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x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting

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commit 44a3918c8245ab10c6c9719dd12e7a8d291980d8 upstream.

With unprivileged eBPF enabled, eIBRS (without retpoline) is vulnerable
to Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.

When both are enabled, print a warning message and report it in the
'spectre_v2' sysfs vulnerabilities file.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.10]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Josh Poimboeuf
2022-02-18 11:49:08 -08:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 071e8b69d7
commit afc2d635b5
3 changed files with 48 additions and 6 deletions
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7
kernel/sysctl.c
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@@ -234,6 +234,10 @@ static int bpf_stats_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
return ret;
}
void __weak unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
{
}
static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
@@ -251,6 +255,9 @@ static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
return -EPERM;
*(int *)table->data = unpriv_enable;
}
unpriv_ebpf_notify(unpriv_enable);
return ret;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL && CONFIG_SYSCTL */