arm64: initialize ptrauth keys for kernel booting task
This patch uses the existing boot_init_stack_canary arch function to initialize the ptrauth keys for the booting task in the primary core. The requirement here is that it should be always inline and the caller must never return. As pointer authentication too detects a subset of stack corruption so it makes sense to place this code here. Both pointer authentication and stack canary codes are protected by their respective config option. Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Catalin Marinas

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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/random.h>
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#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
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#if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR) || defined(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH)
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# include <asm/stackprotector.h>
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#else
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static inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
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