Merge 5.10.119 into android12-5.10-lts

Changes in 5.10.119
	lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use
	staging: rtl8723bs: prevent ->Ssid overflow in rtw_wx_set_scan()
	KVM: x86: Properly handle APF vs disabled LAPIC situation
	KVM: x86/mmu: fix NULL pointer dereference on guest INVPCID
	tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time
	secure_seq: use the 64 bits of the siphash for port offset calculation
	media: vim2m: Register video device after setting up internals
	media: vim2m: initialize the media device earlier
	ACPI: sysfs: Make sparse happy about address space in use
	ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping
	random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness
	random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool
	MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c
	MAINTAINERS: add git tree for random.c
	crypto: lib/blake2s - Move selftest prototype into header file
	crypto: blake2s - define shash_alg structs using macros
	crypto: x86/blake2s - define shash_alg structs using macros
	crypto: blake2s - remove unneeded includes
	crypto: blake2s - move update and final logic to internal/blake2s.h
	crypto: blake2s - share the "shash" API boilerplate code
	crypto: blake2s - optimize blake2s initialization
	crypto: blake2s - add comment for blake2s_state fields
	crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming
	crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h>
	lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in
	lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard
	lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size
	lib/crypto: blake2s: avoid indirect calls to compression function for Clang CFI
	random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions
	random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness()
	random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction
	random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing
	random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init
	random: mix bootloader randomness into pool
	random: harmonize "crng init done" messages
	random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs
	random: early initialization of ChaCha constants
	random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction
	random: don't reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read()
	random: fix typo in comments
	random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction
	random: cleanup integer types
	random: remove incomplete last_data logic
	random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument
	random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global
	random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants
	random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants
	random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_
	random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants
	random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer
	random: selectively clang-format where it makes sense
	random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account()
	random: continually use hwgenerator randomness
	random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer
	random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng
	random: use computational hash for entropy extraction
	random: simplify entropy debiting
	random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting
	random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction
	random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe
	random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed()
	random: remove batched entropy locking
	random: fix locking in crng_fast_load()
	random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction
	random: get rid of secondary crngs
	random: inline leaves of rand_initialize()
	random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init
	random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random
	random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load
	random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys
	random: use hash function for crng_slow_load()
	random: make more consistent use of integer types
	random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read()
	random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace
	random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed()
	random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation
	random: remove ifdef'd out interrupt bench
	random: remove unused tracepoints
	random: add proper SPDX header
	random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions
	random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed()
	random: remove useless header comment
	random: remove whitespace and reorder includes
	random: group initialization wait functions
	random: group crng functions
	random: group entropy extraction functions
	random: group entropy collection functions
	random: group userspace read/write functions
	random: group sysctl functions
	random: rewrite header introductory comment
	random: defer fast pool mixing to worker
	random: do not take pool spinlock at boot
	random: unify early init crng load accounting
	random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness()
	random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h
	random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up
	random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32
	random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed
	random: cleanup UUID handling
	random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types
	random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq
	random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value
	random: don't let 644 read-only sysctls be written to
	random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one
	random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator
	random: make consistent usage of crng_ready()
	random: reseed more often immediately after booting
	random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy
	random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy
	random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle
	random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding
	random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init
	random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness()
	random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack
	random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check
	random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random
	random: allow partial reads if later user copies fail
	random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long
	random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility
	random: fix sysctl documentation nits
	init: call time_init() before rand_initialize()
	ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
	s390: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
	parisc: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
	alpha: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
	powerpc: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
	timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy()
	m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	riscv: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random
	arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	nios2: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	x86/tsc: Use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	um: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	sparc: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	xtensa: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
	random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify
	random: do not use batches when !crng_ready()
	random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init
	random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model
	random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions
	random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs
	random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments
	siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations
	random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states
	random: avoid initializing twice in credit race
	random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path
	random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness
	random: use proper jiffies comparison macro
	random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init()
	random: credit architectural init the exact amount
	random: use static branch for crng_ready()
	random: remove extern from functions in header
	random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait()
	random: make consistent use of buf and len
	random: move initialization functions out of hot pages
	random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs
	random: unify batched entropy implementations
	random: convert to using fops->read_iter()
	random: convert to using fops->write_iter()
	random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter()
	random: check for signals after page of pool writes
	ALSA: ctxfi: Add SB046x PCI ID
	Linux 5.10.119

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: I65f898474b7704881a3dd528012e7e91b09b3767

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -4130,6 +4130,12 @@
 			fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
 			by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
 
+	random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
+			[KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
+			seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
+			fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+			by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+
 	ras=option[,option,...]	[KNL] RAS-specific options
 
 		cec_disable	[X86]

Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst

@@ -1006,28 +1006,22 @@ This is a directory, with the following entries:
 * ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
   unvarying after that;
 
+* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
+  thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
+
 * ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
 
 * ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
 
 * ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
-  number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding).
+  number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
-
+  writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
-* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
+  on any RNG behavior;
-  thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
 
 * ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
   (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
-  are woken up.
+  are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
-
+  writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
-If ``drivers/char/random.c`` is built with ``ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH``
-defined, these additional entries are present:
-
-* ``add_interrupt_avg_cycles``: the average number of cycles between
-  interrupts used to feed the pool;
-
-* ``add_interrupt_avg_deviation``: the standard deviation seen on the
-  number of cycles between interrupts used to feed the pool.
 
 
 randomize_va_space

MAINTAINERS

@@ -14702,6 +14702,8 @@ F:	arch/mips/generic/board-ranchu.c
 
 RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER
 M:	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
+M:	Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+T:	git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git
 S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/char/random.c
 

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 10
-SUBLEVEL = 118
+SUBLEVEL = 119
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Dare mighty things
 

arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
 	__asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret));
 	return ret;
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 #endif

arch/arm/crypto/Makefile

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_ARM_NEON) += sha1-arm-neon.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_ARM) += sha256-arm.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_ARM) += sha512-arm.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_ARM) += blake2s-arm.o
+obj-$(if $(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_ARM),y) += libblake2s-arm.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2B_NEON) += blake2b-neon.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_NEON) += chacha-neon.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_POLY1305_ARM) += poly1305-arm.o
@@ -31,7 +32,8 @@ sha256-arm-neon-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) := sha256_neon_glue.o
 sha256-arm-y	:= sha256-core.o sha256_glue.o $(sha256-arm-neon-y)
 sha512-arm-neon-$(CONFIG_KERNEL_MODE_NEON) := sha512-neon-glue.o
 sha512-arm-y	:= sha512-core.o sha512-glue.o $(sha512-arm-neon-y)
-blake2s-arm-y   := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
+blake2s-arm-y   := blake2s-shash.o
+libblake2s-arm-y:= blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
 blake2b-neon-y  := blake2b-neon-core.o blake2b-neon-glue.o
 sha1-arm-ce-y	:= sha1-ce-core.o sha1-ce-glue.o
 sha2-arm-ce-y	:= sha2-ce-core.o sha2-ce-glue.o

arch/arm/crypto/blake2s-core.S

@@ -167,8 +167,8 @@
 .endm
 
 //
-// void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
+// void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state,
-//			      const u8 *block, size_t nblocks, u32 inc);
+//			 const u8 *block, size_t nblocks, u32 inc);
 //
 // Only the first three fields of struct blake2s_state are used:
 //	u32 h[8];	(inout)
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@
 //	u32 f[2];	(in)
 //
 	.align		5
-ENTRY(blake2s_compress_arch)
+ENTRY(blake2s_compress)
 	push		{r0-r2,r4-r11,lr}	// keep this an even number
 
