bpf: fix integer overflows
There were various issues related to the limited size of integers used in
the verifier:
- `off + size` overflow in __check_map_access()
- `off + reg->off` overflow in check_mem_access()
- `off + reg->var_off.value` overflow or 32-bit truncation of
`reg->var_off.value` in check_mem_access()
- 32-bit truncation in check_stack_boundary()
Make sure that any integer math cannot overflow by not allowing
pointer math with large values.
Also reduce the scope of "scalar op scalar" tracking.
Fixes: f1174f77b5
("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
This commit is contained in:

committed by
Daniel Borkmann

parent
179d1c5602
commit
bb7f0f989c
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@
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* In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit
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* ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64.
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*/
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#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1ULL << 31)
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#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF (1 << 29)
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/* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO]. This ensures
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* that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow.
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*/
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#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ INT_MAX
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#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ (1 << 29)
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/* Liveness marks, used for registers and spilled-regs (in stack slots).
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* Read marks propagate upwards until they find a write mark; they record that
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