDB_ENABLE_FLOW_CTRL;
const int read_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_READ |
KDB_ENABLE_REG_READ;
bool need_to_lockdown_write = false;
bool need_to_lockdown_read = false;
if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | write_flags))
need_to_lockdown_write =
security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL);
if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | read_flags))
need_to_lockdown_read =
security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL);
/* De-compose KDB_ENABLE_ALL if required */
if (need_to_lockdown_write || need_to_lockdown_read)
if (kdb_cmd_enabled & KDB_ENABLE_ALL)
kdb_cmd_enabled = KDB_ENABLE_MASK & ~KDB_ENABLE_ALL;
if (need_to_lockdown_write)
kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~write_flags;
if (need_to_lockdown_read)
kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~read_flags;
}
/*
* Check whether the flags of the current command, the permissions of the kdb
* console and the lockdown state allow a command to be run.
*/
static bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions,
bool no_args)
{
/* permissions comes from userspace so needs massaging slightly */
@@ -1194,6 +1247,9 @@ static int kdb_local(kdb_reason_t reason, int error, struct pt_regs *regs,
kdb_curr_task(raw_smp_processor_id());
KDB_DEBUG_STATE("kdb_local 1", reason);
kdb_check_for_lockdown();
kdb_go_count = 0;
if (reason == KDB_REASON_DEBUG) {
/* special case below */

2
kernel/irq/handle.c
View File

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc *desc)
retval = __handle_irq_event_percpu(desc, &flags);
add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq, flags);
add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq);
if (!noirqdebug)
note_interrupt(desc, retval);

15
kernel/time/timekeeping.c
View File

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/clocksource.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/timex.h>
#include <linux/tick.h>
#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
#include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
@@ -2378,6 +2379,20 @@ static int timekeeping_validate_timex(const struct __kernel_timex *txc)
return 0;
}
/**
* random_get_entropy_fallback - Returns the raw clock source value,
* used by random.c for platforms with no valid random_get_entropy().
*/
unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void)
{
struct tk_read_base *tkr = &tk_core.timekeeper.tkr_mono;
struct clocksource *clock = READ_ONCE(tkr->clock);
if (unlikely(timekeeping_suspended || !clock))
return 0;
return clock->read(clock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_get_entropy_fallback);
/**
* do_adjtimex() - Accessor function to NTP __do_adjtimex function

3
lib/Kconfig.debug
View File

@@ -1427,8 +1427,7 @@ config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
However, since users cannot do anything actionable to
address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single
warning for the first use of unseeded randomness.
address this, by default this option is disabled.
Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
unseeded randomness. This will be of use primarily for

23
lib/crypto/Kconfig
View File

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
comment "Crypto library routines"
config CRYPTO_LIB_AES
tristate
@@ -9,14 +7,14 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
tristate
config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
tristate
bool
help
Declares whether the architecture provides an arch-specific
accelerated implementation of the Blake2s library interface,
either builtin or as a module.
config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
tristate
def_bool !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
help
This symbol can be depended upon by arch implementations of the
Blake2s library interface that require the generic code as a
@@ -24,15 +22,6 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
implementation is enabled, this implementation serves the users
of CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S.
config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S
tristate "BLAKE2s hash function library"
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=n
help
Enable the Blake2s library interface. This interface may be fulfilled
by either the generic implementation or an arch-specific one, if one
is available and enabled.
config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
tristate
help
@@ -51,7 +40,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
of CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA.
config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
tristate "ChaCha library interface"
tristate
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=n
help
@@ -76,7 +65,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
of CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519.
config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
tristate "Curve25519 scalar multiplication library"
tristate
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519
select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=n
help
@@ -111,7 +100,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
of CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305.
config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
tristate "Poly1305 library interface"
tristate
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=n
help
@@ -120,7 +109,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
is available and enabled.
config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
tristate "ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD support (8-byte nonce library version)"
tristate
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA

9
lib/crypto/Makefile
View File

@@ -10,11 +10,10 @@ libaes-y := aes.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4) += libarc4.o
libarc4-y := arc4.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC) += libblake2s-generic.o
libblake2s-generic-y += blake2s-generic.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S) += libblake2s.o
libblake2s-y += blake2s.o
# blake2s is used by the /dev/random driver which is always builtin
obj-y += libblake2s.o
libblake2s-y := blake2s.o
libblake2s-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC) += blake2s-generic.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305) += libchacha20poly1305.o
libchacha20poly1305-y += chacha20poly1305.o

