bpf: fix integer overflows

There were various issues related to the limited size of integers used in
the verifier:
 - `off + size` overflow in __check_map_access()
 - `off + reg->off` overflow in check_mem_access()
 - `off + reg->var_off.value` overflow or 32-bit truncation of
   `reg->var_off.value` in check_mem_access()
 - 32-bit truncation in check_stack_boundary()

Make sure that any integer math cannot overflow by not allowing
pointer math with large values.

Also reduce the scope of "scalar op scalar" tracking.

Fixes: f1174f77b5 ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
This commit is contained in:
Alexei Starovoitov
2017-12-18 20:12:00 -08:00
committed by Daniel Borkmann
parent 179d1c5602
commit bb7f0f989c
2 changed files with 50 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@
* In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit
* ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64.
*/
#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1ULL << 31)
#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1 << 29)
/* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO]. This ensures
* that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow.
*/
#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ INT_MAX
#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ (1 << 29)
/* Liveness marks, used for registers and spilled-regs (in stack slots).
* Read marks propagate upwards until they find a write mark; they record that