KVM: Enable MTRR for EPT
The effective memory type of EPT is the mixture of MSR_IA32_CR_PAT and memory type field of EPT entry. Signed-off-by: Sheng Yang <sheng@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Esse commit está contido em:
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ static u64 __read_mostly shadow_x_mask; /* mutual exclusive with nx_mask */
|
||||
static u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;
|
||||
static u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;
|
||||
static u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask;
|
||||
static u64 __read_mostly shadow_mt_mask;
|
||||
|
||||
void kvm_mmu_set_nonpresent_ptes(u64 trap_pte, u64 notrap_pte)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -183,13 +184,14 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_base_ptes(u64 base_pte)
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_base_ptes);
|
||||
|
||||
void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask,
|
||||
u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask)
|
||||
u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask, u64 mt_mask)
|
||||
{
|
||||
shadow_user_mask = user_mask;
|
||||
shadow_accessed_mask = accessed_mask;
|
||||
shadow_dirty_mask = dirty_mask;
|
||||
shadow_nx_mask = nx_mask;
|
||||
shadow_x_mask = x_mask;
|
||||
shadow_mt_mask = mt_mask;
|
||||
}
|
||||
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1546,6 +1548,8 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *shadow_pte,
|
||||
{
|
||||
u64 spte;
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
u64 mt_mask = shadow_mt_mask;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We don't set the accessed bit, since we sometimes want to see
|
||||
* whether the guest actually used the pte (in order to detect
|
||||
@@ -1564,6 +1568,11 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *shadow_pte,
|
||||
spte |= shadow_user_mask;
|
||||
if (largepage)
|
||||
spte |= PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
|
||||
if (mt_mask) {
|
||||
mt_mask = get_memory_type(vcpu, gfn) <<
|
||||
kvm_x86_ops->get_mt_mask_shift();
|
||||
spte |= mt_mask;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
|
||||
|
||||
|
Referência em uma nova issue
Block a user