dccp: limit sk_filter trim to payload
Dccp verifies packet integrity, including length, at initial rcv in
dccp_invalid_packet, later pulls headers in dccp_enqueue_skb.
A call to sk_filter in-between can cause __skb_pull to wrap skb->len.
skb_copy_datagram_msg interprets this as a negative value, so
(correctly) fails with EFAULT. The negative length is reported in
ioctl SIOCINQ or possibly in a DCCP_WARN in dccp_close.
Introduce an sk_receive_skb variant that caps how small a filter
program can trim packets, and call this in dccp with the header
length. Excessively trimmed packets are now processed normally and
queued for reception as 0B payloads.
Fixes: 7c657876b6
("[DCCP]: Initial implementation")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:

committed by
David S. Miller

parent
f4979fcea7
commit
4f0c40d944
@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ lookup:
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if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
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goto discard_and_relse;
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return sk_receive_skb(sk, skb, 1) ? -1 : 0;
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return __sk_receive_skb(sk, skb, 1, dh->dccph_doff * 4) ? -1 : 0;
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no_dccp_socket:
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if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
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