exec: Compute file based creds only once
Move the computation of creds from prepare_binfmt into begin_new_exec so that the creds need only be computed once. This is just code reorganization no semantic changes of any kind are made. Moving the computation is safe. I have looked through the kernel and verified none of the binfmts look at bprm->cred directly, and that there are no helpers that look at bprm->cred indirectly. Which means that it is not a problem to compute the bprm->cred later in the execution flow as it is not used until it becomes current->cred. A new function bprm_creds_from_file is added to contain the work that needs to be done. bprm_creds_from_file first computes which file bprm->executable or most likely bprm->file that the bprm->creds will be computed from. The funciton bprm_fill_uid is updated to receive the file instead of accessing bprm->file. The now unnecessary work needed to reset the bprm->cred->euid, and bprm->cred->egid is removed from brpm_fill_uid. A small comment to document that bprm_fill_uid now only deals with the work to handle suid and sgid files. The default case is already heandled by prepare_exec_creds. The function security_bprm_repopulate_creds is renamed security_bprm_creds_from_file and now is explicitly passed the file from which to compute the creds. The documentation of the bprm_creds_from_file security hook is updated to explain when the hook is called and what it needs to do. The file is passed from cap_bprm_creds_from_file into get_file_caps so that the caps are computed for the appropriate file. The now unnecessary work in cap_bprm_creds_from_file to reset the ambient capabilites has been removed. A small comment to document that the work of cap_bprm_creds_from_file is to read capabilities from the files secureity attribute and derive capabilities from the fact the user had uid 0 has been added. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
|
||||
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
|
||||
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
|
||||
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
|
||||
extern int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
|
||||
extern int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file);
|
||||
extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
|
||||
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
|
||||
extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
|
||||
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int security_syslog(int type);
|
||||
int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
|
||||
int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
|
||||
int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
|
||||
int security_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
|
||||
int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file);
|
||||
int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
|
||||
void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
|
||||
void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
|
||||
@@ -575,9 +575,10 @@ static inline int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline int security_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
||||
static inline int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
|
||||
struct file *file)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(bprm);
|
||||
return cap_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
||||
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user