exec: Compute file based creds only once
Move the computation of creds from prepare_binfmt into begin_new_exec so that the creds need only be computed once. This is just code reorganization no semantic changes of any kind are made. Moving the computation is safe. I have looked through the kernel and verified none of the binfmts look at bprm->cred directly, and that there are no helpers that look at bprm->cred indirectly. Which means that it is not a problem to compute the bprm->cred later in the execution flow as it is not used until it becomes current->cred. A new function bprm_creds_from_file is added to contain the work that needs to be done. bprm_creds_from_file first computes which file bprm->executable or most likely bprm->file that the bprm->creds will be computed from. The funciton bprm_fill_uid is updated to receive the file instead of accessing bprm->file. The now unnecessary work needed to reset the bprm->cred->euid, and bprm->cred->egid is removed from brpm_fill_uid. A small comment to document that bprm_fill_uid now only deals with the work to handle suid and sgid files. The default case is already heandled by prepare_exec_creds. The function security_bprm_repopulate_creds is renamed security_bprm_creds_from_file and now is explicitly passed the file from which to compute the creds. The documentation of the bprm_creds_from_file security hook is updated to explain when the hook is called and what it needs to do. The file is passed from cap_bprm_creds_from_file into get_file_caps so that the caps are computed for the appropriate file. The now unnecessary work in cap_bprm_creds_from_file to reset the ambient capabilites has been removed. A small comment to document that the work of cap_bprm_creds_from_file is to read capabilities from the files secureity attribute and derive capabilities from the fact the user had uid 0 has been added. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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@@ -29,13 +29,8 @@ struct linux_binprm {
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/* Should an execfd be passed to userspace? */
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have_execfd:1,
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/* It is safe to use the creds of a script (see binfmt_misc) */
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preserve_creds:1,
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/*
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* True if most recent call to security_bprm_set_creds
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* resulted in elevated privileges.
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*/
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active_secureexec:1,
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/* Use the creds of a script (see binfmt_misc) */
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execfd_creds:1,
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/*
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* Set by bprm_creds_for_exec hook to indicate a
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* privilege-gaining exec has happened. Used to set
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@@ -55,11 +50,6 @@ struct linux_binprm {
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struct file * file;
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struct cred *cred; /* new credentials */
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int unsafe; /* how unsafe this exec is (mask of LSM_UNSAFE_*) */
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/*
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* bits to clear in current->personality
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* recalculated for each bprm->file.
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*/
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unsigned int pf_per_clear;
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unsigned int per_clear; /* bits to clear in current->personality */
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int argc, envc;
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const char * filename; /* Name of binary as seen by procps */
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