net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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committed by
David S. Miller

parent
aa4cf9452f
commit
90f62cf30a
@@ -643,13 +643,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
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if ((task_active_pid_ns(current) != &init_pid_ns))
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return -EPERM;
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if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
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if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
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err = -EPERM;
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break;
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case AUDIT_USER:
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case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
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case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
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if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
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if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
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err = -EPERM;
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break;
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default: /* bad msg */
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