scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Don't allow spoofing pids over unix domain sockets in the corner cases where a user has created a user namespace but has not yet created a pid namespace. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
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#include <linux/interrupt.h>
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#include <linux/interrupt.h>
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#include <linux/netdevice.h>
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#include <linux/netdevice.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/pid.h>
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#include <linux/pid.h>
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#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
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#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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@@ -52,7 +53,8 @@ static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
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if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
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if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
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return -EINVAL;
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return -EINVAL;
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if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
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if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
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ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
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((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
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((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
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uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
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uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
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((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
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((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
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