x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only

The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS
is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR.  Make it
read-only on x86_64.

On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task
switches, and we use a task gate for double faults.  I'd also be
nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations
without double fault handling.

[ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO.  So
  	it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel
  	might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for
  	confirmation. ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Andy Lutomirski
2017-12-04 15:07:29 +01:00
committed by Ingo Molnar
parent 0f9a48100f
commit c482feefe1
16 changed files with 60 additions and 48 deletions

View File

@@ -340,13 +340,11 @@ struct SYSENTER_stack {
unsigned long words[64];
};
struct tss_struct {
/*
* Space for the temporary SYSENTER stack, used for SYSENTER
* and the entry trampoline as well.
*/
struct SYSENTER_stack SYSENTER_stack;
struct SYSENTER_stack_page {
struct SYSENTER_stack stack;
} __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
struct tss_struct {
/*
* The fixed hardware portion. This must not cross a page boundary
* at risk of violating the SDM's advice and potentially triggering
@@ -363,7 +361,7 @@ struct tss_struct {
unsigned long io_bitmap[IO_BITMAP_LONGS + 1];
} __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
DECLARE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss);
DECLARE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss_rw);
/*
* sizeof(unsigned long) coming from an extra "long" at the end
@@ -378,7 +376,8 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cpu_current_top_of_stack);
#else
#define cpu_current_top_of_stack cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp1
/* The RO copy can't be accessed with this_cpu_xyz(), so use the RW copy. */
#define cpu_current_top_of_stack cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.sp1
#endif
/*
@@ -538,7 +537,7 @@ static inline void native_set_iopl_mask(unsigned mask)
static inline void
native_load_sp0(unsigned long sp0)
{
this_cpu_write(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0, sp0);
this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.sp0, sp0);
}
static inline void native_swapgs(void)