maccess: always use strict semantics for probe_kernel_read
Except for historical confusion in the kprobes/uprobes and bpf tracers, which has been fixed now, there is no good reason to ever allow user memory accesses from probe_kernel_read. Switch probe_kernel_read to only read from kernel memory. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: update it for "mm, dump_page(): do not crash with invalid mapping pointer"] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-17-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Linus Torvalds

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98a23609b1
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr)
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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goto fail;
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ret = probe_kernel_read_strict(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
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ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
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if (unlikely(ret < 0))
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goto fail;
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return ret;
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@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ fetch_store_strlen(unsigned long addr)
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#endif
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do {
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ret = probe_kernel_read_strict(&c, (u8 *)addr + len, 1);
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ret = probe_kernel_read(&c, (u8 *)addr + len, 1);
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len++;
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} while (c && ret == 0 && len < MAX_STRING_SIZE);
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@@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ probe_mem_read(void *dest, void *src, size_t size)
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if ((unsigned long)src < TASK_SIZE)
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return probe_mem_read_user(dest, src, size);
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#endif
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return probe_kernel_read_strict(dest, src, size);
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return probe_kernel_read(dest, src, size);
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}
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/* Note that we don't verify it, since the code does not come from user space */
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