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x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n

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commit b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce upstream.

If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants
to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be
silently disabled.

There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling.  Remove the
CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Josh Poimboeuf
2022-06-14 23:16:05 +02:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent ea1aa926f4
commit f1b01ace81
3 changed files with 0 additions and 6 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
View File

@@ -782,7 +782,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm)
movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset
#endif #endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
/* /*
* When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
* the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -791,7 +790,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm)
* speculative execution to prevent attack. * speculative execution to prevent attack.
*/ */
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
#endif
/* Restore flags or the incoming task to restore AC state. */ /* Restore flags or the incoming task to restore AC state. */
popfl popfl

2
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
View File

@@ -249,7 +249,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm)
movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset
#endif #endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
/* /*
* When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
* the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@@ -258,7 +257,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm)
* speculative execution to prevent attack. * speculative execution to prevent attack.
*/ */
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */ /* restore callee-saved registers */
popq %r15 popq %r15

2
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
View File

@@ -122,11 +122,9 @@
* monstrosity above, manually. * monstrosity above, manually.
*/ */
.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP) __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
.Lskip_rsb_\@: .Lskip_rsb_\@:
#endif
.endm .endm
/* /*