security: introduce CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
Subsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however, SELinux still needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to handle architectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not feasible. Introduce a new kernel configuration parameter CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS, and a helper macro __lsm_ro_after_init, to handle this case. Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This commit is contained in:

committed by
James Morris

parent
84e6885e9e
commit
dd0859dccb
@@ -1920,6 +1920,13 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */
|
||||
|
||||
/* Currently required to handle SELinux runtime hook disable. */
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
|
||||
#define __lsm_ro_after_init
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */
|
||||
|
||||
extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
|
||||
extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
|
||||
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user