tcp: syncookies: reduce cookie lifetime to 128 seconds
We currently accept cookies that were created less than 4 minutes ago (ie, cookies with counter delta 0-3). Combined with the 8 mss table values, this yields 32 possible values (out of 2**32) that will be valid. Reducing the lifetime to < 2 minutes halves the guessing chance while still providing a large enough period. While at it, get rid of jiffies value -- they overflow too quickly on 32 bit platforms. getnstimeofday is used to create a counter that increments every 64s. perf shows getnstimeofday cost is negible compared to sha_transform; normal tcp initial sequence number generation uses getnstimeofday, too. Reported-by: Jakob Lell <jakob@jakoblell.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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committed by
David S. Miller

parent
61f860c356
commit
8c27bd75f0
@@ -36,14 +36,6 @@ static __u16 const msstab[] = {
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9000 - 60,
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};
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/*
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* This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted.
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* Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and
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* sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential
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* backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here.
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*/
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#define COUNTER_TRIES 4
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static inline struct sock *get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
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struct request_sock *req,
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struct dst_entry *dst)
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@@ -86,8 +78,9 @@ static u32 cookie_hash(const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *dadd
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static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(const struct in6_addr *saddr,
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const struct in6_addr *daddr,
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__be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq,
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__u32 count, __u32 data)
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__u32 data)
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{
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u32 count = tcp_cookie_time();
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return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
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sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
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((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
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@@ -96,15 +89,14 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(const struct in6_addr *saddr,
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static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, const struct in6_addr *saddr,
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const struct in6_addr *daddr, __be16 sport,
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__be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count,
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__u32 maxdiff)
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__be16 dport, __u32 sseq)
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{
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__u32 diff;
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__u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time();
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cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
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diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) -1 >> COOKIEBITS);
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if (diff >= maxdiff)
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if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE)
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return (__u32)-1;
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return (cookie -
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@@ -125,8 +117,7 @@ u32 __cookie_v6_init_sequence(const struct ipv6hdr *iph,
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*mssp = msstab[mssind];
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return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(&iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, th->source,
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th->dest, ntohl(th->seq),
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jiffies / (HZ * 60), mssind);
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th->dest, ntohl(th->seq), mssind);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v6_init_sequence);
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@@ -146,8 +137,7 @@ int __cookie_v6_check(const struct ipv6hdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
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{
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__u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
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__u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, &iph->saddr, &iph->daddr,
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th->source, th->dest, seq,
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jiffies / (HZ * 60), COUNTER_TRIES);
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th->source, th->dest, seq);
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return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0;
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}
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