xfrm: Workaround incompatibility of ESN and async crypto
ESN for esp is defined in RFC 4303. This RFC assumes that the sequence number counters are always up to date. However, this is not true if an async crypto algorithm is employed. If the sequence number counters are not up to date on sequence number check, we may incorrectly update the upper 32 bit of the sequence number. This leads to a DOS. We workaround this by comparing the upper sequence number, (used for authentication) with the upper sequence number computed after the async processing. We drop the packet if these numbers are different. To do this, we introduce a recheck function that does this check in the ESN case. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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David S. Miller

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37159ef2c1
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3b59df46a4
@@ -273,6 +273,9 @@ struct xfrm_replay {
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int (*check)(struct xfrm_state *x,
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struct sk_buff *skb,
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__be32 net_seq);
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int (*recheck)(struct xfrm_state *x,
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struct sk_buff *skb,
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__be32 net_seq);
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void (*notify)(struct xfrm_state *x, int event);
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int (*overflow)(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb);
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};
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