6
lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
View File

@@ -37,7 +37,11 @@ static inline void blake2s_increment_counter(struct blake2s_state *state,
state->t[1] += (state->t[0] < inc);
}
void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
__weak __alias(blake2s_compress_generic);
void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
{
u32 m[16];

31
lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
View File

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
* #include <stdio.h>
*
* #include <openssl/evp.h>
* #include <openssl/hmac.h>
*
* #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT 256
*
@@ -58,16 +57,6 @@
* }
* printf("};\n\n");
*
* printf("static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n");
*
* HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), key, sizeof(key), buf, sizeof(buf), hash, NULL);
* print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
*
* HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), buf, sizeof(buf), key, sizeof(key), hash, NULL);
* print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
*
* printf("};\n");
*
* return 0;
*}
*/
@@ -554,15 +543,6 @@ static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, },
};
static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
{ 0xce, 0xe1, 0x57, 0x69, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x43, 0xad, 0x56, 0x4c, 0x70,
0xed, 0x68, 0x16, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xa4, 0x73, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x79,
0x08, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x82, 0xda, 0x3f, 0x05, 0x11, },
{ 0x77, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x41, 0xf4, 0x4b, 0x2b, 0xb3, 0xc6, 0xb6, 0xf9,
0x60, 0xde, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x38, 0x66, 0xe8, 0xbf, 0x9b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x9f,
0x60, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x37, 0x99, 0xd6, 0xec, 0x31, },
};
bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
{
u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
@@ -607,16 +587,5 @@ bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
}
}
if (success) {
blake2s256_hmac(hash, buf, key, sizeof(buf), sizeof(key));
success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[0], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
blake2s256_hmac(hash, key, buf, sizeof(key), sizeof(buf));
success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[1], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
if (!success)
pr_err("blake2s256_hmac self-test: FAIL\n");
}
return success;
}

47
lib/crypto/blake2s.c
View File

@@ -16,63 +16,20 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S)
# define blake2s_compress blake2s_compress_arch
#else
# define blake2s_compress blake2s_compress_generic
#endif
void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen)
{
__blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, blake2s_compress);
__blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, false);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_update);
void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out)
{
WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && !out);
__blake2s_final(state, out, blake2s_compress);
__blake2s_final(state, out, false);
memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
const size_t keylen)
{
struct blake2s_state state;
u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
int i;
if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
} else
memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s256_hmac);
static int __init mod_init(void)
{
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&

16
lib/random32.c
View File

@@ -39,8 +39,9 @@
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <trace/events/random.h>
/**
* prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
@@ -386,7 +387,6 @@ u32 prandom_u32(void)
struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
trace_prandom_u32(res);
put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
return res;
}
@@ -552,9 +552,11 @@ static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused)
* To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
* long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
*/
static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
static int prandom_timer_start(struct notifier_block *nb,
unsigned long action, void *data)
{
mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
@@ -618,13 +620,13 @@ core_initcall(prandom32_state_selftest);
*/
static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
{
static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
.func = prandom_timer_start
static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
.notifier_call = prandom_timer_start
};
int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
int ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
if (ret == -EALREADY) {
prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
prandom_timer_start(&random_ready, 0, NULL);
ret = 0;
}
return ret;

