kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels. For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type, and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down. This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Dieser Commit ist enthalten in:

committet von
James Morris

Ursprung
b0c8fdc7fd
Commit
29d3c1c8df
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
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u64 count;
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};
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extern const int read_idmap[];
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#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
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void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
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#else
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@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
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return 0;
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}
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static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
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const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
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[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
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[READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
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[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
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@@ -1339,3 +1339,53 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
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return 0;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
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#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
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/*
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* ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using
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* an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel
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* has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply
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* loading additional keys.
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*/
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bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
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{
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struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
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bool found = false;
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enum ima_hooks func;
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if (id >= READING_MAX_ID)
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return false;
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func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
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rcu_read_lock();
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list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
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if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
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continue;
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/*
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* A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it
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* match the func we're looking for
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*/
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if (entry->func && entry->func != func)
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continue;
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/*
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* We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA
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* hash.
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*/
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if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
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found = true;
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/*
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* We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it
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* didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does
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* won't override it, so would be a false positive.
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*/
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break;
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}
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return found;
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}
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#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
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