 .Lnext_block:
@@ -303,4 +303,4 @@ ENTRY(blake2s_compress_arch)
 	str		r3, [r12], #4
 	bne		1b
 	b		.Lcopy_block_done
-ENDPROC(blake2s_compress_arch)
+ENDPROC(blake2s_compress)

arch/arm/crypto/blake2s-glue.c

@@ -1,78 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
-/*
- * BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation
- *
- * Copyright 2020 Google LLC
- */
 
 #include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
-
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
 /* defined in blake2s-core.S */
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_arch);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress);
-
-static int crypto_blake2s_update_arm(struct shash_desc *desc,
-				     const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
-{
-	return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, blake2s_compress_arch);
-}
-
-static int crypto_blake2s_final_arm(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
-{
-	return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, blake2s_compress_arch);
-}
-
-#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size)			\
-	{								\
-		.base.cra_name		= name,				\
-		.base.cra_driver_name	= driver_name,			\
-		.base.cra_priority	= 200,				\
-		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,	\
-		.base.cra_blocksize	= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,		\
-		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
-		.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,			\
-		.digestsize		= digest_size,			\
-		.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,	\
-		.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,		\
-		.update			= crypto_blake2s_update_arm,	\
-		.final			= crypto_blake2s_final_arm,	\
-		.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),	\
-	}
-
-static struct shash_alg blake2s_arm_algs[] = {
-	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-arm", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
-	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-arm", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
-	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-arm", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
-	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-arm", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
-};
-
-static int __init blake2s_arm_mod_init(void)
-{
-	return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
-		crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
-					ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs)) : 0;
-}
-
-static void __exit blake2s_arm_mod_exit(void)
-{
-	if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH))
-		crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
-					  ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs));
-}
-
-module_init(blake2s_arm_mod_init);
-module_exit(blake2s_arm_mod_exit);
-
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-arm");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-arm");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-arm");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-arm");

arch/arm/crypto/blake2s-shash.c

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2020 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_update_arm(struct shash_desc *desc,
+				     const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
+{
+	return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, false);
+}
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_final_arm(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+	return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, false);
+}
+
+#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size)			\
+	{								\
+		.base.cra_name		= name,				\
+		.base.cra_driver_name	= driver_name,			\
+		.base.cra_priority	= 200,				\
+		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,	\
+		.base.cra_blocksize	= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,		\
+		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
+		.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,			\
+		.digestsize		= digest_size,			\
+		.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,	\
+		.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,		\
+		.update			= crypto_blake2s_update_arm,	\
+		.final			= crypto_blake2s_final_arm,	\
+		.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),	\
+	}
+
+static struct shash_alg blake2s_arm_algs[] = {
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-arm", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-arm", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-arm", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-arm", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
+};
+
+static int __init blake2s_arm_mod_init(void)
+{
+	return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
+		crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
+					ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs)) : 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit blake2s_arm_mod_exit(void)
+{
+	if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH))
+		crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_arm_algs,
+					  ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_arm_algs));
+}
+
+module_init(blake2s_arm_mod_init);
+module_exit(blake2s_arm_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("BLAKE2s digest algorithm, ARM scalar implementation");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-arm");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-arm");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-arm");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-arm");

arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -11,5 +11,6 @@
 
 typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
 #define get_cycles()	({ cycles_t c; read_current_timer(&c) ? 0 : c; })
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
 
 #endif

arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ get_cycles (void)
 	ret = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_AR_ITC);
 	return ret;
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 extern void ia64_cpu_local_tick (void);
 extern unsigned long long ia64_native_sched_clock (void);

arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
 {
 	if (mach_random_get_entropy)
 		return mach_random_get_entropy();
-	return 0;
+	return random_get_entropy_fallback();
 }
 #define random_get_entropy	random_get_entropy
 

arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -76,25 +76,24 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 	else
 		return 0;	/* no usable counter */
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 /*
  * Like get_cycles - but where c0_count is not available we desperately
  * use c0_random in an attempt to get at least a little bit of entropy.
- *
- * R6000 and R6000A neither have a count register nor a random register.
- * That leaves no entropy source in the CPU itself.
  */
 static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
 {
-	unsigned int prid = read_c0_prid();
+	unsigned int c0_random;
-	unsigned int imp = prid & PRID_IMP_MASK;
 
-	if (can_use_mips_counter(prid))
+	if (can_use_mips_counter(read_c0_prid()))
 		return read_c0_count();
-	else if (likely(imp != PRID_IMP_R6000 && imp != PRID_IMP_R6000A))
+
-		return read_c0_random();
+	if (cpu_has_3kex)
+		c0_random = (read_c0_random() >> 8) & 0x3f;
 	else
-		return 0;	/* no usable register */
+		c0_random = read_c0_random() & 0x3f;
+	return (random_get_entropy_fallback() << 6) | (0x3f - c0_random);
 }
 #define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
 

arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -8,5 +8,8 @@
 typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
 
 extern cycles_t get_cycles(void);
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
 
 #endif

arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@
 
 typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
 
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
+static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 {
 	return mfctl(16);
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 #endif

arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 {
 	return mftb();
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 #endif	/* __KERNEL__ */
 #endif	/* _ASM_POWERPC_TIMEX_H */

arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static inline u32 get_cycles_hi(void)
 static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
 {
 	if (unlikely(clint_time_val == NULL))
-		return 0;
+		return random_get_entropy_fallback();
 	return get_cycles();
 }
 #define random_get_entropy()	random_get_entropy()

arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 {
 	return (cycles_t) get_tod_clock() >> 2;
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 int get_phys_clock(unsigned long *clock);
 void init_cpu_timer(void);

arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h

@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
 
 #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE	1193180 /* Underlying HZ */
 
-/* XXX Maybe do something better at some point... -DaveM */
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-#define get_cycles()	(0)
 
 #endif

arch/um/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -2,13 +2,8 @@
 #ifndef __UM_TIMEX_H
 #define __UM_TIMEX_H
 
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-
 #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE (HZ)
 
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
 #endif

arch/x86/crypto/Makefile

@@ -66,7 +66,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_SSSE3) += sha512-ssse3.o
 sha512-ssse3-y := sha512-ssse3-asm.o sha512-avx-asm.o sha512-avx2-asm.o sha512_ssse3_glue.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86) += blake2s-x86_64.o
-blake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
+blake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-shash.o
+obj-$(if $(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86),y) += libblake2s-x86_64.o
+libblake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_CLMUL_NI_INTEL) += ghash-clmulni-intel.o
 ghash-clmulni-intel-y := ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.o ghash-clmulni-intel_glue.o

arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
 
 #include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
@@ -28,9 +27,8 @@ asmlinkage void blake2s_compress_avx512(struct blake2s_state *state,
 static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_ssse3);
 static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_avx512);
 
-void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
+void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
-			   const u8 *block, size_t nblocks,
+		      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
-			   const u32 inc)
 {
 	/* SIMD disables preemption, so relax after processing each page. */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(SZ_4K / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE < 8);
@@ -56,49 +54,12 @@ void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
 		block += blocks * BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	} while (nblocks);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_arch);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress);
-
-static int crypto_blake2s_update_x86(struct shash_desc *desc,
-				     const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
-{
-	return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, blake2s_compress_arch);
-}
-
-static int crypto_blake2s_final_x86(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
-{
-	return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, blake2s_compress_arch);
-}
-
-#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size)			\
-	{								\
-		.base.cra_name		= name,				\
-		.base.cra_driver_name	= driver_name,			\
-		.base.cra_priority	= 200,				\
-		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,	\
-		.base.cra_blocksize	= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,		\
-		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
-		.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,			\
-		.digestsize		= digest_size,			\
-		.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,	\
-		.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,		\
-		.update			= crypto_blake2s_update_x86,	\
-		.final			= crypto_blake2s_final_x86,	\
-		.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),	\
-	}
-
-static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {
-	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-x86", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
-	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-x86", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
-	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-x86", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
-	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-x86", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
-};
 
 static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
-		return 0;
+		static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_ssse3);
-
-	static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_ssse3);
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) &&
 	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
@@ -109,26 +70,9 @@ static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
 			      XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512, NULL))
 		static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_avx512);
 
