Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux

Pull arm64 updates from Catalin Marinas: - Pseudo NMI support for arm64 using GICv3 interrupt priorities - uaccess macros clean-up (unsafe user accessors also merged but reverted, waiting for objtool support on arm64) - ptrace regsets for Pointer Authentication (ARMv8.3) key management - inX() ordering w.r.t. delay() on arm64 and riscv (acks in place by the riscv maintainers) - arm64/perf updates: PMU bindings converted to json-schema, unused variable and misleading comment removed - arm64/debug fixes to ensure checking of the triggering exception level and to avoid the propagation of the UNKNOWN FAR value into the si_code for debug signals - Workaround for Fujitsu A64FX erratum 010001 - lib/raid6 ARM NEON optimisations - NR_CPUS now defaults to 256 on arm64 - Minor clean-ups (documentation/comments, Kconfig warning, unused asm-offsets, clang warnings) - MAINTAINERS update for list information to the ARM64 ACPI entry * tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (54 commits) arm64: mmu: drop paging_init comments arm64: debug: Ensure debug handlers check triggering exception level arm64: debug: Don't propagate UNKNOWN FAR into si_code for debug signals Revert "arm64: uaccess: Implement unsafe accessors" arm64: avoid clang warning about self-assignment arm64: Kconfig.platforms: fix warning unmet direct dependencies lib/raid6: arm: optimize away a mask operation in NEON recovery routine lib/raid6: use vdupq_n_u8 to avoid endianness warnings arm64: io: Hook up __io_par() for inX() ordering riscv: io: Update __io_[p]ar() macros to take an argument asm-generic/io: Pass result of I/O accessor to __io_[p]ar() arm64: Add workaround for Fujitsu A64FX erratum 010001 arm64: Rename get_thread_info() arm64: Remove documentation about TIF_USEDFPU arm64: irqflags: Fix clang build warnings arm64: Enable the support of pseudo-NMIs arm64: Skip irqflags tracing for NMI in IRQs disabled context arm64: Skip preemption when exiting an NMI arm64: Handle serror in NMI context irqchip/gic-v3: Allow interrupts to be set as pseudo-NMI ...
2019-03-10 10:17:23 -07:00
parent d607526296 b855b58ac1
commit 3d8dfe75ef
64 changed files with 1215 additions and 369 deletions
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/of_address.h>
 #include <linux/of_irq.h>
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>

 #include <linux/irqchip.h>
@@ -41,6 +42,8 @@

 #include "irq-gic-common.h"

+#define GICD_INT_NMI_PRI	(GICD_INT_DEF_PRI & ~0x80)
+
 #define FLAGS_WORKAROUND_GICR_WAKER_MSM8996	(1ULL << 0)

 struct redist_region {
@@ -66,6 +69,34 @@ struct gic_chip_data {
 static struct gic_chip_data gic_data __read_mostly;
 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(supports_deactivate_key);

+/*
+ * The behaviours of RPR and PMR registers differ depending on the value of
+ * SCR_EL3.FIQ, and the behaviour of non-secure priority registers of the
+ * distributor and redistributors depends on whether security is enabled in the
+ * GIC.
+ *
+ * When security is enabled, non-secure priority values from the (re)distributor
+ * are presented to the GIC CPUIF as follow:
+ *     (GIC_(R)DIST_PRI[irq] >> 1) | 0x80;
+ *
+ * If SCR_EL3.FIQ == 1, the values writen to/read from PMR and RPR at non-secure
+ * EL1 are subject to a similar operation thus matching the priorities presented
+ * from the (re)distributor when security is enabled.
+ *
+ * see GICv3/GICv4 Architecture Specification (IHI0069D):
+ * - section 4.8.1 Non-secure accesses to register fields for Secure interrupt
+ *   priorities.
+ * - Figure 4-7 Secure read of the priority field for a Non-secure Group 1
+ *   interrupt.
+ *
+ * For now, we only support pseudo-NMIs if we have non-secure view of
+ * priorities.
+ */
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(supports_pseudo_nmis);
+
+/* ppi_nmi_refs[n] == number of cpus having ppi[n + 16] set as NMI */
+static refcount_t ppi_nmi_refs[16];
+
 static struct gic_kvm_info gic_v3_kvm_info;
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, has_rss);

