security: Minor improvements to no_new_privs documentation
The documentation didn't actually mention how to enable no_new_privs. This also adds a note about possible interactions between no_new_privs and LSMs (i.e. why teaching systemd to set no_new_privs is not necessarily a good idea), and it references the new docs from include/linux/prctl.h. Suggested-by: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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James Morris

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@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@
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* Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for example,
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* asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
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* in execve returning -EPERM.
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*
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* See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details.
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*/
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#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
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#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39
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