-	return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
+	return 0;
-		crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs,
-					ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs)) : 0;
-}
-
-static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
-{
-	if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
-		crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
 }
 
 module_init(blake2s_mod_init);
-module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit);
 
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-x86");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-x86");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-x86");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-x86");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");

arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-shash.c

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_update_x86(struct shash_desc *desc,
+				     const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
+{
+	return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, false);
+}
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_final_x86(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+	return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, false);
+}
+
+#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size)			\
+	{								\
+		.base.cra_name		= name,				\
+		.base.cra_driver_name	= driver_name,			\
+		.base.cra_priority	= 200,				\
+		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,	\
+		.base.cra_blocksize	= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,		\
+		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
+		.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,			\
+		.digestsize		= digest_size,			\
+		.setkey			= crypto_blake2s_setkey,	\
+		.init			= crypto_blake2s_init,		\
+		.update			= crypto_blake2s_update_x86,	\
+		.final			= crypto_blake2s_final_x86,	\
+		.descsize		= sizeof(struct blake2s_state),	\
+	}
+
+static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-x86", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-x86", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-x86", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
+	BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-x86", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
+};
+
+static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
+{
+	if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+		return crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
+{
+	if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+		crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
+}
+
+module_init(blake2s_mod_init);
+module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-x86");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-x86");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-x86");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-x86");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");

arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/tsc.h>
 
+static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+		return random_get_entropy_fallback();
+	return rdtsc();
+}
+#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
+
 /* Assume we use the PIT time source for the clock tick */
 #define CLOCK_TICK_RATE		PIT_TICK_RATE
 

arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h

@@ -20,13 +20,12 @@ extern void disable_TSC(void);
 
 static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
 {
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_TSC
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
-	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
 		return 0;
-#endif
-
 	return rdtsc();
 }
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
 
 extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_to_tsc(u64 art);
 extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_ns_to_tsc(u64 art_ns);

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_hyperv_stimer0)
 	inc_irq_stat(hyperv_stimer0_count);
 	if (hv_stimer0_handler)
 		hv_stimer0_handler();
-	add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR, 0);
+	add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR);
 	ack_APIC_irq();
 
 	set_irq_regs(old_regs);

arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c

@@ -297,6 +297,10 @@ static inline void apic_set_spiv(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 val)
 
 		atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
 	}
+
+	/* Check if there are APF page ready requests pending */
+	if (enabled)
+		kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, apic->vcpu);
 }
 
 static inline void kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u8 id)
@@ -2260,6 +2264,8 @@ void kvm_lapic_set_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 value)
 		if (value & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE) {
 			kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
 			static_key_slow_dec_deferred(&apic_hw_disabled);
+			/* Check if there are APF page ready requests pending */
+			kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, vcpu);
 		} else {
 			static_key_slow_inc(&apic_hw_disabled.key);
 			atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);

arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c

@@ -5178,14 +5178,16 @@ void kvm_mmu_invpcid_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, unsigned long pcid)
 	uint i;
 
 	if (pcid == kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu)) {
-		mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->root_hpa);
+		if (mmu->invlpg)
+			mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->root_hpa);
 		tlb_flush = true;
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) {
 		if (VALID_PAGE(mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa) &&
 		    pcid == kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, mmu->prev_roots[i].pgd)) {
-			mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa);
+			if (mmu->invlpg)
+				mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa);
 			tlb_flush = true;
 		}
 	}

arch/x86/kvm/x86.c

@@ -11146,7 +11146,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_can_dequeue_async_page_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(vcpu))
 		return true;
 	else
-		return apf_pageready_slot_free(vcpu);
+		return kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu) && apf_pageready_slot_free(vcpu);
 }
 
 void kvm_arch_start_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)

arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h

@@ -29,10 +29,6 @@
 
 extern unsigned long ccount_freq;
 
-typedef unsigned long long cycles_t;
-
-#define get_cycles()	(0)
-
 void local_timer_setup(unsigned cpu);
 
 /*
@@ -59,4 +55,6 @@ static inline void set_linux_timer (unsigned long ccompare)
 	xtensa_set_sr(ccompare, SREG_CCOMPARE + LINUX_TIMER);
 }
 
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
 #endif	/* _XTENSA_TIMEX_H */

crypto/Kconfig

@@ -1966,9 +1966,10 @@ config CRYPTO_STATS
 config CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	bool
 
-source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
 source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
 source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
 source "certs/Kconfig"
 
 endif	# if CRYPTO
+
+source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"

crypto/blake2s_generic.c

@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@
 static int crypto_blake2s_update_generic(struct shash_desc *desc,
 					 const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
 {
-	return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, blake2s_compress_generic);
+	return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, true);
 }
 
 static int crypto_blake2s_final_generic(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
 {
-	return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, blake2s_compress_generic);
+	return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, true);
 }
 
 #define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size)			\

crypto/drbg.c

@@ -1491,12 +1491,13 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+static int drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void *data)
 {
-	struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(rdy, struct drbg_state,
+	struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(nb, struct drbg_state,
 					       random_ready);
 
 	schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
@@ -1511,10 +1512,8 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 
 	INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed);
 
-	drbg->random_ready.owner = THIS_MODULE;
+	drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
-	drbg->random_ready.func = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
+	err = register_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready);
-
-	err = add_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
 
 	switch (err) {
 	case 0:
@@ -1525,7 +1524,7 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 		fallthrough;
 
 	default:
-		drbg->random_ready.func = NULL;
+		drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = NULL;
 		return err;
 	}
 
@@ -1629,8 +1628,8 @@ free_everything:
  */
 static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
-	if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
+	if (drbg->random_ready.notifier_call) {
-		del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
+		unregister_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready);
 		cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
 	}
 

drivers/acpi/sysfs.c

@@ -439,18 +439,29 @@ static ssize_t acpi_data_show(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 {
 	struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr;
 	void __iomem *base;
-	ssize_t rc;
+	ssize_t size;
 
 	data_attr = container_of(bin_attr, struct acpi_data_attr, attr);
+	size = data_attr->attr.size;
 
-	base = acpi_os_map_memory(data_attr->addr, data_attr->attr.size);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (offset >= size)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (count > size - offset)
+		count = size - offset;
+
+	base = acpi_os_map_iomem(data_attr->addr, size);
 	if (!base)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &offset, base,
-				     data_attr->attr.size);
-	acpi_os_unmap_memory(base, data_attr->attr.size);
 
-	return rc;
+	memcpy_fromio(buf, base + offset, count);
+
+	acpi_os_unmap_iomem(base, size);
+
+	return count;
 }
 
 static int acpi_bert_data_init(void *th, struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr)

drivers/char/Kconfig

@@ -495,4 +495,5 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
 	device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the
 	booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy
 	pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that
-	only mixes the entropy pool.
+	only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with
+	"random.trust_bootloader=on/off".

drivers/char/hw_random/core.c

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/hw_random.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>

drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c

@@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void)
 			tasklet_schedule(&hv_cpu->msg_dpc);
 	}
 
-	add_interrupt_randomness(hv_get_vector(), 0);
+	add_interrupt_randomness(hv_get_vector());
 }
 
 /*

drivers/media/test-drivers/vim2m.c

@@ -1325,12 +1325,6 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	vfd->lock = &dev->dev_mutex;
 	vfd->v4l2_dev = &dev->v4l2_dev;
 
