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smb3: check xattr value length earlier

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[ Upstream commit 5fa2cffba0b82336a2244d941322eb1627ff787b ]

Coverity complains about assigning a pointer based on
value length before checking that value length goes
beyond the end of the SMB.  Although this is even more
unlikely as value length is a single byte, and the
pointer is not dereferenced until laterm, it is clearer
to check the lengths first.

Addresses-Coverity: 1467704 ("Speculative execution data leak")
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Steve French
2022-07-12 11:43:44 -05:00
committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 336936f72a
commit 52a408548a
1 changed files with 3 additions and 2 deletions
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5
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
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@@ -1000,9 +1000,7 @@ move_smb2_ea_to_cifs(char *dst, size_t dst_size,
size_t name_len, value_len, user_name_len;
while (src_size > 0) {
name = &src->ea_data[0];
name_len = (size_t)src->ea_name_length;
value = &src->ea_data[src->ea_name_length + 1];
value_len = (size_t)le16_to_cpu(src->ea_value_length);
if (name_len == 0)
@@ -1014,6 +1012,9 @@ move_smb2_ea_to_cifs(char *dst, size_t dst_size,
goto out;
}
name = &src->ea_data[0];
value = &src->ea_data[src->ea_name_length + 1];
if (ea_name) {
if (ea_name_len == name_len &&
memcmp(ea_name, name, name_len) == 0) {