powerpc/mm: Use _PAGE_READ to indicate Read access
This splits the _PAGE_RW bit into _PAGE_READ and _PAGE_WRITE. It also
removes the dependency on _PAGE_USER for implying read only. Few things
to note here is that, we have read implied with write and execute
permission. Hence we should always find _PAGE_READ set on hash pte
fault.
We still can't switch PROT_NONE to !(_PAGE_RWX). Auto numa depends on
marking a prot none pte _PAGE_WRITE. (For more details look at
b191f9b106
"mm: numa: preserve PTE write permissions across a NUMA
hinting fault")
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>
Cc: Frederic Barrat <fbarrat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ian Munsie <imunsie@au1.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
This commit is contained in:

committed by
Michael Ellerman

parent
ee3caed37d
commit
c7d54842de
@@ -175,8 +175,9 @@ unsigned long htab_convert_pte_flags(unsigned long pteflags)
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* or PP=0x3 for read-only (including writeable but clean pages).
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*/
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if (pteflags & _PAGE_USER) {
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rflags |= 0x2;
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if (!((pteflags & _PAGE_RW) && (pteflags & _PAGE_DIRTY)))
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if (pteflags & _PAGE_RWX)
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rflags |= 0x2;
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if (!((pteflags & _PAGE_WRITE) && (pteflags & _PAGE_DIRTY)))
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rflags |= 0x1;
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}
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/*
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@@ -1209,7 +1210,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hash_page);
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int __hash_page(unsigned long ea, unsigned long msr, unsigned long trap,
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unsigned long dsisr)
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{
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unsigned long access = _PAGE_PRESENT;
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unsigned long access = _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_READ;
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unsigned long flags = 0;
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struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
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@@ -1220,7 +1221,7 @@ int __hash_page(unsigned long ea, unsigned long msr, unsigned long trap,
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flags |= HPTE_NOHPTE_UPDATE;
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if (dsisr & DSISR_ISSTORE)
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access |= _PAGE_RW;
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access |= _PAGE_WRITE;
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/*
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* We need to set the _PAGE_USER bit if MSR_PR is set or if we are
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* accessing a userspace segment (even from the kernel). We assume
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