-	ret = video_register_device(vfd, VFL_TYPE_VIDEO, 0);
-	if (ret) {
-		v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to register video device\n");
-		goto error_v4l2;
-	}
-
 	video_set_drvdata(vfd, dev);
 	v4l2_info(&dev->v4l2_dev,
 		  "Device registered as /dev/video%d\n", vfd->num);
@@ -1353,12 +1347,20 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	media_device_init(&dev->mdev);
 	dev->mdev.ops = &m2m_media_ops;
 	dev->v4l2_dev.mdev = &dev->mdev;
+#endif
 
+	ret = video_register_device(vfd, VFL_TYPE_VIDEO, 0);
+	if (ret) {
+		v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to register video device\n");
+		goto error_m2m;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MEDIA_CONTROLLER
 	ret = v4l2_m2m_register_media_controller(dev->m2m_dev, vfd,
 						 MEDIA_ENT_F_PROC_VIDEO_SCALER);
 	if (ret) {
 		v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to init mem2mem media controller\n");
-		goto error_dev;
+		goto error_v4l2;
 	}
 
 	ret = media_device_register(&dev->mdev);
@@ -1373,11 +1375,13 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 error_m2m_mc:
 	v4l2_m2m_unregister_media_controller(dev->m2m_dev);
 #endif
-error_dev:
+error_v4l2:
 	video_unregister_device(&dev->vfd);
 	/* vim2m_device_release called by video_unregister_device to release various objects */
 	return ret;
-error_v4l2:
+error_m2m:
+	v4l2_m2m_release(dev->m2m_dev);
+error_dev:
 	v4l2_device_unregister(&dev->v4l2_dev);
 error_free:
 	kfree(dev);

drivers/net/Kconfig

@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ config WIREGUARD
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
-	select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S
 	select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT
 	select CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT
 	select CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86 if X86 && 64BIT

drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c

@@ -302,6 +302,41 @@ void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(
 		static_identity->static_public, private_key);
 }
 
+static void hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen, const size_t keylen)
+{
+	struct blake2s_state state;
+	u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
+	u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
+	int i;
+
+	if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+		blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
+		blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
+	} else
+		memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
+		x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
+
+	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
+	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
+		x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
+
+	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
+
+	memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+}
+
 /* This is Hugo Krawczyk's HKDF:
  *  - https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf
  *  - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
@@ -322,14 +357,14 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
 		 ((third_len || third_dst) && (!second_len || !second_dst))));
 
 	/* Extract entropy from data into secret */
-	blake2s256_hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+	hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
 
 	if (!first_dst || !first_len)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Expand first key: key = secret, data = 0x1 */
 	output[0] = 1;
-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 	memcpy(first_dst, output, first_len);
 
 	if (!second_dst || !second_len)
@@ -337,8 +372,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
 
 	/* Expand second key: key = secret, data = first-key || 0x2 */
 	output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2;
-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
+	hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-			BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 	memcpy(second_dst, output, second_len);
 
 	if (!third_dst || !third_len)
@@ -346,8 +380,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
 
 	/* Expand third key: key = secret, data = second-key || 0x3 */
 	output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3;
-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
+	hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-			BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 	memcpy(third_dst, output, third_len);
 
 out:

drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c

@@ -1351,9 +1351,11 @@ static int rtw_wx_set_scan(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_request_info *a,
 
 					sec_len = *(pos++); len -= 1;
 
-					if (sec_len > 0 && sec_len <= len) {
+					if (sec_len > 0 &&
+					    sec_len <= len &&
+					    sec_len <= 32) {
 						ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength = sec_len;
-						memcpy(ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, pos, ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength);
+						memcpy(ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, pos, sec_len);
 						/* DBG_871X("%s COMBO_SCAN with specific ssid:%s, %d\n", __func__ */
 						/* 	, ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength); */
 						ssid_index++;

include/crypto/blake2s.h

@@ -101,7 +101,4 @@ static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
 	blake2s_final(&state, out);
 }
 
-void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
-		     const size_t keylen);
-
 #endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */

include/crypto/chacha.h

@@ -47,12 +47,19 @@ static inline void hchacha_block(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds)
 		hchacha_block_generic(state, out, nrounds);
 }
 
+enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */
+	CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U,
+	CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU,
+	CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U,
+	CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U
+};
+
 static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state)
 {
-	state[0]  = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */
+	state[0]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA;
-	state[1]  = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */
+	state[1]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3;
-	state[2]  = 0x79622d32; /* "2-by" */
+	state[2]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY;
-	state[3]  = 0x6b206574; /* "te k" */
+	state[3]  = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K;
 }
 
 void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv);

include/crypto/drbg.h

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ struct drbg_state {
 	const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops;
 	const struct drbg_core *core;
 	struct drbg_string test_data;
-	struct random_ready_callback random_ready;
+	struct notifier_block random_ready;
 };
 
 static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg)

include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h

@@ -11,11 +11,11 @@
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 
-void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
 			      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
 
-void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
-			   size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
+		      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
 
 bool blake2s_selftest(void);
 
@@ -24,14 +24,11 @@ static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state)
 	state->f[0] = -1;
 }
 
-typedef void (*blake2s_compress_t)(struct blake2s_state *state,
-				   const u8 *block, size_t nblocks, u32 inc);
-
 /* Helper functions for BLAKE2s shared by the library and shash APIs */
 
-static inline void __blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state,
+static __always_inline void
-				    const u8 *in, size_t inlen,
+__blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen,
-				    blake2s_compress_t compress)
+		 bool force_generic)
 {
 	const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
 
@@ -39,7 +36,12 @@ static inline void __blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state,
 		return;
 	if (inlen > fill) {
 		memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
-		(*compress)(state, state->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		if (force_generic)
+			blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1,
+						 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		else
+			blake2s_compress(state, state->buf, 1,
+					 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
 		state->buflen = 0;
 		in += fill;
 		inlen -= fill;
@@ -47,7 +49,12 @@ static inline void __blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state,
 	if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 		const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
 		/* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
-		(*compress)(state, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		if (force_generic)
+			blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1,
+						 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		else
+			blake2s_compress(state, in, nblocks - 1,
+					 BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
 		in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
 		inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
 	}
@@ -55,13 +62,16 @@ static inline void __blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state,
 	state->buflen += inlen;
 }
 
-static inline void __blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out,
+static __always_inline void
-				   blake2s_compress_t compress)
+__blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out, bool force_generic)
 {
 	blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
 	memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
 	       BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
-	(*compress)(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+	if (force_generic)
+		blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+	else
+		blake2s_compress(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
 	cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
 	memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
 }
@@ -99,20 +109,20 @@ static inline int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
 
 static inline int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
 					const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen,
-					blake2s_compress_t compress)
+					bool force_generic)
 {
 	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
 
-	__blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, compress);
+	__blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, force_generic);
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out,
-				       blake2s_compress_t compress)
+				       bool force_generic)
 {
 	struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
 
-	__blake2s_final(state, out, compress);
+	__blake2s_final(state, out, force_generic);
 	return 0;
 }
 

include/linux/cpuhotplug.h

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
 	CPUHP_LUSTRE_CFS_DEAD,
 	CPUHP_AP_ARM_CACHE_B15_RAC_DEAD,
 	CPUHP_PADATA_DEAD,
+	CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE,
 	CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP,
 	CPUHP_POWER_NUMA_PREPARE,
 	CPUHP_HRTIMERS_PREPARE,
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
 	CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_HV_GPCI_ONLINE,
 	CPUHP_AP_WATCHDOG_ONLINE,
 	CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE,
+	CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE,
 	CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE,
 	CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE,
 	CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,

include/linux/hw_random.h

@@ -60,7 +60,5 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct device *dev, struct hwrng *rng);
 /** Unregister a Hardware Random Number Generator driver. */
 extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng);
 extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng);
-/** Feed random bits into the pool. */
-extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
 
