security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example, read extended attributes for signatures, etc. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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@@ -395,6 +395,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
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return 0;
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}
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static int cap_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static int cap_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
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{
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return 0;
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@@ -967,6 +972,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
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set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
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set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
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set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
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set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file);
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set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
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set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid);
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set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid);
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