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Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next-integrity

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From Mimi:

In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load
syscall.  Different signature verification methods exist for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image.  This pull request adds additional support
in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load
syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime
"secure boot" flag.  An initial IMA kselftest is included.

In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.

(David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
use case scenario, are included here.)
This commit is contained in:
James Morris
2018-12-17 11:26:46 -08:00
parent 8bd8ea195f eed9de3b4f
commit 5580b4a1a8
20 changed files with 863 additions and 93 deletions
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14
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
View File

@@ -289,12 +289,22 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
(const char *)xattr_value, rc,
(const char *)xattr_value,
xattr_len,
iint->ima_hash->digest,
iint->ima_hash->length);
if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
} else if (rc) {
break;
}
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) && rc &&
func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
(const char *)xattr_value,
xattr_len,
iint->ima_hash->digest,
iint->ima_hash->length);
if (rc) {
cause = "invalid-signature";
status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
} else {