security: Add a "locked down" LSM hook
Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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James Morris

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@@ -1446,6 +1446,11 @@
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* @bpf_prog_free_security:
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* Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog.
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*
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* @locked_down
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* Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary
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* code execution in kernel space should be permitted.
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*
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* @what: kernel feature being accessed
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*/
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union security_list_options {
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int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(struct task_struct *mgr);
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@@ -1807,6 +1812,7 @@ union security_list_options {
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int (*bpf_prog_alloc_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
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void (*bpf_prog_free_security)(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux);
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#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
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int (*locked_down)(enum lockdown_reason what);
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};
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struct security_hook_heads {
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@@ -2046,6 +2052,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
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struct hlist_head bpf_prog_alloc_security;
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struct hlist_head bpf_prog_free_security;
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#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
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struct hlist_head locked_down;
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} __randomize_layout;
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/*
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