net-timestamp: no-payload only sysctl
Tx timestamps are looped onto the error queue on top of an skb. This mechanism leaks packet headers to processes unless the no-payload options SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY is set. Add a sysctl that optionally drops looped timestamp with data. This only affects processes without CAP_NET_RAW. The policy is checked when timestamps are generated in the stack. It is possible for timestamps with data to be reported after the sysctl is set, if these were queued internally earlier. No vulnerability is immediately known that exploits knowledge gleaned from packet headers, but it may still be preferable to allow administrators to lock down this path at the cost of possible breakage of legacy applications. Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> ---- Changes (v1 -> v2) - test socket CAP_NET_RAW instead of capable(CAP_NET_RAW) (rfc -> v1) - document the sysctl in Documentation/sysctl/net.txt - fix access control race: read .._OPT_TSONLY only once, use same value for permission check and skb generation. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:

committed by
David S. Miller

parent
49ca0d8bfa
commit
b245be1f4d
@@ -2239,6 +2239,7 @@ bool sk_net_capable(const struct sock *sk, int cap);
|
||||
extern __u32 sysctl_wmem_max;
|
||||
extern __u32 sysctl_rmem_max;
|
||||
|
||||
extern int sysctl_tstamp_allow_data;
|
||||
extern int sysctl_optmem_max;
|
||||
|
||||
extern __u32 sysctl_wmem_default;
|
||||
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user