95
lib/sha1.c
View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
@@ -55,7 +56,8 @@
#define SHA_ROUND(t, input, fn, constant, A, B, C, D, E) do { \
__u32 TEMP = input(t); setW(t, TEMP); \
E += TEMP + rol32(A,5) + (fn) + (constant); \
B = ror32(B, 2); } while (0)
B = ror32(B, 2); \
TEMP = E; E = D; D = C; C = B; B = A; A = TEMP; } while (0)
#define T_0_15(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_SRC, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
#define T_16_19(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_MIX, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
@@ -84,6 +86,7 @@
void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
{
__u32 A, B, C, D, E;
unsigned int i = 0;
A = digest[0];
B = digest[1];
@@ -92,94 +95,24 @@ void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
E = digest[4];
/* Round 1 - iterations 0-16 take their input from 'data' */
T_0_15( 0, A, B, C, D, E);
T_0_15( 1, E, A, B, C, D);
T_0_15( 2, D, E, A, B, C);
T_0_15( 3, C, D, E, A, B);
T_0_15( 4, B, C, D, E, A);
T_0_15( 5, A, B, C, D, E);
T_0_15( 6, E, A, B, C, D);
T_0_15( 7, D, E, A, B, C);
T_0_15( 8, C, D, E, A, B);
T_0_15( 9, B, C, D, E, A);
T_0_15(10, A, B, C, D, E);
T_0_15(11, E, A, B, C, D);
T_0_15(12, D, E, A, B, C);
T_0_15(13, C, D, E, A, B);
T_0_15(14, B, C, D, E, A);
T_0_15(15, A, B, C, D, E);
for (; i < 16; ++i)
T_0_15(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 1 - tail. Input from 512-bit mixing array */
T_16_19(16, E, A, B, C, D);
T_16_19(17, D, E, A, B, C);
T_16_19(18, C, D, E, A, B);
T_16_19(19, B, C, D, E, A);
for (; i < 20; ++i)
T_16_19(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 2 */
T_20_39(20, A, B, C, D, E);
T_20_39(21, E, A, B, C, D);
T_20_39(22, D, E, A, B, C);
T_20_39(23, C, D, E, A, B);
T_20_39(24, B, C, D, E, A);
T_20_39(25, A, B, C, D, E);
T_20_39(26, E, A, B, C, D);
T_20_39(27, D, E, A, B, C);
T_20_39(28, C, D, E, A, B);
T_20_39(29, B, C, D, E, A);
T_20_39(30, A, B, C, D, E);
T_20_39(31, E, A, B, C, D);
T_20_39(32, D, E, A, B, C);
T_20_39(33, C, D, E, A, B);
T_20_39(34, B, C, D, E, A);
T_20_39(35, A, B, C, D, E);
T_20_39(36, E, A, B, C, D);
T_20_39(37, D, E, A, B, C);
T_20_39(38, C, D, E, A, B);
T_20_39(39, B, C, D, E, A);
for (; i < 40; ++i)
T_20_39(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 3 */
T_40_59(40, A, B, C, D, E);
T_40_59(41, E, A, B, C, D);
T_40_59(42, D, E, A, B, C);
T_40_59(43, C, D, E, A, B);
T_40_59(44, B, C, D, E, A);
T_40_59(45, A, B, C, D, E);
T_40_59(46, E, A, B, C, D);
T_40_59(47, D, E, A, B, C);
T_40_59(48, C, D, E, A, B);
T_40_59(49, B, C, D, E, A);
T_40_59(50, A, B, C, D, E);
T_40_59(51, E, A, B, C, D);
T_40_59(52, D, E, A, B, C);
T_40_59(53, C, D, E, A, B);
T_40_59(54, B, C, D, E, A);
T_40_59(55, A, B, C, D, E);
T_40_59(56, E, A, B, C, D);
T_40_59(57, D, E, A, B, C);
T_40_59(58, C, D, E, A, B);
T_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, A);
for (; i < 60; ++i)
T_40_59(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 4 */
T_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E);
T_60_79(61, E, A, B, C, D);
T_60_79(62, D, E, A, B, C);
T_60_79(63, C, D, E, A, B);
T_60_79(64, B, C, D, E, A);
T_60_79(65, A, B, C, D, E);
T_60_79(66, E, A, B, C, D);
T_60_79(67, D, E, A, B, C);
T_60_79(68, C, D, E, A, B);
T_60_79(69, B, C, D, E, A);
T_60_79(70, A, B, C, D, E);
T_60_79(71, E, A, B, C, D);
T_60_79(72, D, E, A, B, C);
T_60_79(73, C, D, E, A, B);
T_60_79(74, B, C, D, E, A);
T_60_79(75, A, B, C, D, E);
T_60_79(76, E, A, B, C, D);
T_60_79(77, D, E, A, B, C);
T_60_79(78, C, D, E, A, B);
T_60_79(79, B, C, D, E, A);
for (; i < 80; ++i)
T_60_79(i, A, B, C, D, E);
digest[0] += A;
digest[1] += B;