 #endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */

include/linux/mm.h

@@ -2735,6 +2735,7 @@ extern int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				   unsigned long flags, struct page **pages);
 
 unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top);
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
 
 extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 

include/linux/prandom.h

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
 
 u32 prandom_u32(void);
 void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
@@ -27,15 +28,10 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
  * The core SipHash round function.  Each line can be executed in
  * parallel given enough CPU resources.
  */
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
-	v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13),  v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
-	v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32),  v3 ^= v2,                     \
-	v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21),  v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
-	v3 ^= v0,                      v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32)  \
-)
 
-#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
+#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2)
-#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3)
 
 #elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
 /*
@@ -43,14 +39,9 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
  * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
  * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
  */
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
-	v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1,  5),  v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3,  8), \
+#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2)
-	v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16),  v3 ^= v2,                     \
+#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3)
-	v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3,  7),  v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
-	v3 ^= v0,                      v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16)  \
-)
-#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
-#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
 
 #else
 #error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG

include/linux/random.h

@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-/*
+
- * include/linux/random.h
- *
- * Include file for the random number generator.
- */
 #ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H
 #define _LINUX_RANDOM_H
 
@@ -14,41 +10,26 @@
 
 #include <uapi/linux/random.h>
 
-struct random_ready_callback {
+struct notifier_block;
-	struct list_head list;
-	void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-	struct module *owner;
-};
 
-extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
-extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
+void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+			  unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
 
 #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
 static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
 {
-	add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
+	add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
-			      sizeof(latent_entropy));
 }
 #else
-static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
+static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
-#endif
-
-extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
-				 unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
-extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
-
-extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
-extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
-extern int __init rand_initialize(void);
-extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
-extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
-
-#ifndef MODULE
-extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
 #endif
 
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len);
 u32 get_random_u32(void);
 u64 get_random_u64(void);
 static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
@@ -80,36 +61,38 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
 
 static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
 {
-	unsigned long val = get_random_long();
+	return get_random_long() & CANARY_MASK;
-
-	return val & CANARY_MASK;
 }
 
+int __init random_init(const char *command_line);
+bool rng_is_initialized(void);
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
+int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+
 /* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
  * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
-static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
+static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
 	get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
+#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
-	static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
+	static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
 		int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
 		if (unlikely(ret)) \
 			return ret; \
-		*out = get_random_ ## var(); \
+		*out = get_random_ ## name(); \
 		return 0; \
 	}
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
 #undef declare_get_random_var
 
-unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
-
 /*
  * This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
  * users, but for now we include it from <linux/random.h>
@@ -120,22 +103,10 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
 # include <asm/archrandom.h>
 #else
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
-{
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
-	return false;
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
-}
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
-	return false;
-}
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
-{
-	return false;
-}
 #endif
 
 /*
@@ -158,4 +129,13 @@ static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */

include/linux/security.h

@@ -121,10 +121,12 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
 	LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS,
 	LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR,
 	LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER,
+	LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL,
 	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
 	LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
 	LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
 	LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
+	LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL,
 	LOCKDOWN_PERF,
 	LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS,
 	LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW,

include/linux/siphash.h

@@ -136,4 +136,32 @@ static inline u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len,
 	return ___hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key);
 }
 
+/*
+ * These macros expose the raw SipHash and HalfSipHash permutations.
+ * Do not use them directly! If you think you have a use for them,
+ * be sure to CC the maintainer of this file explaining why.
+ */
+
+#define SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+	(a) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 13), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol64((a), 32), \
+	(c) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 16), (d) ^= (c), \
+	(a) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 21), (d) ^= (a), \
+	(c) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 17), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol64((c), 32))
+
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_0 0x736f6d6570736575ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_1 0x646f72616e646f6dULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c7967656e657261ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_3 0x7465646279746573ULL
+
+#define HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+	(a) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 5), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol32((a), 16), \
+	(c) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 8), (d) ^= (c), \
+	(a) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 7), (d) ^= (a), \
+	(c) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 13), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol32((c), 16))
+
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_0 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_1 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c796765U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_3 0x74656462U
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */

include/linux/timex.h

@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/param.h>
 
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void);
+
 #include <asm/timex.h>
 
 #ifndef random_get_entropy
@@ -74,8 +76,14 @@
  *
  * By default we use get_cycles() for this purpose, but individual
  * architectures may override this in their asm/timex.h header file.
+ * If a given arch does not have get_cycles(), then we fallback to
+ * using random_get_entropy_fallback().
  */
-#define random_get_entropy()	get_cycles()
+#ifdef get_cycles
+#define random_get_entropy()	((unsigned long)get_cycles())
+#else
+#define random_get_entropy()	random_get_entropy_fallback()
+#endif
 #endif
 
 /*

include/net/inet_hashtables.h

@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static inline void sk_rcv_saddr_set(struct sock *sk, __be32 addr)
 }
 
 int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
-			struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
+			struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
 			int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
 						 struct sock *, __u16,
 						 struct inet_timewait_sock **));

include/net/secure_seq.h

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
+u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
 			       __be16 dport);
 u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
 		   __be16 sport, __be16 dport);

include/trace/events/random.h

@@ -1,330 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
-#define TRACE_SYSTEM random
-
-#if !defined(_TRACE_RANDOM_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
-#define _TRACE_RANDOM_H
-
-#include <linux/writeback.h>
-#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
-	TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	bytes			)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->bytes		= bytes;
-		__entry->IP		= IP;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("bytes %d caller %pS",
-		__entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	bytes			)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->bytes		= bytes;
-		__entry->IP		= IP;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count,
-		 unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, IP),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	bits			)
-		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->bits		= bits;
-		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
-		__entry->IP		= IP;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits,
-		  __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(push_to_pool,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int pool_bits, int input_bits),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, pool_bits, input_bits),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	pool_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	input_bits		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->pool_bits	= pool_bits;
-		__entry->input_bits	= input_bits;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("%s: pool_bits %d input_pool_bits %d",
-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->pool_bits,
-		  __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, debit_bits),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	debit_bits		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->debit_bits	= debit_bits;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("%s: debit_bits %d", __entry->pool_name,
-		  __entry->debit_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
-	TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
-
-	TP_ARGS(input_bits),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	input_bits		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->input_bits	= input_bits;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("input_pool_bits %d", __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
-	TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, int input_bits),
-
-	TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	dev_t,	dev			)
-		__field(	  int,	input_bits		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->dev		= dev;
-		__entry->input_bits	= input_bits;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %d", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
-		  MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(xfer_secondary_pool,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int xfer_bits, int request_bits,
-		 int pool_entropy, int input_entropy),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, xfer_bits, request_bits, pool_entropy,
-		input_entropy),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	xfer_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	request_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	pool_entropy		)
-		__field(	  int,	input_entropy		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->xfer_bits	= xfer_bits;
-		__entry->request_bits	= request_bits;
-		__entry->pool_entropy	= pool_entropy;
-		__entry->input_entropy	= input_entropy;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("pool %s xfer_bits %d request_bits %d pool_entropy %d "
-		  "input_entropy %d", __entry->pool_name, __entry->xfer_bits,
-		  __entry->request_bits, __entry->pool_entropy,
-		  __entry->input_entropy)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->nbytes		= nbytes;
-		__entry->IP		= IP;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
-	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
-		 unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
-		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
-		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
-		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
-		__entry->nbytes		= nbytes;
-		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
-		__entry->IP		= IP;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count,
-		  (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
-		 unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy_user,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
-		 unsigned long IP),
-
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(random_read,
-	TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int need_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
-
-	TP_ARGS(got_bits, need_bits, pool_left, input_left),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	got_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	need_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	pool_left		)
-		__field(	  int,	input_left		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->got_bits	= got_bits;
-		__entry->need_bits	= need_bits;
-		__entry->pool_left	= pool_left;
-		__entry->input_left	= input_left;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("got_bits %d still_needed_bits %d "
-		  "blocking_pool_entropy_left %d input_entropy_left %d",
-		  __entry->got_bits, __entry->got_bits, __entry->pool_left,
-		  __entry->input_left)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
-	TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
-
-	TP_ARGS(got_bits, pool_left, input_left),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(	  int,	got_bits		)
-		__field(	  int,	pool_left		)
-		__field(	  int,	input_left		)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->got_bits	= got_bits;
-		__entry->pool_left	= pool_left;
-		__entry->input_left	= input_left;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("got_bits %d nonblocking_pool_entropy_left %d "
-		  "input_entropy_left %d", __entry->got_bits,
-		  __entry->pool_left, __entry->input_left)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(prandom_u32,
-
-	TP_PROTO(unsigned int ret),
-
-	TP_ARGS(ret),
-
-	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field(   unsigned int, ret)
-	),
-
-	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->ret = ret;
-	),
-
-	TP_printk("ret=%u" , __entry->ret)
-);
-
-#endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */
-
-/* This part must be outside protection */
-#include <trace/define_trace.h>

