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Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

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Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
   (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.

 - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
   sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.

 - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.

 - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
  selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
  KEYS: refcount bug fix
  ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
  IMA: policy can be updated zero times
  selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
  selinux: export validatetrans decisions
  gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
  selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
  security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
  selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
  selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
  keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
  keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
  keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
  tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
  tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
  tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
  tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
2016-01-17 19:13:15 -08:00
parent 2d663b5581 acb2cfdb31
commit 5807fcaa9b
53 changed files with 1282 additions and 375 deletions
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34
security/selinux/ss/services.c
View File

@@ -778,8 +778,8 @@ out:
return -EPERM;
}
int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
u16 orig_tclass)
static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
{
struct context *ocontext;
struct context *ncontext;
@@ -794,11 +794,12 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
if (!user)
tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
else
tclass = orig_tclass;
if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n",
__func__, tclass);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -832,8 +833,13 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
while (constraint) {
if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
constraint->expr)) {
rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
tcontext, tclass);
if (user)
rc = -EPERM;
else
rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext,
ncontext,
tcontext,
tclass);
goto out;
}
constraint = constraint->next;
@@ -844,6 +850,20 @@ out:
return rc;
}
int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
u16 tclass)
{
return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
tclass, true);
}
int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
u16 orig_tclass)
{
return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
orig_tclass, false);
}
/*
* security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
* transition is directed to bounded, or not.