Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers

 - Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of
   kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file
   descriptor, from Mimi Zohar.

 - Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than
   just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from
   Mimi.

 - Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if
   using signed firmware), from Mimi.

 - Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be
   measured by IMA, from Mimi.

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append()
  security: export security_kernel_load_data function
  ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)
  module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module
  ima: add build time policy
  ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
  firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback
  ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
  kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
  security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data
  MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

@@ -429,16 +429,14 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
  */
 int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
-	bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
-
-	if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
-		if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
-		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
-			pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
-			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
-		}
-		return 0;	/* We rely on module signature checking */
-	}
+	/*
+	 * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER
+	 *
+	 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
+	 * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
+	 * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
+	 * buffers?
+	 */
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -472,14 +470,13 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 
 	if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
 		if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
-		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+		    (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+			pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
 			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+		}
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */
-		return 0;
-
 	/* permit signed certs */
 	if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
 		return 0;
@@ -496,6 +493,49 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
 				   MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
+/**
+ * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
+ * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
+ *
+ * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the
+ * data provided by userspace.  Enforce policy rules requring a file
+ * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image).
+ *
+ * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+{
+	bool sig_enforce;
+
+	if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
+		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) {
+			pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
+			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+		}
+		break;
+	case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
+		if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) {
+			pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
+			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+		}
+		break;
+	case LOADING_MODULE:
+		sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
+
+		if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) {
+			pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
+			return -EACCES;	/* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+		}
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
 	int error;