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x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass

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The Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability can be mitigated with the
Reduced Data Speculation (RDS) feature. To allow finer grained control of
this eventually expensive mitigation a per task mitigation control is
required.

Add a new TIF_RDS flag and put it into the group of TIF flags which are
evaluated for mismatch in switch_to(). If these bits differ in the previous
and the next task, then the slow path function __switch_to_xtra() is
invoked. Implement the TIF_RDS dependent mitigation control in the slow
path.

If the prctl for controlling Speculative Store Bypass is disabled or no
task uses the prctl then there is no overhead in the switch_to() fast
path.

Update the KVM related speculation control functions to take TID_RDS into
account as well.

Based on a patch from Tim Chen. Completely rewritten.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-29 15:21:42 +02:00
parent b617cfc858
commit 885f82bfbc
5 changed files with 65 additions and 7 deletions
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26
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
* Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
* writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set.
*/
static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
/*
* The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
@@ -140,25 +140,41 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set);
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void)
{
return x86_spec_ctrl_base;
u64 msrval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
msrval |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
return msrval;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default);
void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
{
u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
return;
if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl)
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest);
void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl)
{
u64 host = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
return;
if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
host |= rds_tif_to_spec_ctrl(current_thread_info()->flags);
if (host != guest_spec_ctrl)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, host);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);