32
lib/siphash.c
View File

@@ -18,19 +18,13 @@
#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
#endif
#define SIPROUND \
do { \
v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \
v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \
v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \
v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \
} while (0)
#define SIPROUND SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define PREAMBLE(len) \
u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; \
u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; \
u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; \
u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; \
u64 v0 = SIPHASH_CONST_0; \
u64 v1 = SIPHASH_CONST_1; \
u64 v2 = SIPHASH_CONST_2; \
u64 v3 = SIPHASH_CONST_3; \
u64 b = ((u64)(len)) << 56; \
v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
@@ -389,19 +383,13 @@ u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 first, const u32 second, const u32 third,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hsiphash_4u32);
#else
#define HSIPROUND \
do { \
v0 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 5); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol32(v0, 16); \
v2 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 8); v3 ^= v2; \
v0 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 7); v3 ^= v0; \
v2 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 13); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol32(v2, 16); \
} while (0)
#define HSIPROUND HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define HPREAMBLE(len) \
u32 v0 = 0; \
u32 v1 = 0; \
u32 v2 = 0x6c796765U; \
u32 v3 = 0x74656462U; \
u32 v0 = HSIPHASH_CONST_0; \
u32 v1 = HSIPHASH_CONST_1; \
u32 v2 = HSIPHASH_CONST_2; \
u32 v3 = HSIPHASH_CONST_3; \
u32 b = ((u32)(len)) << 24; \
v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
v2 ^= key->key[0]; \

10
lib/vsprintf.c
View File

@@ -756,14 +756,16 @@ static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn);
static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
static int fill_random_ptr_key(struct notifier_block *nb,
unsigned long action, void *data)
{
/* This may be in an interrupt handler. */
queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work);
return 0;
}
static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
.func = fill_random_ptr_key
static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
.notifier_call = fill_random_ptr_key
};
static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
@@ -777,7 +779,7 @@ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
return 0;
}
ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
if (!ret) {
return 0;
} else if (ret == -EALREADY) {

32
mm/util.c
View File

@@ -334,6 +334,38 @@ unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
#endif
}
/**
* randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
* @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
* @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
* random address must fall.
*
* If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
*
* NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
* @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
*
* Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
* @start is returned.
*/
unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
{
if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
}
if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
range = ULONG_MAX - start;
range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
if (range == 0)
return start;
return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
{

4
net/core/secure_seq.c
View File

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ u32 secure_tcpv6_seq(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_seq);
u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
__be16 dport)
{
const struct {
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_tcp_seq);
u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
{
net_secret_init();
return siphash_4u32((__force u32)saddr, (__force u32)daddr,

28
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
View File

@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ not_unique:
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
static u32 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
static u64 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
@@ -722,8 +722,19 @@ void inet_unhash(struct sock *sk)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
/* RFC 6056 3.3.4. Algorithm 4: Double-Hash Port Selection Algorithm
* Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
* because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
* property might be used by clever attacker.
* RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement,
* we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and
* privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
*/
#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT];
int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
struct sock *, __u16, struct inet_timewait_sock **))
{
@@ -735,8 +746,8 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct inet_bind_bucket *tb;
u32 remaining, offset;
int ret, i, low, high;
static u32 hint;
int l3mdev;
u32 index;
if (port) {
head = &hinfo->bhash[inet_bhashfn(net, port,
@@ -763,7 +774,12 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
if (likely(remaining > 1))
remaining &= ~1U;
offset = (hint + port_offset) % remaining;
net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb));
index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset;
offset %= remaining;
/* In first pass we try ports of @low parity.
* inet_csk_get_port() does the opposite choice.
*/
@@ -817,7 +833,7 @@ next_port:
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
ok:
hint += i + 2;
WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
inet_bind_hash(sk, tb, port);
@@ -840,7 +856,7 @@ ok:
int inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk)
{
u32 port_offset = 0;
u64 port_offset = 0;
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
port_offset = inet_sk_port_offset(sk);

4
net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
View File

@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ not_unique:
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
static u64 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
int inet6_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk)
{
u32 port_offset = 0;
u64 port_offset = 0;
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
port_offset = inet6_sk_port_offset(sk);

2
sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c
View File

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
| ((IEC958_AES3_CON_FS_48000) << 24))
static const struct snd_pci_quirk subsys_20k1_list[] = {
SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0021, "SB046x", CTSB046X),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0022, "SB055x", CTSB055X),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x002f, "SB055x", CTSB055X),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0029, "SB073x", CTSB073X),
@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk subsys_20k2_list[] = {
static const char *ct_subsys_name[NUM_CTCARDS] = {
/* 20k1 models */
[CTSB046X] = "SB046x",
[CTSB055X] = "SB055x",
[CTSB073X] = "SB073x",
[CTUAA] = "UAA",

3
sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h
View File

@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ enum CHIPTYP {
enum CTCARDS {
/* 20k1 models */
CTSB046X,
CT20K1_MODEL_FIRST = CTSB046X,
CTSB055X,
CT20K1_MODEL_FIRST = CTSB055X,
CTSB073X,
CTUAA,
CT20K1_UNKNOWN,