powerpc/fsl: Flush the branch predictor at each kernel entry (32 bit)

In order to protect against speculation attacks on
indirect branches, the branch predictor is flushed at
kernel entry to protect for the following situations:
- userspace process attacking another userspace process
- userspace process attacking the kernel
Basically when the privillege level change (i.e.the kernel
is entered), the branch predictor state is flushed.

Signed-off-by: Diana Craciun <diana.craciun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
This commit is contained in:
Diana Craciun
2018-12-12 16:03:06 +02:00
committed by Michael Ellerman
parent 10c5e83afd
commit 7fef436295
2 changed files with 21 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@@ -453,6 +453,13 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_EMB_HV)
mfcr r13
stw r13, THREAD_NORMSAVE(3)(r10)
DO_KVM BOOKE_INTERRUPT_DTLB_MISS SPRN_SRR1
START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
mfspr r11, SPRN_SRR1
andi. r10,r11,MSR_PR
beq 1f
BTB_FLUSH(r10)
1:
END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
mfspr r10, SPRN_DEAR /* Get faulting address */
/* If we are faulting a kernel address, we have to use the
@@ -547,6 +554,14 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_EMB_HV)
mfcr r13
stw r13, THREAD_NORMSAVE(3)(r10)
DO_KVM BOOKE_INTERRUPT_ITLB_MISS SPRN_SRR1
START_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
mfspr r11, SPRN_SRR1
andi. r10,r11,MSR_PR
beq 1f
BTB_FLUSH(r10)
1:
END_BTB_FLUSH_SECTION
mfspr r10, SPRN_SRR0 /* Get faulting address */
/* If we are faulting a kernel address, we have to use the