xiaomi-sm8450/android_kernel_xiaomi_sm8450
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

efi: Get and store the secure boot status

Browse Source 
Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash
it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.

The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the ARM stub and (a)
generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use
efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode.

For x86, it is stored in boot_params and can be overridden by the boot
loader or kexec.  This allows secure-boot mode to be passed on to a new
kernel.

Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1486380166-31868-5-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
[ Small readability edits. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells
2017-02-06 11:22:43 +00:00
committed by Ingo Molnar
parent e58910cdc9
commit de8cb45862
8 changed files with 88 additions and 59 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

63
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
View File

@@ -20,52 +20,6 @@
bool __nokaslr;
static int efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg)
{
static efi_char16_t const sb_var_name[] = {
'S', 'e', 'c', 'u', 'r', 'e', 'B', 'o', 'o', 't', 0 };
static efi_char16_t const sm_var_name[] = {
'S', 'e', 't', 'u', 'p', 'M', 'o', 'd', 'e', 0 };
efi_guid_t var_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
efi_get_variable_t *f_getvar = sys_table_arg->runtime->get_variable;
u8 val;
unsigned long size = sizeof(val);
efi_status_t status;
status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sb_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
NULL, &size, &val);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out_efi_err;
if (val == 0)
return 0;
status = f_getvar((efi_char16_t *)sm_var_name, (efi_guid_t *)&var_guid,
NULL, &size, &val);
if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
goto out_efi_err;
if (val == 1)
return 0;
return 1;
out_efi_err:
switch (status) {
case EFI_NOT_FOUND:
return 0;
case EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
return -EIO;
case EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION:
return -EACCES;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
efi_status_t efi_open_volume(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
void *__image, void **__fh)
{
@@ -157,7 +111,7 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
efi_guid_t loaded_image_proto = LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID;
unsigned long reserve_addr = 0;
unsigned long reserve_size = 0;
int secure_boot = 0;
enum efi_secureboot_mode secure_boot;
struct screen_info *si;
/* Check if we were booted by the EFI firmware */
@@ -227,19 +181,14 @@ unsigned long efi_entry(void *handle, efi_system_table_t *sys_table,
pr_efi_err(sys_table, "Failed to parse EFI cmdline options\n");
secure_boot = efi_get_secureboot(sys_table);
if (secure_boot > 0)
pr_efi(sys_table, "UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
if (secure_boot < 0) {
pr_efi_err(sys_table,
"could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
}
/*
* Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so
* ignore 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled.
* Unauthenticated device tree data is a security hazard, so ignore
* 'dtb=' unless UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. We assume that secure
* boot is enabled if we can't determine its state.
*/
if (secure_boot != 0 && strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
if (secure_boot != efi_secureboot_mode_disabled &&
strstr(cmdline_ptr, "dtb=")) {
pr_efi(sys_table, "Ignoring DTB from command line.\n");
} else {
status = handle_cmdline_files(sys_table, image, cmdline_ptr,