mac80211: clear crypto tx tailroom counter upon keys enable
In case we got a fw restart while roaming from encrypted AP to non-encrypted one, we might end up with hitting a warning on the pending counter crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec having a non-zero value. The following comment taken from net/mac80211/key.c explains the rational for the delayed tailroom needed: /* * The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to * make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted * and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the * crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes * the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this * by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on * key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than * zero and no 0->1 transition happens. * * The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys * to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no * longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case * within an ESS this usually won't happen. */ The next flow lead to the warning eventually reported as a bug: 1. Disconnect from encrypted AP 2. Set crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 1 for the key 3. Schedule work 4. Reconnect to non-encrypted AP 5. Add a new key, setting the tailroom counter = 1 6. Got FW restart while pending counter is set ---> hit the warning While on it, the ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom() func was merged into its single caller ieee80211_reenable_keys (previously called ieee80211_enable_keys). Also, we reset the crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec and remove the counters warning as we just reset both. Signed-off-by: Lior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-7-luca@coelho.fi Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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committed by
Johannes Berg

parent
1c9559734e
commit
624ff4b210
@@ -843,46 +843,30 @@ void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool delay_tailroom)
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ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom);
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}
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void ieee80211_enable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
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void ieee80211_reenable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
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{
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struct ieee80211_key *key;
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struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
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ASSERT_RTNL();
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if (WARN_ON(!ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)))
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return;
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mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
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WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
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sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
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if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
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list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
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WARN_ON_ONCE(vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
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vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
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}
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list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
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increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
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ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
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}
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mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
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}
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void ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
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{
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struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
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mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
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sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
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sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
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if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
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list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
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list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) {
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vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
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vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
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}
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}
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if (ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)) {
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list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
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increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
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ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
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}
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}
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mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
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