Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "Only three SELinux patches for v5.5:

   - Remove the size limit on SELinux policies, the limitation was a
     lingering vestige and no longer necessary.

   - Allow file labeling before the policy is loaded. This should ease
     some of the burden when the policy is initially loaded (no need to
     relabel files), but it should also help enable some new system
     concepts which dynamically create the root filesystem in the
     initrd.

   - Add support for the "greatest lower bound" policy construct which
     is defined as the intersection of the MLS range of two SELinux
     labels"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: default_range glblub implementation
  selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded
  selinux: remove load size limit

security/selinux/hooks.c

@@ -3144,6 +3144,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 	}
 
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized)
+		return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
+
 	sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 	if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -3227,6 +3230,15 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
+		/* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
+		 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
+		 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
+		 * we've since initialized.
+		 */
+		return;
+	}
+
 	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
 					   &newsid);
 	if (rc) {