bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill

commit 484611357c ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
introduces the ability to do pointer math inside a map element value via
the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ register type.

The current support doesn't handle the case where a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ
is spilled into the stack, limiting several use cases, especially when
generating bpf code from a compiler.

Handle this case by explicitly enabling the register type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ to be spilled. Also, make sure that min_value and
max_value are reset just for BPF_LDX operations that don't result in a
restore of a spilled register from stack.

Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

kernel/bpf/verifier.c

@@ -481,6 +481,13 @@ static void reset_reg_range_values(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
 	regs[regno].max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
 }
 
+static void mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
+					     u32 regno)
+{
+	mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
+	reset_reg_range_values(regs, regno);
+}
+
 enum reg_arg_type {
 	SRC_OP,		/* register is used as source operand */
 	DST_OP,		/* register is used as destination operand */
@@ -532,6 +539,7 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
 	switch (type) {
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
+	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ:
 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
 	case PTR_TO_CTX:
 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
@@ -616,7 +624,8 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
 		}
 		if (value_regno >= 0)
 			/* have read misc data from the stack */
-			mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+			mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+							 value_regno);
 		return 0;
 	}
 }
@@ -825,7 +834,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 		else
 			err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
-			mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+			mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+							 value_regno);
 
 	} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
 		enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
@@ -837,7 +847,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 		}
 		err = check_ctx_access(env, off, size, t, &reg_type);
 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
-			mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+			mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+							 value_regno);
 			/* note that reg.[id|off|range] == 0 */
 			state->regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
 		}
@@ -870,7 +881,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 		}
 		err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
-			mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+			mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+							 value_regno);
 	} else {
 		verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n",
 			regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
@@ -2744,7 +2756,6 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			if (err)
 				return err;
 
-			reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
 			if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W &&
 			    BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
 				insn_idx++;