media: az6007: Fix null-ptr-deref in az6007_i2c_xfer()
[ Upstream commit 1047f9343011f2cedc73c64829686206a7e9fc3f ] In az6007_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be passed. Malicious data finally reach az6007_i2c_xfer. If accessing msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash. Similar commit: commit 0ed554fd769a ("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()") Signed-off-by: Zhang Shurong <zhang_shurong@foxmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:

committed by
Greg Kroah-Hartman

parent
4a9763d2bc
commit
a9def3e971
@@ -788,6 +788,10 @@ static int az6007_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[],
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if (az6007_xfer_debug)
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if (az6007_xfer_debug)
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printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C W addr=0x%x len=%d\n",
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printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C W addr=0x%x len=%d\n",
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addr, msgs[i].len);
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addr, msgs[i].len);
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if (msgs[i].len < 1) {
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ret = -EIO;
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goto err;
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}
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req = AZ6007_I2C_WR;
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req = AZ6007_I2C_WR;
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index = msgs[i].buf[0];
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index = msgs[i].buf[0];
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value = addr | (1 << 8);
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value = addr | (1 << 8);
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@@ -802,6 +806,10 @@ static int az6007_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[],
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if (az6007_xfer_debug)
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if (az6007_xfer_debug)
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printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C R addr=0x%x len=%d\n",
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printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C R addr=0x%x len=%d\n",
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addr, msgs[i].len);
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addr, msgs[i].len);
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if (msgs[i].len < 1) {
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ret = -EIO;
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goto err;
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}
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req = AZ6007_I2C_RD;
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req = AZ6007_I2C_RD;
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index = msgs[i].buf[0];
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index = msgs[i].buf[0];
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value = addr;
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value = addr;
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