@@ -232,6 +263,12 @@ static void gic_unmask_irq(struct irq_data *d)
 	gic_poke_irq(d, GICD_ISENABLER);
 }

+static inline bool gic_supports_nmi(void)
+{
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI) &&
+	       static_branch_likely(&supports_pseudo_nmis);
+}
+
 static int gic_irq_set_irqchip_state(struct irq_data *d,
 				     enum irqchip_irq_state which, bool val)
 {
@@ -287,6 +324,79 @@ static int gic_irq_get_irqchip_state(struct irq_data *d,
 	return 0;
 }

+static void gic_irq_set_prio(struct irq_data *d, u8 prio)
+{
+	void __iomem *base = gic_dist_base(d);
+
+	writeb_relaxed(prio, base + GICD_IPRIORITYR + gic_irq(d));
+}
+
+static int gic_irq_nmi_setup(struct irq_data *d)
+{
+	struct irq_desc *desc = irq_to_desc(d->irq);
+
+	if (!gic_supports_nmi())
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (gic_peek_irq(d, GICD_ISENABLER)) {
+		pr_err("Cannot set NMI property of enabled IRQ %u\n", d->irq);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * A secondary irq_chip should be in charge of LPI request,
+	 * it should not be possible to get there
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON(gic_irq(d) >= 8192))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* desc lock should already be held */
+	if (gic_irq(d) < 32) {
+		/* Setting up PPI as NMI, only switch handler for first NMI */
+		if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&ppi_nmi_refs[gic_irq(d) - 16])) {
+			refcount_set(&ppi_nmi_refs[gic_irq(d) - 16], 1);
+			desc->handle_irq = handle_percpu_devid_fasteoi_nmi;
+		}
+	} else {
+		desc->handle_irq = handle_fasteoi_nmi;
+	}
+
+	gic_irq_set_prio(d, GICD_INT_NMI_PRI);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void gic_irq_nmi_teardown(struct irq_data *d)
+{
+	struct irq_desc *desc = irq_to_desc(d->irq);
+
+	if (WARN_ON(!gic_supports_nmi()))
+		return;
+
+	if (gic_peek_irq(d, GICD_ISENABLER)) {
+		pr_err("Cannot set NMI property of enabled IRQ %u\n", d->irq);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * A secondary irq_chip should be in charge of LPI request,
+	 * it should not be possible to get there
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON(gic_irq(d) >= 8192))
+		return;
+
+	/* desc lock should already be held */
+	if (gic_irq(d) < 32) {
+		/* Tearing down NMI, only switch handler for last NMI */
+		if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ppi_nmi_refs[gic_irq(d) - 16]))
+			desc->handle_irq = handle_percpu_devid_irq;
+	} else {
+		desc->handle_irq = handle_fasteoi_irq;
+	}
+
+	gic_irq_set_prio(d, GICD_INT_DEF_PRI);
+}
+
 static void gic_eoi_irq(struct irq_data *d)
 {
 	gic_write_eoir(gic_irq(d));
@@ -350,12 +460,50 @@ static u64 gic_mpidr_to_affinity(unsigned long mpidr)
 	return aff;
 }

+static void gic_deactivate_unhandled(u32 irqnr)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key)) {
+		if (irqnr < 8192)
+			gic_write_dir(irqnr);
+	} else {
+		gic_write_eoir(irqnr);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void gic_handle_nmi(u32 irqnr, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key))
+		gic_write_eoir(irqnr);
+	/*
+	 * Leave the PSR.I bit set to prevent other NMIs to be
+	 * received while handling this one.
+	 * PSR.I will be restored when we ERET to the
+	 * interrupted context.
+	 */
+	err = handle_domain_nmi(gic_data.domain, irqnr, regs);
+	if (err)
+		gic_deactivate_unhandled(irqnr);
+}
+
 static asmlinkage void __exception_irq_entry gic_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	u32 irqnr;

 	irqnr = gic_read_iar();

