IB/mlx5: fix uaccess beyond "count" in debugfs read/write handlers
In general, accessing userspace memory beyond the length of the supplied buffer in VFS read/write handlers can lead to both kernel memory corruption (via kernel_read()/kernel_write(), which can e.g. be triggered via sys_splice()) and privilege escalation inside userspace. In this case, the affected files are in debugfs (and should therefore only be accessible to root), and the read handlers check that *pos is zero (meaning that at least sys_splice() can't trigger kernel memory corruption). Because of the root requirement, this is not a security fix, but rather a cleanup. For the read handlers, fix it by using simple_read_from_buffer() instead of custom logic. Add min() calls to the write handlers. Fixes:4a2da0b8c0
("IB/mlx5: Add debug control parameters for congestion control") Fixes:e126ba97db
("mlx5: Add driver for Mellanox Connect-IB adapters") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
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zatwierdzone przez
Jason Gunthorpe

rodzic
222c7b1fd4
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60e6627f12
@@ -359,9 +359,6 @@ static ssize_t get_param(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
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int ret;
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char lbuf[11];
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if (*pos)
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return 0;
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ret = mlx5_ib_get_cc_params(param->dev, param->port_num, offset, &var);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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@@ -370,11 +367,7 @@ static ssize_t get_param(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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if (copy_to_user(buf, lbuf, ret))
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return -EFAULT;
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*pos += ret;
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return ret;
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return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, pos, lbuf, ret);
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}
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static const struct file_operations dbg_cc_fops = {
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