init/main.c

@@ -947,21 +947,18 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
 	softirq_init();
 	timekeeping_init();
 	kfence_init();
+	time_init();
 
 	/*
 	 * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
 	 * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
-	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize()
+	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in random_init()
-	 * - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND
+	 * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms
-	 * - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy
+	 * - random_init() to initialize the RNG from from early entropy sources
-	 * - adding command line entropy
 	 */
-	rand_initialize();
+	random_init(command_line);
-	add_latent_entropy();
-	add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
 	boot_init_stack_canary();
 
-	time_init();
 	perf_event_init();
 	profile_init();
 	call_function_init();

kernel/cpu.c

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <linux/scs.h>
 #include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h>
 #include <linux/cpuset.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/sched/types.h>
 
 #include <trace/events/power.h>
@@ -1882,6 +1883,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
 		.startup.single		= perf_event_init_cpu,
 		.teardown.single	= perf_event_exit_cpu,
 	},
+	[CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE] = {
+		.name			= "random:prepare",
+		.startup.single		= random_prepare_cpu,
+		.teardown.single	= NULL,
+	},
 	[CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP] = {
 		.name			= "workqueue:prepare",
 		.startup.single		= workqueue_prepare_cpu,
@@ -1998,6 +2004,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
 		.startup.single		= workqueue_online_cpu,
 		.teardown.single	= workqueue_offline_cpu,
 	},
+	[CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE] = {
+		.name			= "random:online",
+		.startup.single		= random_online_cpu,
+		.teardown.single	= NULL,
+	},
 	[CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE] = {
 		.name			= "RCU/tree:online",
 		.startup.single		= rcutree_online_cpu,

kernel/debug/debug_core.c

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 #include <linux/vmacache.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/irq.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
@@ -756,6 +757,29 @@ cpu_master_loop:
 				continue;
 			kgdb_connected = 0;
 		} else {
+			/*
+			 * This is a brutal way to interfere with the debugger
+			 * and prevent gdb being used to poke at kernel memory.
+			 * This could cause trouble if lockdown is applied when
+			 * there is already an active gdb session. For now the
+			 * answer is simply "don't do that". Typically lockdown
+			 * *will* be applied before the debug core gets started
+			 * so only developers using kgdb for fairly advanced
+			 * early kernel debug can be biten by this. Hopefully
+			 * they are sophisticated enough to take care of
+			 * themselves, especially with help from the lockdown
+			 * message printed on the console!
+			 */
+			if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL)) {
+				if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KGDB_KDB)) {
+					/* Switch back to kdb if possible... */
+					dbg_kdb_mode = 1;
+					continue;
+				} else {
+					/* ... otherwise just bail */
+					break;
+				}
+			}
 			error = gdb_serial_stub(ks);
 		}
 

kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include "kdb_private.h"
 
 #undef	MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
@@ -197,10 +198,62 @@ struct task_struct *kdb_curr_task(int cpu)
 }
 
 /*
- * Check whether the flags of the current command and the permissions
+ * Update the permissions flags (kdb_cmd_enabled) to match the
- * of the kdb console has allow a command to be run.
+ * current lockdown state.
+ *
+ * Within this function the calls to security_locked_down() are "lazy". We
+ * avoid calling them if the current value of kdb_cmd_enabled already excludes
+ * flags that might be subject to lockdown. Additionally we deliberately check
+ * the lockdown flags independently (even though read lockdown implies write
+ * lockdown) since that results in both simpler code and clearer messages to
+ * the user on first-time debugger entry.
+ *
+ * The permission masks during a read+write lockdown permits the following
+ * flags: INSPECT, SIGNAL, REBOOT (and ALWAYS_SAFE).
+ *
+ * The INSPECT commands are not blocked during lockdown because they are
+ * not arbitrary memory reads. INSPECT covers the backtrace family (sometimes
+ * forcing them to have no arguments) and lsmod. These commands do expose
+ * some kernel state but do not allow the developer seated at the console to
+ * choose what state is reported. SIGNAL and REBOOT should not be controversial,
+ * given these are allowed for root during lockdown already.
  */
-static inline bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions,
+static void kdb_check_for_lockdown(void)
+{
+	const int write_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_WRITE |
+				KDB_ENABLE_REG_WRITE |
+				KDB_ENABLE_FLOW_CTRL;
+	const int read_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_READ |
+			       KDB_ENABLE_REG_READ;
+
+	bool need_to_lockdown_write = false;
+	bool need_to_lockdown_read = false;
+
+	if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | write_flags))
+		need_to_lockdown_write =
+			security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL);
+
+	if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | read_flags))
+		need_to_lockdown_read =
+			security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL);
+
+	/* De-compose KDB_ENABLE_ALL if required */
+	if (need_to_lockdown_write || need_to_lockdown_read)
+		if (kdb_cmd_enabled & KDB_ENABLE_ALL)
+			kdb_cmd_enabled = KDB_ENABLE_MASK & ~KDB_ENABLE_ALL;
+
+	if (need_to_lockdown_write)
+		kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~write_flags;
+
+	if (need_to_lockdown_read)
+		kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~read_flags;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the flags of the current command, the permissions of the kdb
+ * console and the lockdown state allow a command to be run.
+ */
+static bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions,
 				   bool no_args)
 {
 	/* permissions comes from userspace so needs massaging slightly */
@@ -1194,6 +1247,9 @@ static int kdb_local(kdb_reason_t reason, int error, struct pt_regs *regs,
 		kdb_curr_task(raw_smp_processor_id());
 
 	KDB_DEBUG_STATE("kdb_local 1", reason);
+
+	kdb_check_for_lockdown();
+
 	kdb_go_count = 0;
 	if (reason == KDB_REASON_DEBUG) {
 		/* special case below */

kernel/irq/handle.c

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc *desc)
 
 	retval = __handle_irq_event_percpu(desc, &flags);
 
-	add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq, flags);
+	add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq);
 
 	if (!noirqdebug)
 		note_interrupt(desc, retval);

kernel/time/timekeeping.c

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/clocksource.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/timex.h>
 #include <linux/tick.h>
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
@@ -2378,6 +2379,20 @@ static int timekeeping_validate_timex(const struct __kernel_timex *txc)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * random_get_entropy_fallback - Returns the raw clock source value,
+ * used by random.c for platforms with no valid random_get_entropy().
+ */
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void)
+{
+	struct tk_read_base *tkr = &tk_core.timekeeper.tkr_mono;
+	struct clocksource *clock = READ_ONCE(tkr->clock);
+
+	if (unlikely(timekeeping_suspended || !clock))
+		return 0;
+	return clock->read(clock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_get_entropy_fallback);
 
 /**
  * do_adjtimex() - Accessor function to NTP __do_adjtimex function

lib/Kconfig.debug

@@ -1427,8 +1427,7 @@ config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
 	  so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
 	  to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
 	  However, since users cannot do anything actionable to
-	  address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single
+	  address this, by default this option is disabled.
-	  warning for the first use of unseeded randomness.
 