+	if (gic_supports_nmi() &&
+	    unlikely(gic_read_rpr() == GICD_INT_NMI_PRI)) {
+		gic_handle_nmi(irqnr, regs);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (gic_prio_masking_enabled()) {
+		gic_pmr_mask_irqs();
+		gic_arch_enable_irqs();
+	}
+
 	if (likely(irqnr > 15 && irqnr < 1020) || irqnr >= 8192) {
 		int err;

@@ -367,12 +515,7 @@ static asmlinkage void __exception_irq_entry gic_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs
 		err = handle_domain_irq(gic_data.domain, irqnr, regs);
 		if (err) {
 			WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected interrupt received!\n");
-			if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key)) {
-				if (irqnr < 8192)
-					gic_write_dir(irqnr);
-			} else {
-				gic_write_eoir(irqnr);
-			}
+			gic_deactivate_unhandled(irqnr);
 		}
 		return;
 	}
@@ -395,6 +538,44 @@ static asmlinkage void __exception_irq_entry gic_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs
 	}
 }

+static u32 gic_get_pribits(void)
+{
+	u32 pribits;
+
+	pribits = gic_read_ctlr();
+	pribits &= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_MASK;
+	pribits >>= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_SHIFT;
+	pribits++;
+
+	return pribits;
+}
+
+static bool gic_has_group0(void)
+{
+	u32 val;
+	u32 old_pmr;
+
+	old_pmr = gic_read_pmr();
+
+	/*
+	 * Let's find out if Group0 is under control of EL3 or not by
+	 * setting the highest possible, non-zero priority in PMR.
+	 *
+	 * If SCR_EL3.FIQ is set, the priority gets shifted down in
+	 * order for the CPU interface to set bit 7, and keep the
+	 * actual priority in the non-secure range. In the process, it
+	 * looses the least significant bit and the actual priority
+	 * becomes 0x80. Reading it back returns 0, indicating that
+	 * we're don't have access to Group0.
+	 */
+	gic_write_pmr(BIT(8 - gic_get_pribits()));
+	val = gic_read_pmr();
+
+	gic_write_pmr(old_pmr);
+
+	return val != 0;
+}
+
 static void __init gic_dist_init(void)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
@@ -530,13 +711,19 @@ static void gic_update_vlpi_properties(void)
 		!gic_data.rdists.has_direct_lpi ? "no " : "");
 }

+/* Check whether it's single security state view */
+static inline bool gic_dist_security_disabled(void)
+{
+	return readl_relaxed(gic_data.dist_base + GICD_CTLR) & GICD_CTLR_DS;
+}
+
 static void gic_cpu_sys_reg_init(void)
 {
 	int i, cpu = smp_processor_id();
 	u64 mpidr = cpu_logical_map(cpu);
 	u64 need_rss = MPIDR_RS(mpidr);
 	bool group0;
-	u32 val, pribits;
+	u32 pribits;

 	/*
 	 * Need to check that the SRE bit has actually been set. If
@@ -548,28 +735,22 @@ static void gic_cpu_sys_reg_init(void)
 	if (!gic_enable_sre())
 		pr_err("GIC: unable to set SRE (disabled at EL2), panic ahead\n");

-	pribits = gic_read_ctlr();
-	pribits &= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_MASK;
-	pribits >>= ICC_CTLR_EL1_PRI_BITS_SHIFT;
-	pribits++;
+	pribits = gic_get_pribits();

