security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example, read extended attributes for signatures, etc. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
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#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
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#include <linux/elf.h>
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#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/fcntl.h>
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@@ -2485,10 +2486,16 @@ static int elf_header_check(struct load_info *info)
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static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
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struct load_info *info)
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{
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int err;
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info->len = len;
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if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr)))
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return -ENOEXEC;
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err = security_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
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if (err)
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return err;
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/* Suck in entire file: we'll want most of it. */
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info->hdr = vmalloc(info->len);
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if (!info->hdr)
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@@ -2515,6 +2522,10 @@ static int copy_module_from_fd(int fd, struct load_info *info)
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if (!file)
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return -ENOEXEC;
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err = security_kernel_module_from_file(file);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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err = vfs_getattr(file->f_vfsmnt, file->f_dentry, &stat);
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if (err)
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goto out;
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