 	  Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
 	  unseeded randomness.  This will be of use primarily for

lib/crypto/Kconfig

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
-comment "Crypto library routines"
-
 config CRYPTO_LIB_AES
 	tristate
 
@@ -9,14 +7,14 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
 	tristate
 
 config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
-	tristate
+	bool
 	help
 	  Declares whether the architecture provides an arch-specific
 	  accelerated implementation of the Blake2s library interface,
 	  either builtin or as a module.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
-	tristate
+	def_bool !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
 	help
 	  This symbol can be depended upon by arch implementations of the
 	  Blake2s library interface that require the generic code as a
@@ -24,15 +22,6 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
 	  implementation is enabled, this implementation serves the users
 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S.
 
-config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S
-	tristate "BLAKE2s hash function library"
-	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
-	select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=n
-	help
-	  Enable the Blake2s library interface. This interface may be fulfilled
-	  by either the generic implementation or an arch-specific one, if one
-	  is available and enabled.
-
 config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
 	tristate
 	help
@@ -51,7 +40,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
-	tristate "ChaCha library interface"
+	tristate
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=n
 	help
@@ -76,7 +65,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
-	tristate "Curve25519 scalar multiplication library"
+	tristate
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=n
 	help
@@ -111,7 +100,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
-	tristate "Poly1305 library interface"
+	tristate
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=n
 	help
@@ -120,7 +109,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
 	  is available and enabled.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
-	tristate "ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD support (8-byte nonce library version)"
+	tristate
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA

lib/crypto/Makefile

@@ -10,11 +10,10 @@ libaes-y					:= aes.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4)			+= libarc4.o
 libarc4-y					:= arc4.o
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC)	+= libblake2s-generic.o
+# blake2s is used by the /dev/random driver which is always builtin
-libblake2s-generic-y				+= blake2s-generic.o
+obj-y						+= libblake2s.o
-
+libblake2s-y					:= blake2s.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S)		+= libblake2s.o
+libblake2s-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC)	+= blake2s-generic.o
-libblake2s-y					+= blake2s.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305)	+= libchacha20poly1305.o
 libchacha20poly1305-y				+= chacha20poly1305.o

lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c

@@ -37,7 +37,11 @@ static inline void blake2s_increment_counter(struct blake2s_state *state,
 	state->t[1] += (state->t[0] < inc);
 }
 
-void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
+		      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
+		      __weak __alias(blake2s_compress_generic);
+
+void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
 			      size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
 {
 	u32 m[16];

lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
  * #include <stdio.h>
  *
  * #include <openssl/evp.h>
- * #include <openssl/hmac.h>
  *
  * #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT	256
  *
@@ -58,16 +57,6 @@
  *	}
  *	printf("};\n\n");
  *
- *	printf("static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n");
- *
- *	HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), key, sizeof(key), buf, sizeof(buf), hash, NULL);
- *	print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
- *
- *	HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), buf, sizeof(buf), key, sizeof(key), hash, NULL);
- *	print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
- *
- *	printf("};\n");
- *
  *	return 0;
  *}
  */
@@ -554,15 +543,6 @@ static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
     0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, },
 };
 
-static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
-  { 0xce, 0xe1, 0x57, 0x69, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x43, 0xad, 0x56, 0x4c, 0x70,
-    0xed, 0x68, 0x16, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xa4, 0x73, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x79,
-    0x08, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x82, 0xda, 0x3f, 0x05, 0x11, },
-  { 0x77, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x41, 0xf4, 0x4b, 0x2b, 0xb3, 0xc6, 0xb6, 0xf9,
-    0x60, 0xde, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x38, 0x66, 0xe8, 0xbf, 0x9b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x9f,
-    0x60, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x37, 0x99, 0xd6, 0xec, 0x31, },
-};
-
 bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
 {
 	u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
@@ -607,16 +587,5 @@ bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (success) {
-		blake2s256_hmac(hash, buf, key, sizeof(buf), sizeof(key));
-		success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[0], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-
-		blake2s256_hmac(hash, key, buf, sizeof(key), sizeof(buf));
-		success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[1], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-
-		if (!success)
-			pr_err("blake2s256_hmac self-test: FAIL\n");
-	}
-
 	return success;
 }

lib/crypto/blake2s.c

@@ -16,63 +16,20 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/bug.h>
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S)
-#  define blake2s_compress blake2s_compress_arch
-#else
-#  define blake2s_compress blake2s_compress_generic
-#endif
-
 void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen)
 {
-	__blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, blake2s_compress);
+	__blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, false);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_update);
 
 void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out)
 {
 	WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && !out);
-	__blake2s_final(state, out, blake2s_compress);
+	__blake2s_final(state, out, false);
 	memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
 
-void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
-		     const size_t keylen)
-{
-	struct blake2s_state state;
-	u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
-	u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
-	int i;
-
-	if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-		blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-		blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
-		blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
-	} else
-		memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
-		x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
-
-	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
-	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
-		x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
-
-	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
-
-	memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-	memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s256_hmac);
-
 static int __init mod_init(void)
 {
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&

lib/random32.c

@@ -39,8 +39,9 @@
 #include <linux/random.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
-#include <trace/events/random.h>
 
 /**
  *	prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
@@ -386,7 +387,6 @@ u32 prandom_u32(void)
 	struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
 	u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
 
-	trace_prandom_u32(res);
 	put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
 	return res;
 }
@@ -552,9 +552,11 @@ static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused)
  * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
  * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
  */
-static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+static int prandom_timer_start(struct notifier_block *nb,
+			       unsigned long action, void *data)
 {
 	mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
@@ -618,13 +620,13 @@ core_initcall(prandom32_state_selftest);
  */
 static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
 {
-	static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+	static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
-		.func = prandom_timer_start
+		.notifier_call = prandom_timer_start
 	};
-	int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+	int ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
 
 	if (ret == -EALREADY) {
-		prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
+		prandom_timer_start(&random_ready, 0, NULL);
 		ret = 0;
 	}
 	return ret;

lib/sha1.c

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
 
@@ -55,7 +56,8 @@
 #define SHA_ROUND(t, input, fn, constant, A, B, C, D, E) do { \
 	__u32 TEMP = input(t); setW(t, TEMP); \
 	E += TEMP + rol32(A,5) + (fn) + (constant); \
-	B = ror32(B, 2); } while (0)
+	B = ror32(B, 2); \
+	TEMP = E; E = D; D = C; C = B; B = A; A = TEMP; } while (0)
 
 #define T_0_15(t, A, B, C, D, E)  SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_SRC, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
 #define T_16_19(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_MIX, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
@@ -84,6 +86,7 @@
 void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
 {
 	__u32 A, B, C, D, E;
+	unsigned int i = 0;
 
 	A = digest[0];
 	B = digest[1];
@@ -92,94 +95,24 @@ void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
 	E = digest[4];
 
 	/* Round 1 - iterations 0-16 take their input from 'data' */
-	T_0_15( 0, A, B, C, D, E);
+	for (; i < 16; ++i)
-	T_0_15( 1, E, A, B, C, D);
+		T_0_15(i, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_0_15( 2, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_0_15( 3, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_0_15( 4, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_0_15( 5, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_0_15( 6, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_0_15( 7, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_0_15( 8, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_0_15( 9, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_0_15(10, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_0_15(11, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_0_15(12, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_0_15(13, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_0_15(14, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_0_15(15, A, B, C, D, E);
 
 	/* Round 1 - tail. Input from 512-bit mixing array */
-	T_16_19(16, E, A, B, C, D);
+	for (; i < 20; ++i)
-	T_16_19(17, D, E, A, B, C);
+		T_16_19(i, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_16_19(18, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_16_19(19, B, C, D, E, A);
 
 	/* Round 2 */
-	T_20_39(20, A, B, C, D, E);
+	for (; i < 40; ++i)
-	T_20_39(21, E, A, B, C, D);
+		T_20_39(i, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(22, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(23, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(24, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_20_39(25, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(26, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_20_39(27, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(28, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(29, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_20_39(30, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(31, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_20_39(32, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(33, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(34, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_20_39(35, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(36, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_20_39(37, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(38, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(39, B, C, D, E, A);
 
 	/* Round 3 */
-	T_40_59(40, A, B, C, D, E);
+	for (; i < 60; ++i)
-	T_40_59(41, E, A, B, C, D);
+		T_40_59(i, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(42, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(43, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(44, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_40_59(45, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(46, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_40_59(47, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(48, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(49, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_40_59(50, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(51, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_40_59(52, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(53, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(54, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_40_59(55, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(56, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_40_59(57, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(58, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, A);
 
 	/* Round 4 */
-	T_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E);
+	for (; i < 80; ++i)
-	T_60_79(61, E, A, B, C, D);
+		T_60_79(i, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(62, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(63, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(64, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_60_79(65, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(66, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_60_79(67, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(68, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(69, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_60_79(70, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(71, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_60_79(72, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(73, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(74, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_60_79(75, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(76, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_60_79(77, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(78, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(79, B, C, D, E, A);
 
 	digest[0] += A;
 	digest[1] += B;

lib/siphash.c

@@ -18,19 +18,13 @@
 #include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
 #endif
 
-#define SIPROUND \
+#define SIPROUND SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
-	do { \
-	v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \
-	v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \
-	v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \
-	v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \
-	} while (0)
 
 #define PREAMBLE(len) \
-	u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; \
+	u64 v0 = SIPHASH_CONST_0; \
-	u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; \
+	u64 v1 = SIPHASH_CONST_1; \
-	u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; \
+	u64 v2 = SIPHASH_CONST_2; \
-	u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; \
+	u64 v3 = SIPHASH_CONST_3; \
 	u64 b = ((u64)(len)) << 56; \
 	v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
 	v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
@@ -389,19 +383,13 @@ u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 first, const u32 second, const u32 third,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(hsiphash_4u32);
 #else
-#define HSIPROUND \
+#define HSIPROUND HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
-	do { \
-	v0 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 5); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol32(v0, 16); \
-	v2 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 8); v3 ^= v2; \
-	v0 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 7); v3 ^= v0; \
-	v2 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 13); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol32(v2, 16); \
-	} while (0)
 
 #define HPREAMBLE(len) \
-	u32 v0 = 0; \
+	u32 v0 = HSIPHASH_CONST_0; \
-	u32 v1 = 0; \
+	u32 v1 = HSIPHASH_CONST_1; \
-	u32 v2 = 0x6c796765U; \
+	u32 v2 = HSIPHASH_CONST_2; \
-	u32 v3 = 0x74656462U; \
+	u32 v3 = HSIPHASH_CONST_3; \
 	u32 b = ((u32)(len)) << 24; \
 	v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
 	v2 ^= key->key[0]; \

lib/vsprintf.c

@@ -756,14 +756,16 @@ static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
 
 static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn);
 
-static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+static int fill_random_ptr_key(struct notifier_block *nb,
+			       unsigned long action, void *data)
 {
 	/* This may be in an interrupt handler. */
 	queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work);
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
-	.func = fill_random_ptr_key
+	.notifier_call = fill_random_ptr_key
 };
 
 static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
@@ -777,7 +779,7 @@ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+	ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
 	if (!ret) {
 		return 0;
 	} else if (ret == -EALREADY) {

mm/util.c

@@ -334,6 +334,38 @@ unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
 #endif
 }
 
+/**
+ * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
+ * @start:	The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
+ * @range:	The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
+ *		random address must fall.
+ *
+ * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
+ * @start was already page aligned.  We now align it regardless.
+ *
+ * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
+ * @start is returned.
+ */
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+{
+	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
+		range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
+		start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+	}
+
+	if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
+		range = ULONG_MAX - start;
+
+	range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	if (range == 0)
+		return start;
+
+	return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
 unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {

net/core/secure_seq.c

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ u32 secure_tcpv6_seq(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_seq);
 
-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
 			       __be16 dport)
 {
 	const struct {
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_tcp_seq);
 
-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
+u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
 {
 	net_secret_init();
 	return siphash_4u32((__force u32)saddr, (__force u32)daddr,

net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c

@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ not_unique:
 	return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
 }
 
-static u32 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
+static u64 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
 {
 	const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
 
@@ -722,8 +722,19 @@ void inet_unhash(struct sock *sk)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
 
+/* RFC 6056 3.3.4.  Algorithm 4: Double-Hash Port Selection Algorithm
+ * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
+ * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
+ * property might be used by clever attacker.
+ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement,
+ * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and
+ * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
+ */
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
+static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT];
+
 int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
-		struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
+		struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
 		int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
 			struct sock *, __u16, struct inet_timewait_sock **))
 {
@@ -735,8 +746,8 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 	struct inet_bind_bucket *tb;
 	u32 remaining, offset;
 	int ret, i, low, high;
-	static u32 hint;
 	int l3mdev;
+	u32 index;
 
 	if (port) {
 		head = &hinfo->bhash[inet_bhashfn(net, port,
@@ -763,7 +774,12 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 	if (likely(remaining > 1))
 		remaining &= ~1U;
 
-	offset = (hint + port_offset) % remaining;
+	net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb));
+	index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
+
+	offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset;
+	offset %= remaining;
+
 	/* In first pass we try ports of @low parity.
 	 * inet_csk_get_port() does the opposite choice.
 	 */
@@ -817,7 +833,7 @@ next_port:
 	return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
 
 ok:
-	hint += i + 2;
+	WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
 
 	/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
 	inet_bind_hash(sk, tb, port);
@@ -840,7 +856,7 @@ ok:
 int inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 		      struct sock *sk)
 {
-	u32 port_offset = 0;
+	u64 port_offset = 0;
 
 	if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
 		port_offset = inet_sk_port_offset(sk);

net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c

@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ not_unique:
 	return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
 }
 
-static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
+static u64 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
 {
 	const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
 
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
 int inet6_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 		       struct sock *sk)
 {
-	u32 port_offset = 0;
+	u64 port_offset = 0;
 
 	if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
 		port_offset = inet6_sk_port_offset(sk);

sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 			    | ((IEC958_AES3_CON_FS_48000) << 24))
 
 static const struct snd_pci_quirk subsys_20k1_list[] = {
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0021, "SB046x", CTSB046X),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0022, "SB055x", CTSB055X),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x002f, "SB055x", CTSB055X),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0029, "SB073x", CTSB073X),
@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk subsys_20k2_list[] = {
 
 static const char *ct_subsys_name[NUM_CTCARDS] = {
 	/* 20k1 models */
+	[CTSB046X]	= "SB046x",
 	[CTSB055X]	= "SB055x",
 	[CTSB073X]	= "SB073x",
 	[CTUAA]		= "UAA",

sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h

@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ enum CHIPTYP {
 
 enum CTCARDS {
 	/* 20k1 models */
+	CTSB046X,
+	CT20K1_MODEL_FIRST = CTSB046X,
 	CTSB055X,
-	CT20K1_MODEL_FIRST = CTSB055X,
 	CTSB073X,
 	CTUAA,
 	CT20K1_UNKNOWN,