-	/*
-	 * Let's find out if Group0 is under control of EL3 or not by
-	 * setting the highest possible, non-zero priority in PMR.
-	 *
-	 * If SCR_EL3.FIQ is set, the priority gets shifted down in
-	 * order for the CPU interface to set bit 7, and keep the
-	 * actual priority in the non-secure range. In the process, it
-	 * looses the least significant bit and the actual priority
-	 * becomes 0x80. Reading it back returns 0, indicating that
-	 * we're don't have access to Group0.
-	 */
-	write_gicreg(BIT(8 - pribits), ICC_PMR_EL1);
-	val = read_gicreg(ICC_PMR_EL1);
-	group0 = val != 0;
+	group0 = gic_has_group0();

 	/* Set priority mask register */
-	write_gicreg(DEFAULT_PMR_VALUE, ICC_PMR_EL1);
+	if (!gic_prio_masking_enabled()) {
+		write_gicreg(DEFAULT_PMR_VALUE, ICC_PMR_EL1);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Mismatch configuration with boot CPU, the system is likely
+		 * to die as interrupt masking will not work properly on all
+		 * CPUs
+		 */
+		WARN_ON(gic_supports_nmi() && group0 &&
+			!gic_dist_security_disabled());
+	}

 	/*
 	 * Some firmwares hand over to the kernel with the BPR changed from
@@ -824,12 +1005,6 @@ static int gic_set_affinity(struct irq_data *d, const struct cpumask *mask_val,
 #endif

 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_PM
-/* Check whether it's single security state view */
-static bool gic_dist_security_disabled(void)
-{
-	return readl_relaxed(gic_data.dist_base + GICD_CTLR) & GICD_CTLR_DS;
-}
-
 static int gic_cpu_pm_notifier(struct notifier_block *self,
 			       unsigned long cmd, void *v)
 {
@@ -866,6 +1041,8 @@ static struct irq_chip gic_chip = {
 	.irq_set_affinity	= gic_set_affinity,
 	.irq_get_irqchip_state	= gic_irq_get_irqchip_state,
 	.irq_set_irqchip_state	= gic_irq_set_irqchip_state,
+	.irq_nmi_setup		= gic_irq_nmi_setup,
+	.irq_nmi_teardown	= gic_irq_nmi_teardown,
 	.flags			= IRQCHIP_SET_TYPE_MASKED |
 				  IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE |
 				  IRQCHIP_MASK_ON_SUSPEND,
@@ -881,6 +1058,8 @@ static struct irq_chip gic_eoimode1_chip = {
 	.irq_get_irqchip_state	= gic_irq_get_irqchip_state,
 	.irq_set_irqchip_state	= gic_irq_set_irqchip_state,
 	.irq_set_vcpu_affinity	= gic_irq_set_vcpu_affinity,
+	.irq_nmi_setup		= gic_irq_nmi_setup,
+	.irq_nmi_teardown	= gic_irq_nmi_teardown,
 	.flags			= IRQCHIP_SET_TYPE_MASKED |
 				  IRQCHIP_SKIP_SET_WAKE |
 				  IRQCHIP_MASK_ON_SUSPEND,
@@ -1082,6 +1261,21 @@ static bool gic_enable_quirk_msm8996(void *data)
 	return true;
 }

+static void gic_enable_nmi_support(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+		refcount_set(&ppi_nmi_refs[i], 0);
+
+	static_branch_enable(&supports_pseudo_nmis);
+
+	if (static_branch_likely(&supports_deactivate_key))
+		gic_eoimode1_chip.flags |= IRQCHIP_SUPPORTS_NMI;
+	else
+		gic_chip.flags |= IRQCHIP_SUPPORTS_NMI;
+}
+
 static int __init gic_init_bases(void __iomem *dist_base,
 				 struct redist_region *rdist_regs,
 				 u32 nr_redist_regions,
@@ -1151,6 +1345,13 @@ static int __init gic_init_bases(void __iomem *dist_base,
 		its_cpu_init();
 	}

+	if (gic_prio_masking_enabled()) {
+		if (!gic_has_group0() || gic_dist_security_disabled())
+			gic_enable_nmi_support();
+		else
+			pr_warn("SCR_EL3.FIQ is cleared, cannot enable use of pseudo-NMIs\n");
+	}
+
 	return 0;

 out_free: