Merge tag 'copy-file-range-fixes-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux
Pull copy_file_range updates from Darrick Wong: "This fixes numerous parameter checking problems and inconsistent behaviors in the new(ish) copy_file_range system call. Now the system call will actually check its range parameters correctly; refuse to copy into files for which the caller does not have sufficient privileges; update mtime and strip setuid like file writes are supposed to do; and allows copying up to the EOF of the source file instead of failing the call like we used to. Summary: - Create a generic copy_file_range handler and make individual filesystems responsible for calling it (i.e. no more assuming that do_splice_direct will work or is appropriate) - Refactor copy_file_range and remap_range parameter checking where they are the same - Install missing copy_file_range parameter checking(!) - Remove suid/sgid and update mtime like any other file write - Change the behavior so that a copy range crossing the source file's eof will result in a short copy to the source file's eof instead of EINVAL - Permit filesystems to decide if they want to handle cross-superblock copy_file_range in their local handlers" * tag 'copy-file-range-fixes-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux: fuse: copy_file_range needs to strip setuid bits and update timestamps vfs: allow copy_file_range to copy across devices xfs: use file_modified() helper vfs: introduce file_modified() helper vfs: add missing checks to copy_file_range vfs: remove redundant checks from generic_remap_checks() vfs: introduce generic_file_rw_checks() vfs: no fallback for ->copy_file_range vfs: introduce generic_copy_file_range()
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@@ -367,20 +367,7 @@ restart:
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* lock above. Eventually we should look into a way to avoid
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* the pointless lock roundtrip.
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*/
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if (likely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_NOCMTIME))) {
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error = file_update_time(file);
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if (error)
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return error;
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}
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/*
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* If we're writing the file then make sure to clear the setuid and
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* setgid bits if the process is not being run by root. This keeps
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* people from modifying setuid and setgid binaries.
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*/
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if (!IS_NOSEC(inode))
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return file_remove_privs(file);
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return 0;
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return file_modified(file);
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}
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static int
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