Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net

Mostly simple overlapping changes.

For example, David Ahern's adjacency list revamp in 'net-next'
conflicted with an adjacency list traversal bug fix in 'net'.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
David S. Miller
2016-10-30 12:42:58 -04:00
1707 changed files with 35401 additions and 13865 deletions

View File

@@ -418,6 +418,7 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet, gfp_t gfp)
__u8 has_data = 0;
int gso = 0;
int pktcount = 0;
int auth_len = 0;
struct dst_entry *dst;
unsigned char *auth = NULL; /* pointer to auth in skb data */
@@ -510,7 +511,12 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet, gfp_t gfp)
list_for_each_entry(chunk, &packet->chunk_list, list) {
int padded = SCTP_PAD4(chunk->skb->len);
if (pkt_size + padded > tp->pathmtu)
if (chunk == packet->auth)
auth_len = padded;
else if (auth_len + padded + packet->overhead >
tp->pathmtu)
goto nomem;
else if (pkt_size + padded > tp->pathmtu)
break;
pkt_size += padded;
}

View File

@@ -3422,6 +3422,12 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* Now that we know we at least have a chunk header,
* do things that are type appropriate.
*/
@@ -3453,12 +3459,6 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,
}
}
/* Report violation if chunk len overflows */
ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length));
if (ch_end > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end;
} while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb));

View File

@@ -4687,7 +4687,7 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_disable_fragments(struct sock *sk, int len,
static int sctp_getsockopt_events(struct sock *sk, int len, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen)
{
if (len <= 0)
if (len == 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (len > sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe))
len = sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe);
@@ -6430,6 +6430,9 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {