drm/amd/display: Avoid HDCP over-read and corruption
[ Upstream commit 06888d571b513cbfc0b41949948def6cb81021b2 ] Instead of reading the desired 5 bytes of the actual target field, the code was reading 8. This could result in a corrupted value if the trailing 3 bytes were non-zero, so instead use an appropriately sized and zero-initialized bounce buffer, and read only 5 bytes before casting to u64. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:

committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman

parent
3c172f6e44
commit
c5b518f4b9
@@ -29,8 +29,10 @@ static inline enum mod_hdcp_status validate_bksv(struct mod_hdcp *hdcp)
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{
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{
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uint64_t n = 0;
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uint64_t n = 0;
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uint8_t count = 0;
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uint8_t count = 0;
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u8 bksv[sizeof(n)] = { };
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memcpy(&n, hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp1.bksv, sizeof(uint64_t));
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memcpy(bksv, hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp1.bksv, sizeof(hdcp->auth.msg.hdcp1.bksv));
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n = *(uint64_t *)bksv;
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while (n) {
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while (n) {
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count++;
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count++;
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