tcp/dccp: fix hashdance race for passive sessions
Multiple cpus can process duplicates of incoming ACK messages matching a SYN_RECV request socket. This is a rare event under normal operations, but definitely can happen. Only one must win the race, otherwise corruption would occur. To fix this without adding new atomic ops, we use logic in inet_ehash_nolisten() to detect the request was present in the same ehash bucket where we try to insert the new child. If request socket was not found, we have to undo the child creation. This actually removes a spin_lock()/spin_unlock() pair in reqsk_queue_unlink() for the fast path. Fixes:e994b2f0fb
("tcp: do not lock listener to process SYN packets") Fixes:079096f103
("tcp/dccp: install syn_recv requests into ehash table") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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committed by
David S. Miller

parent
7b1311807f
commit
5e0724d027
@@ -278,7 +278,9 @@ int dccp_v4_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
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struct sock *dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
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struct request_sock *req,
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struct dst_entry *dst);
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struct dst_entry *dst,
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struct request_sock *req_unhash,
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bool *own_req);
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struct sock *dccp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
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struct request_sock *req);
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